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Summary 
There has been an explosion of discourse about risk and risk assessment beginning in 
the 1980s, growing during the 1990s and continuing to accelerate. This has extended to the 
arena of mental health care where there is an expectation for services to assess and manage 
risks, and high quality clinical assessment has been re-described to incorporate risk 
assessment. This expectation obscures certain problems with risk assessment such as its 
accuracy, the selective nature of the risks prioritised, and the potential for it to enhance 
stigma and encourage defensive practice. It also obscures how risk assessment emerged out 
of a particular social and historical context, and was linked to high profile homicides, the 
introduction of community care, and a cultural emphasis on accountability and litigation. This 
thesis reconceptualises risk assessment as a hegemonic discourse within mental health care 
through an engagement with the theoretical concepts of the logics approach, rooted in 
poststructuralist discourse theory. It turns towards the actual clinical practice of completing 
risk assessments through analysing assessments completed within an Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies service. An articulation of the social, political and fantasmatic logics 
influencing these risk assessments is offered. These assessments are characterised as 
functioning according to the social logics of well-oiled administration and preservation 
where bureaucratic process is prioritised, contingency ironed out and managing potential 
risks to the service predominates. These social logics become comprehensible within a 
competitive commissioning context with political logics of difference preventing an 
equivalence between practitioners and clients. Fantasmatic logics generated an investment in 
the process of completing risk assessments with a well-documented assessment offering 
protection to practitioners and the service from the obstacles that clients could become. 
Implications are discussed and clinical perceptions of risks offered as an alternative social 
practice that recognises the radical contingency of the social world. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Problematisation 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter introduces the empirical context and theoretical orientation of the 
research. It discusses its location within the literature and the initial moments of puzzlement 
that led to the development of this project. From here, the thesis turns to the social practice of 
risk assessment within therapeutic settings and considers its context, some problems with it 
and some of its consequences as part of an archaeological investigation. The chapter then 
moves in a genealogical direction and considers the ignoble beginnings of risk assessment 
within mental health following the killing of Jonathan Zito by Christopher Clunis. It ends by 
formalising the research questions being studied. 
 
1.2 Introduction 
 This thesis took as its object the assessment of risk within primary care. The focus 
was not on one particular type of risk, such as the risk an individual posed to him or herself, 
rather, the focus was on the multiple ways risk surfaced and the way in which it was 
understood and responded to. This did therefore include the risk someone posed to him or 
herself, but also the risk posed to others, to services and to the wider social order. Risk can 
manifest in various ways; it can be explicitly stated by the actors involved, it can lurk beneath 
the surface, being talked around without being directly mentioned, or it can inform the 
structure of an encounter itself. All such manifestations of risk were relevant here. 
 
1.2.1 Empirical context and material. 
 The particular context studied was duty screening assessments completed within an 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies service (IAPT) in primary care. IAPT is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. It was launched as a government initiative in 2008 and 
involved the creation of new psychological therapy services across England to treat 
depression and anxiety disorders (Department of Health, 2008). This was a substantial 
development which involved an additional investment in the National Health Service (NHS) 
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of £173 million per annum, and by spring 2011, the majority of England had an IAPT 
service, 3,660 new cognitive behavioural therapy workers had been trained and over 600,000 
people had begun treatment (Clark et al., 2009; IAPT, n.d.). These services were, and still are, 
seen as an important part of the overall implementation of the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) guidelines for depression and anxiety disorders.1 In the current range of 
guidelines for depression and anxiety, NICE (2009, 2011) recommend a range of 
psychological and pharmacological treatments, and also specify a framework for the 
provision of services which is referred to as a stepped-care model. 
IAPT slots into this system of stepped care and provides interventions at the primary 
care level (steps 2 and 3), with services at the secondary care level consisting of specialist 
mental health services (step 4). The stepped-care model is described as one where people 
receive the “most effective yet least burdensome treatment…and which has a self-correcting 
mechanism built in (that is, if a person does not benefit from an initial intervention they are 
‘stepped up’ to a more complex intervention)” (NICE, 2009, p. 122). The duty screening 
assessments that formed the primary empirical material for this research are used to assess 
people’s suitability for the interventions IAPT offer, which include, at step two, guided self-
help based upon cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), group-based CBT and computerised 
CBT, and at step three, individual CBT.2 Alternatively, they are used to inform a referral to 
specialist services. These assessments explicitly include an assessment of the risk an 
individual poses to him or herself, or to or from others, which is considered a key component 
of all mental health assessments and the stepped-care approach: people who present a 
“considerable immediate risk to themselves or others” are to be referred “urgently to 
specialist mental health services” (NICE, 2009, p. 18).  
 This thesis investigated the way in which risk was assessed within an IAPT service. 
This was done through analysing audio recordings of the duty screening assessments. 
Additional empirical material consisted of discourse about risk from a range of texts: policy 
documents, NICE guidelines, newspapers, mental health textbooks as well as theoretical and 
empirical studies.  
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1.2.2 Theoretical stance and strategy. 
As with all research, the empirical material was considered from a particular 
theoretical orientation. The research was informed by the view that meaning and the social 
world can never be fully, or permanently, fixed. This ontological stance was informed by the 
approach to discourse theory elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe (2014). Following Laclau and 
Mouffe, this did not mean the social world was seen as a free-for-all where anything goes as 
some crude characterisations of social constructionist approaches contend. Rather, the view 
was that discourses can attain a hegemonic position that may be conceptualised as a partial 
fixation or stabilisation of meaning.3 These hegemonic discourses can be powerful, hard to 
challenge, and appear, crucially, as taken for granted facts or practices structuring the social. 
However, such discourses, despite attempts made to cover up their contingency, can never 
achieve complete sedimentation and so remain vulnerable to resistance and re-articulation.  
There is therefore a radical contingency about the elements, linguistic and material, 
that constitute the social world, leaving a structural incompleteness in any system and a 
fundamental lack in the identity of subjects. Applying this to risk assessments, they become a 
social practice consisting of contingent elements located within a wider system of meaning. 
There can never be a full or complete risk assessment and contingency can be seen in various 
ways such as the risks being prioritised, who is at risk, how something is understood as a risk 
and what risks are excluded. Rather than being an essential and necessary component of 
mental health assessments, risk assessment becomes one way of doing things with a 
particular history and is linked to the projects of certain social actors. 
This approach was applied in relation to the risk assessments studied here. More 
specifically, the thesis employed Glynos and Howarth’s (2007) logics approach to discourse, 
which has grown out of the work of Laclau and Mouffe. The logics approach provides a 
framework for empirical, interpretative and critical research within the social sciences. It is a 
problem-driven approach to research which begins by confronting puzzling issues in the 
present. Then, through a process of reflection and engagement, a problem, or 
problematisation, can be constituted. In this case, Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical 
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work, supplemented by the concept of hegemony (Howarth, 2002), informs the process of 
problematisation. This involves “a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see 
how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how these different 
solutions result from a specific form of problematization” (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984, p. 
389).     
Following an archaeological and genealogical problematisation of risk assessment, a 
more detailed outline of the theoretical concepts and ontological presuppositions of the logics 
approach will be provided in the research strategy chapter. The three logics that constitute 
this approach are social, political and fantasmatic logics (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Social 
logics refer to patterned social practices and can be thought of as the rules or grammar of a 
practice; political logics show the institution of a particular practice or regime; and 
fantasmatic logics refer to the grip a particular practice has over us. In short, these logics 
enable a characterisation of what practices are (social logics), how they came into being and 
remain so (political) and why (fantasmatic). 
The analysis of the audio recorded risk assessments will then be presented. This will 
involve a characterisation of the empirical material using the logics framework. The argument 
constructed over the course of the thesis should be thought of as a critical explanation made 
through a process of articulation. The thesis will conclude by considering the extent to which 
this research offers a plausible account of its research object. This will involve a discussion of 
the research process and consideration will be given to what this can tell us about both risk 
assessment and a logics approach. This follows Howarth’s (2000) pragmatic view for 
evaluating research using a discourse approach “by the degree to which it makes possible 
new and meaningful interpretations of the social and political phenomena it investigates” (p. 
130). 
 
1.2.3 Place of research. 
 Within the academic literature, there has been an explosion of discourse about risk 
and risk assessment beginning in the 1980s, growing during the 1990s and continuing to 
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accelerate. As one example, Risk Analysis: An International Journal, first released in 1981, is 
a journal published by the Society for Risk Analysis and covers issues relating to the social 
sciences and mathematics (Wiley Online Library, n.d.). In the 1990s, this journal published 
523 articles and between 2000 and 2009 this rose to 2,379 articles. In the last ten years it has 
doubled its number of pages and impact factor, and has gone from having four issues per year 
in the 1980s, to six in the 1990s, to twelve by 2009.  
Within healthcare, Risk Management and Healthcare Policy was first published in 
2008 and in 2014-15 published fifty three articles compared with fifteen in the first two years 
(Dovepress, n.d.). This increasing appetite for risk can also be seen when searching academic 
databases. Searching CINAHL Complete, MEDLINE with full text and PsycARTICLES in 
February 2015 using the term risk produced 2,109,852 articles, of which 1,973,962 (93.6%) 
were published since 1990. A slightly more refined search strategy of: (1) risk assess* OR 
risk manag*, (2) therap* and (3) mental health OR mental illness returned 341, 535 results, of 
which 331,290 (97%) were published since 1990.  
Within this broad area of therapeutic risk assessment or management within mental 
health care, the published research varies in scope and intention. Broadly speaking, there is a 
body of work discussing methods of risk assessment (Buchanan, 1999), risk assessment 
instruments (Phull, 2012), different theoretical approaches to risk assessment (Doctor, 2004; 
Holloway, 2004; Witteman, 2004), and assessment of different kinds of risk, such as risk of 
violence (Langan, 2010) and risk of suicide (Cutcliffe & Barker, 2004). There is also work 
that has explored the practice of risk assessment from the perspective of those involved 
(Aflague & Ferszt, 2010; Godin, 2004; Moerman, 2012), and approaches using 
poststructuralist ideas to engage with risk (Crowe & Carlyle, 2003; Rose, 1998).  
This thesis falls within the latter camp but offers an alternative way of engaging with 
risk assessment practices through the use of the logics framework and the distinct ontological 
position this offers. This involves an open engagement with work coming from alternative 
ontological and epistemological positions, but an attempt to understand such work from the 
ontological position of radical contingency. The thesis is also unique in engaging with actual 
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clinical practice as the source of empirical data, which is informed by the view of there being 
an overreliance on interviews within qualitative research (Potter & Hepburn, 2005), and a 
desire to place clinical practice centre stage. The logics approach is a relatively recent 
framework for empirical research and has typically been utilised to engage with issues of 
policy (Clarke, 2012; Glynos, Klimecki, & Willmott, 2012; Glynos, Speed, & West, 2015; 
Hawkins, 2015) and so the empirical context being studied here is also novel for this 
approach, although the logics frame has been used to study interview data relating to business 
education (Andersson & Öhman, 2015) and business board room interactions (Thompson & 
Willmott, 2015).  
 
1.2.4 Puzzling issues. 
The puzzling issues began from my own experience working within an IAPT service 
as a Psychological Wellbeing Practitioner, although not the service involved in this research, 
where I provided NICE recommended interventions and completed risk assessments. A range 
of questions arose from this experience. The training materials for the psychological 
wellbeing practitioner role describe risk assessment as essential and provide a recommended 
format for assessing risk: firstly assess suicidal intent, then specific action plans; following 
this, there is guidance on how to assess current or past actions, access to means, and then 
preventative factors; finally, risk to others, and risk of neglect should be assessed (Richards & 
Whyte, 2011). This recommended format is accompanied by “empathy dots”, and these are 
supposed to remind workers to “use statements of empathy at regular times in the interview”, 
although no examples of empathy statements are provided (Richards & Whyte, 2011, pp. 13–
14). For subsequent interviews, an example of how to introduce a risk assessment is 
provided:  
Last time we talked, I mentioned that sometimes when people are depressed they can 
feel so despondent that they feel like taking their own lives. You said that [insert 
summary of last risk assessment]. Can you tell me if there has been any change in 
this? (Richards & Whyte, 2011, p. 16) 
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The way in which people responded to the risk assessment had an impact on the 
services they received and these questions were asked in the context of a therapeutic 
assessment typically completed by telephone. My experience of this work raised a number of 
questions for me such as: does asking standardised questions in this way influence the 
responses given? Can this information actually be obtained in such a straightforward way? 
How does the way in which the questions are asked inform the responses given? How does 
the context of the therapeutic assessment influence the responses? Would people respond 
differently if they knew how it may affect the service they receive?  
 
1.2.5 Tentative questions. 
Completing these risk assessments was seen as the single most important aspect of an 
encounter. When there was a concern about someone’s level of risk which led to a referral to 
specialist services, the information would be documented and passed onto the relevant 
service. This could often be a process which evoked considerable anxiety about documenting 
information and completing paperwork as well as about the actual issue itself. Once a referral 
had been accepted, there would be no further involvement. This raised wider questions about 
risk assessments which this research will grapple with: why have risk assessments come to be 
seen as so important? Why are they carried out in the way they are? Are there alternatives? 
What influenced the development of risk assessments? What risks do they engage with and 
what risks do they neglect? What consequences do they have, generally, as well as in relation 
to views of services, patients, therapists? How do they connect to service organisation?  
These questions describe the initial moment of puzzlement, and are used to inform 
the next stage of the research process, which is the development of the specific processes of 
problematisation. This is accomplished through an archaeological and genealogical 
consideration of risk assessment. 
 
1.3 Problematising Risk Assessments – An Archaeological Contribution 
1.3.1 Risk assessment – some context. 
8 
 
Risk has become a familiar concept and frequently encountered term in twenty-first 
century life. We meet risk in many areas of life including the classroom, the clinic and the 
law court. Risk pervades both public and private organisations. It is, as Power (2004) puts it, 
“all around us” (p. 9). Consequently, it can appear as a taken-for-granted concept which does 
not require defining. However, as a signifier, it is used in multiple ways; it refers to the 
possibility of an unwelcome consequence; the possibility of harm or loss, such as financial 
loss; the possibility of an error; a person or thing likely to produce a good or bad outcome in 
some respect; and so the list goes on (Risk, n.d.). The standard approach taken within the 
arena of mental health is to see risk as a combined measure of the subjective probability of an 
event and the events likely impact (Undrill, 2007).  
In The Risk Management of Everything, Power (2004) describes how since the 1990s 
it has become increasingly important for companies to have a “broad and formal risk 
management programme” in order to be considered effective (p. 11). Consistent with the 
surge of academic literature focusing on risk mentioned above, he describes an explosion of 
discourse about risk management which emerged not from government sources initially, 
although they have adopted risk management thinking, but from private sector companies 
who opportunistically used risk to redefine their own strategic utility. The contemporary 
emphasis on organisational governance and corporate responsibility, as well as new 
information systems and certain crises, has created an environment where risk can be 
deployed in this way. Power (2004) calls risk an organising concept which has created a 
“new style of organisational discipline and accountability” (p. 9).  
 
1.3.1.1 IAPTs emergence.  
It is helpful therefore to conceptualise risk and risk assessment as a historically 
situated discourse linked to specific projects and goals of particular social actors. Within the 
field of mental health, there are a range of professional groups: psychiatry, clinical 
psychology, psychotherapy, social work, mental health nursing being just a few; and different 
epistemological approaches towards mental health such as biological, psychoanalytic, 
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systemic, cognitive, behavioural and so forth.4 The risk assessments studied here were located 
within an IAPT service, a new project which emerged from this recent historical context. This 
project grew out of the liberal, utilitarian approach espoused by Layard (2003) in his work 
looking at unemployment, welfare and more recent work seeking to measure and maximise 
happiness. The development of IAPT is said to be a consequence of the increasing 
significance of NICE as well as particular economic and clinical arguments (Clark et al., 
2009). The depression report was a key document involved in establishing IAPT.  
 
The depression report. 
This report drew upon a range of elements to make the case for new psychological 
therapy services in the form of IAPT. The report begins with an affective appeal: “crippling 
depression and chronic anxiety are the biggest causes of misery in Britain today. They are the 
great submerged problem, which shame keeps out of sight” (Layard et al., 2006, p. 1). The 
argument presented for new psychological therapy services describes depression and anxiety 
as illnesses that affect one in three families in Britain. The strategic success of the report can 
be helpfully understood through considering Laclau and Mouffe’s (2014) description of a 
logic of equivalence. A logic of equivalence works by simplifying social space into opposing 
camps, creating a chain of equivalential identity between social actors in opposition to a 
common enemy. Here, IAPT, NICE, families and people with these ‘illnesses’ are aligned 
with ‘evidence-based psychological therapies’, CBT in particular. This favouring of CBT is 
better understood through reconceptualising it as currently achieving hegemonic status within 
the world of psychological therapy rather than being ‘better’ per se than other therapies 
(Pilgrim, 2011). No less significant, there is also an equivalence with economic arguments in 
favour of reducing state expenditure on incapacity benefits and increasing productivity and 
tax revenues. This chain of equivalence sets itself in opposition to unspecified “endless or 
backward-looking treatments” as well as political actors not willing to support IAPT: 
“everyone who wants something to be done should write to their MP calling for action” 
(Layard et al., 2006, pp. 1–2). 
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Clinical governance. 
NICE came into being in 1999 as part of the government at the time desiring 
evidence based clinical practice and cost-effectiveness within the NHS. NICE was 
established to appraise research and provide recommendations for treatment, which would 
then be audited through a process of clinical governance as set out in A First Class Service 
(Department of Health, 1998).5 This was said to reduce confusion for clinicians and patients 
about expected care. Clinical governance was seen as a way of making services accountable 
for providing recommended treatments and for improving service quality, with audit, 
regulation and patient involvement being key components (McPherson, Richardson, & 
Leroux, 2003). This made the chief executives of NHS Trusts accountable for quality of 
service provision as well as financial responsibilities, and incorporated an obligation to have 
clear policies specifying risk practices including systematic risk assessment and risk 
reduction programmes. This was seen as a way of overcoming the failings of a market based 
system which prioritised finances and activity, not clinical quality (McSherry, Pearce, & 
Tingle, 2011). 
Clinical governance grew out of the model of corporate governance in business 
which had been introduced by companies to safeguard investments and assets, and minimise 
company risks (McSherry et al., 2011). Corporate governance was seen as having value in the 
public sector and so was introduced into the NHS with the focus being on accountability, 
transparency and integrity. As corporate governance focused on financial and operational 
success, clinical aspects of healthcare provision were not accounted for and it was here that 
clinical governance was seen as a way of ensuring overall, total governance.    
If clinical governance was seen as a way of addressing some market failings, key 
elements of a market-based system, in particular choice and competition, have been extended 
in recent NHS reforms (Glynos et al., 2015). This has also included a reduced role for the 
government in daily management of the NHS and a competitive commissioning process 
whereby any qualified provider can bid to provide services with the view that this will create 
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innovation and improvements.6 This competitive context, and cultural embracement of risk 
thinking, intensifies the need for organisations to have an effective risk assessment and 
reduction programme in order to win service provision contracts.  
 
1.3.1.2 Juridical and political context. 
Recent government policy also makes clear the expectation that services should be 
assessing all types of risk, and managing and reducing risks. Risk assessment is described as 
“an intrinsic aspect of all high-quality clinical assessment and not a separate activity” 
(Department of Health, 2011, p. 77). Services are not expected to prevent all incidents of 
violence but there are too many cases where more could and should have been done and 
inquiries often highlight the same problems. Good risk management is said to involve: good 
record-keeping, access to information about a person’s history and risks; addressing a 
person’s needs; effective communication with other agencies; appropriate information 
sharing; effective risk assessment and management which incorporates risk posed to self, to 
others, from others and safeguarding issues; a consideration of risk and protective factors; 
clarity about objectives and responsibilities; and effective use of the Mental Health Act.7  
The political importance given to managing risk was underscored by the publication 
of the Best Practice in Managing Risk document which emphasised the dual objectives of 
patient autonomy and public safety (Department of Health, 2007). A good therapeutic 
relationship was re-described to include an “objective assessment of risk” as well as 
“sympathetic support” (Department of Health, 2007, p. 3). The aim of this document was to 
embed risk management in daily clinical practice as part of the Care Programme Approach. 
This document also announced the planned introduction of supervised community treatment; 
“a new power…to ensure that high-risk and vulnerable patients receive the treatment that 
they need after hospital discharge” (p. 3). Sixteen best practice points were outlined followed 
by a discussion of various standardised ‘risk tools’ for assessing multiple risks, risk of 
violence or sexual violence, risk of antisocial or offending behaviour, and risk of suicide or 
self-harm. The document has since been updated stressing its continued importance and 
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providing additional guidance on implementation within services (Department of Health, 
2009).  
The contemporary emphasis on accountability and litigation intensifies the role the 
legal system plays in relation to risk. The legal view of risk is concerned with obligation or 
responsibility for loss, harm or damage. Mental health professionals are said to have a duty of 
care towards patients which includes an adequate knowledge of mental illnesses and 
treatments, and an application of such knowledge in the best interests of a patient (Harrison, 
1997). Professionals can face legal action and be judged on this which involves considering 
recommendations of relevant professional bodies such as the Royal College of Psychiatry, or 
the Health and Care Professions Council, and government guidelines which specify standards 
of care. The legal system therefore complements the political emphasis upon risk and 
becomes the arbiter for the implementation of government policy. The juridical and political 
may not always align however, and the link between the political, juridical and clinical is best 
seen as one in constant flux. One example is the recent emphasis on protecting the civil 
liberties of patients being used to challenge restrictive political and clinical perspectives (as 
illustrated in the genealogy section below). Although this may have changed little in practice 
as patients’ credibility during legal proceedings is typically questioned from the outset 
(Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014).  
This context elevates juridical and political processes over clinical ones and makes 
the possibility of facing legal action the risk people strive to avoid, and so constructs patients 
as a source of threat to professionals. It also makes visible the additional role of the mental 
health practitioner; not only should practitioners be prioritising their patients’ best interests 
from a clinical perspective, they should firstly be ensuring they follow legal and political 
guidance. This shows the social role granted to psychiatry and related professions, which 
Rose (1996) describes as being a “technician of social order” (p. 6). Put more plainly, there is 
a responsibility “for the welfare not only of…patients or clients, but more broadly for the 
public at large” and an expectation that individual practitioners “should be able to assess risk 
and take appropriate action” (Duggan, 1997, p. 1). 
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The administrative task of assessing and managing risk has therefore become a part 
of everyday, routine practice within mental health, as well as a legal obligation. Additionally, 
risk assessment within IAPT is considered important as the treatments they provide are not 
appropriate for those with “significant risk” (Clark et al., 2009, p. 912). It becomes important 
then to identify those with significant risk not only because of the actual risk but because of 
an additional risk of treatment not being appropriate. As the service is not designed for people 
with significant risk, this creates an additional risk in terms of clinical governance as the 
service could be held accountable should there be a risk incident. Like in The Depression 
Report, this creates an equivalence with juridical and political processes, which given the 
context outlined above, has an important strategic value in the ability to provide mental 
health services.  
 IAPT has therefore neatly slotted into this legal, political and organisational 
framework and their risk assessments follow these recommendations. In doing this, a number 
of tensions between clinical and juridical thought are smoothed over and clinical conceptions 
are subordinated to legal-political ones. This is done by incorporating legal-political 
conceptions into clinical discourse, such as prioritising the responsibility to protect the public 
from someone who may become violent as opposed to prioritising treatment for that person’s 
mental health. However, there may be times when these conflict and it is not clear if, once 
established, clinical services remain subordinate to juridical and political processes in terms 
of their daily operations. The reality may not be so straightforward and this chain of 
equivalence, or subordination, may, at times, dissolve. After all, there has been longstanding 
conflict, tension and conceptual disagreement between medical and juridical approaches to 
disorder (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014). What is clear is that these developments neglect a number 
of debates that have taken place in relation to risk assessment and have not gone 
unchallenged. 
  
 
 
14 
 
1.3.2 Risk assessment – some problems. 
This legal-political discourse takes for granted that risk is necessarily a bad thing that 
should be minimised which the focus then shifts towards. However, focusing on risk itself 
has produced the view that any definition of risk is a political act which is inherently 
controversial due to the way the chosen definition “can affect the outcome of policy debates, 
the allocation of resources among safety measures, and the distribution of political power in 
society” (Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984, p. 124). Defining risk therefore involves making 
value judgements. As Ewald (1991) puts it: “nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in 
reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the 
danger, considers the event” (p. 199). One value judgement is the importance given to 
potential undesirable consequences in a given situation. The legal-political stance also 
portrays the assessment and management of risk as necessary and straightforward. However, 
within risk assessment literature this view has been problematised. 
 
1.3.2.1 Accuracy of assessment. 
Despite this embracing of risk assessment, it has not been shown to be effective in 
accurately assessing, predicting or reducing the risk of suicide or violence. A review of the 
effectiveness of risk assessments concluded that “there is little evidence that this approach is 
effective in reducing risk of harm to self or others” (Wand, 2012, p. 6). In relation to 
violence, the Royal College of Psychiatry (2008) describe an absence of evidence around risk 
assessment tools reducing or preventing violent incidents and state that “accurate prediction 
is never possible for individual patients…the risks posed by those with mental disorders are 
much less susceptible to prediction because of the multiplicity of, and complex interrelation 
of, factors underlying a person’s behaviour” (p. 10). Similarly, with suicide, accurate 
prediction of individual suicides has been described as impossible, even when knowing 
information about an individual that is connected with suicidal intent (Harriss & Hawton, 
2005). 
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1.3.2.2 Methods of risk assessment. 
The difficulty of assessing risk accurately can be seen in the debate over methods of 
risk assessment which have focused on the ability of risk assessments to accurately predict 
risk rather than reduce risk. Historically, the two dominant approaches to risk assessment 
have been the unstructured, clinical approach and the statistical, actuarial approach (Lamont 
& Brunero, 2009). Clinical approaches are based on the judgement of a professional 
following an assessment. In contrast, actuarial approaches involve using risk assessment tools 
to identify static or historical factors associated with an increased risk, referred to as risk 
factors.  
Different theoretical approaches also influence the way risk assessment is understood 
and carried out. Writing within the psychodynamic tradition, and against actuarial 
approaches, Doctor (2004) describes the importance of entering a patient’s inner world and 
object relationships, and confronting the feelings which emerge within the transference and 
countertransference. From this view, actuarial approaches become “a defence against real 
contact with violent patients” (p. 267). Assessment of risk is said to require an ability to 
tolerate unbearable psychic pain and an awareness of the extent to which we try to avoid 
reality. Elsewhere, risk assessment has been described as a directive activity which conflicts 
with particular schools of thought such as person-centred counselling where an assessment 
may be viewed as an experiential, holistic process rather than a scientific endeavour 
(Moerman, 2012).  
The actuarial approach to risk assessment was adopted in response to the 
shortcomings of the traditional clinical approach which was seen as anecdotal and critiqued 
for being subjective, unreliable and based on insufficient information. The accuracy of this 
method was described as being no better than chance, and clinicians were not felt to possess 
particular expertise in relation to predicting risk, with knowledge of past violence seen as 
more accurate (Langan, 2010; Monahan, 1981). The actuarial approach, however, is not 
without problems. 
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1.3.2.3 Base rate problems.  
One problem with the actuarial approach relates to what is known as the base rate 
problem, which highlights the difficulty of predicting a behaviour that occurs rarely within a 
population being studied, such as violent behaviour in the general population. Risk 
assessment tools are considered in terms of sensitivity, the ability to correctly identify those 
at risk, and specificity, the ability to correctly identify those not at risk (Duggan, 1997). Tests 
have four possibilities: correctly identifying those at risk (true positive), correctly identifying 
those not at risk (true negative), incorrectly identifying those at risk as not being at risk (false 
negative), or incorrectly identifying those not at risk as being at risk (false positive). A ratio is 
derived from these possibilities to produce sensitivity (true positives/true positives and false 
negatives) and specificity (true negatives/true negatives and false positives) values. A test 
with low sensitivity will have a high number of false negatives and a test with low specificity 
will have a high number of false positives. Positive and negative predictive values are 
calculated from these tests. Positive predictive values are the proportion of individuals 
correctly predicted by a test to be at risk and negative predictive values, the proportion of 
individuals correctly predicted to not be at risk. These values are influenced by the prevalence 
of the risk behaviour being studied. Using Duggan’s (1997) hypothetical example, in a 
population of 100 people, where 10 are violent, a test with 90% sensitivity and 95% 
specificity would give a positive predictive value of 64% and a negative predictive value of 
99%.8 This would mean 64% (9 people) of those the test identifies as being violent would 
actually be violent, and 36% (5 people) identified as being violent would be false positives. 
This test would correctly identify 99% (85 people) of non-violent people and 1% (1 person) 
would be false negatives. Figure 1 represents this.  
17 
 
Note. Adapted from “Introduction” by C. Duggan, 1997, British Journal of Psychiatry, 170 
(suppl. 32), p. 2. Copyright 1997 by The Royal College of Psychiatrists.  
 
When the prevalence rate changes to 10 in 1000 people (1%), the same test would 
maintain a high negative predictive value of 99% but the positive predictive value reduces to 
13%. As shown in figure 2, this means the test would incorrectly identify 59 people as violent 
who are not, and, as before, incorrectly identify one violent individual as non-violent. In this 
case, the majority (86.8%) of those the test identifies as violent would not actually be violent. 
This clearly shows a problem with the application of such tests in cases where the behaviour 
being studied is rare within the population like violence and suicide. As Szmukler (2001) puts 
it: “even a test with an impossible 0.9 accuracy for both true positives and true negatives will 
be wrong more than nine times out of ten at a base rate of 1%” (p. 85). Even when classifying 
patients into high or low risk categories, an empirically derived hypothetical example, with 
an optimal risk assessment, showed that to prevent one homicide by patients with 
schizophrenia, 35,000 successful individual risk management programmes would be required 
Figure 1. Test results 
  TRULY VIOLENT 
  
 Yes No 
 
 
   
TEST 
 
Positive 
  
9 
 
5 
 
 
Negative 
 
1 
 
 
85 
Sensitivity 90% 
Specificity 95% 
Positive predictive value 64% 
Negative predictive value 99% 
 
Figure 1. Results for a risk tool used in a population of 100 with 10 people (10%) being 
violent. 
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(Large, Ryan, Singh, Paton, & Nielssen, 2011). This has led to the suggestion of a need to 
discuss acceptable levels of false positives, described as a moral issue (Buchanan & Leese, 
2001; Szmukler, 2003). Discussing the base rate problem elsewhere, Szmukler and Rose 
(2013) conclude that the events we are most concerned with preventing “because of their 
infrequency are not statistically predictable in a clinically useful way when it comes to an 
individual patient” (p. 129).9 
 
  
Note. Adapted from “Introduction” by C. Duggan, 1997, British Journal of Psychiatry, 170 
(suppl. 32), p. 2. Copyright 1997 by The Royal College of Psychiatrists. 
 
1.3.2.4 Causal explanations. 
Actuarial approaches, then, involve converting risk into a numerical problem and are 
based upon information about groups which may not be relevant to a given individual. The 
problems with prediction has led to calls for them to be used with great caution or abandoned 
Figure 2. Test results 
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Sensitivity 90% 
Specificity 95% 
Positive predictive value 13% 
Negative predictive value 99% 
 
Figure 2. Results for a risk tool used in a population of 1000 with 10 people (1%) being 
violent. 
 
19 
 
(Hart, Michie, & Cooke, 2007), and for their use to be restricted to people with clear risk 
factors (Swanson, 2008). In Buchanan’s (1999) critique of actuarial approaches, he describes 
how mathematical models only use one type of probability, probability based on chance. 
Drawing on the philosophy of Hume, he claims there is an alternative type of probability 
based on causes and describes how the probability of an aircraft crashing could be based on 
how many aircrafts crash on the relevant route or on an inspection of the state of the aircraft. 
Buchanan concludes that it is not appropriate to rely purely on mathematical approaches to 
assessing risk, although he claims the future of these approaches is not in doubt, and there 
must be a consideration of causes or explanations of risk behaviour which requires a clinical 
approach. 
While Buchanan points to the limits of prediction and thus rejects the idea of simple 
causal laws, prioritising causes or explanations of risk behaviour relies upon the idea that this 
can be achieved through identifying a causal pattern across situations. The strength of this 
approach is that it rejects the false choice between universal, causal laws lacking in context 
and particular, case-specific descriptions lacking in applicability. However, as Glynos and 
Howarth (2007) describe in their critique of causal mechanisms, the idea of causal patterns 
remains tied to a causal law ideal based on a mechanistic understanding of causality which 
cannot be realised in understanding social phenomena.  
Causal patterns themselves require an explanation, which relies upon 
contextualisation, and, in relation to the social sciences, such patterns require subjects to 
maintain them. As they can be modified, through knowledge of them for example, a causal 
view falls apart. An alternative would be to explain risk behaviour purely through referring to 
an individual’s inner states. This would be equally problematic for neglecting social practices 
which constitute such inner states. An ontology of lack offers a way of avoiding such 
individualism without returning purely to a privileging of social structures. More will be said 
about this in the strategy section below. 
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1.3.2.5 Structured professional judgement. 
Nevertheless, a combination of the clinical and actuarial approach has been described 
as the preferred method of risk assessment (Lamont & Brunero, 2009). This has been called a 
structured professional judgement or structured clinical judgement and makes use of 
empirically validated risk factors, clinical experience and knowledge about the individual 
being assessed. The argument for this has been forcefully made by Maden (2005) who says 
“the evidence is clear” and that attempts by psychiatrists to distance themselves from 
violence damages the “profession’s public image” (p. 121). He cites the overrepresentation of 
ethnic minorities among detained patients as a reason to be sceptical about an unstructured 
approach to risk assessment, although doesn’t clarify the relationship between the two other 
than to describe the unstructured approach as one based on “gut feelings, instincts, intuitions 
and rules of thumb” (p. 121). He argues that standardised measures could lead to more 
scientific study and describes how both public and governmental confidence in the 
psychiatric profession is low: 
the lesson for general psychiatry is that, once the public and politicians have made 
violence a major issue, services need to be seen to be taking it seriously. Structured 
risk assessment is not the whole answer, but it sends the right message. (Maden, 
2005, p. 121) 
Maden concludes his account by saying that whilst clinicians were arguing about 
whether or not to assess risk, the managers “got on with it…it is time for clinicians to take 
back the initiative and to take the lead in introducing scientifically based, clinically 
meaningful risk assessment” (p. 122). 
This opposition of clinicians to managers, the public and politicians shows a potential 
antagonism in social space which Maden attempts to appease by sending the right message 
while also creating an important role for clinicians by drawing upon scientific discourse in 
completing risk assessments. While this incorporates the concerns of the public and 
politicians into clinical thought, it also works to elevate the clinical approach through its 
scientific expertise. Through constructing managers as a threat to clinicians, the legitimacy 
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and content of the debate over whether to assess risk or not is obscured and the reputation of 
the psychiatric profession prioritised. The integration of clinical and actuarial approaches 
does not necessarily make them more accurate though, and leaves a number of other issues 
unresolved including the difficulty of multiple interacting risk factors, difficulties in 
acquiring accurate and comprehensive information, how best to incorporate actuarial 
information and how to prevent or minimise risk (Langan, 2010).  
 
1.3.2.6 Risks assessed. 
A further problem with current risk assessment practice is that some risks command 
much greater attention than others. Mainly, this consists of the risks posed by the mentally ill 
to themselves or others, with the latter given special significance. This is linked to an 
assumption that people with mental illnesses pose more of a risk than the general population. 
There is a large body of research exploring this with variation in findings, methodological 
approaches and quality of research (Langan, 2010; The Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2008). 
Within an epidemiological frame and associated positivist epistemology, a small association 
between psychosis and violence has been described but the consensus is that “acts of harm to 
others perpetrated by people with a mental illness are not primarily related to their mental 
illness once substance misuse is taken into account” (Wand, 2012, p. 4).10 This leads to the 
view that substance misuse is riskier than mental illness as 9% of homicides are estimated to 
be by people in recent contact with mental health services, whereas 61% are linked to alcohol 
and drug misuse (Swinson et al., 2007). There is a related estimate with suicide too; of the 
4,500 – 5,000 people who complete suicide each year, only around 25% have had contact 
with mental health services in the year preceding their death. Most suicides will occur in low 
risk groups simply because these groups are larger than high risk groups (Wand, 2012). 
While these views usefully show problems with the current approach to risk assessment in 
mental health, they also present the social world as one which is relatively static, simplistic 
and fully knowable. This is at odds with the approach taken here as it loses sight of the 
radical contingency and historicity that constitutes the social world. 
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Nevertheless, this approach suggests that the extensive focus on the risk posed by 
people with mental illness is disproportionate. Pilgrim and Rogers (2011) highlight the 
arbitrary nature of this in their critique of separate legislation existing for people with mental 
health problems. They cite the actuarial knowledge of the risk of violence posed by 
intoxicated young men every weekend but the lack of legislation for this particular group. 
Focusing on these elements of risk also serves to obscure other marginalised risks. For 
example, there may be a risk from coming into contact with mental health services. Some 
possible risks include loss of liberty, forced treatment (typically pharmacological) or being 
treated by someone incompetent or abusive (Vassilev & Pilgrim, 2007). There is also the risk 
that treatment is ineffective, unhelpful or makes things worse, such as the side effects of 
medication or the stigma received from a diagnosis. There may also be less straightforward 
risks as seen in the work of Hacking (2007). He describes how the human sciences bring into 
being new types of people, which he calls ‘making up people’. This is a process which 
involves a classification system, people being classified, institutional involvement, 
knowledge production and relevant experts. Hacking describes a ‘looping effect’ where 
classifications interact with the people classified and so alter the classifications. What his 
work shows is that receiving support for a particular mental illness, or, more relevant here, 
being classified as a risk, may constitute a new identity with unclear consequences for the 
person so identified.  
In an interview study with community mental health nurses, Godin (2004) documents 
how the current emphasis on risk assessment and management, along with the potential for 
blame, encourages attention to be turned away from the risks faced by people with mental 
illness, inadequate accommodation for example, towards the risks they pose. This potentially 
prevents clinicians from understanding the victimisation people may have experienced. An 
additional concept of risk is that of positive risk taking, or therapeutic risk taking. Here, 
professionals purposefully take risks which they anticipate may be therapeutically beneficial 
to see if someone responds well, such as someone being given an opportunity to live 
independently. Maybe there are risks involved in not taking risks. Parsons (2008) describes 
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the dignity of risk to illustrate the double standard whereby people with mental illness are 
denied the right to make risky or self-defeating decisions and to then learn from these 
mistakes contra to how everyone else is able to do this. 
There are also social or systemic risks which fade into the distance. For example, 
criminalising drug use creates an illicit drug market which produces violence from the state in 
attempting to police it and from those associated with organised crime (Pilgrim & Rogers, 
2011). This systemic violence is far greater than the violence which comes from the effects of 
using such substances. Additionally, particular communities with higher levels of poverty, 
unemployment and substance abuse could be seen as posing a risk to the individuals within 
those communities, with the communities then, instead of individuals, being targeted for 
intervention (Wand, 2012). 
 
1.3.3 Risk assessment – some consequences. 
1.3.3.1 Inaccuracy and coercion. 
 A number of consequences of this extensive focus on risk assessment have been 
pointed to. Firstly, risk assessment remains inaccurate. The move to integrating clinical and 
actuarial approaches provides a space for advocates from both camps, but it does not 
necessarily improve accuracy. After all, actuarial tools were seen as a way of overcoming the 
limitations of clinical judgement but have not been successful in this and so it is unclear how 
combining the two will improve accuracy. For some, the use of actuarial tools will lead to the 
mistaken prediction that they are at risk which, if supported by clinical judgement, could lead 
to the provision of unnecessary interventions. Due to the actuarial base rate problem, this is 
likely to involve greater numbers when used in general settings like primary care than in 
more specialist settings where incidences are higher. For those correctly seen as not at risk, 
the process of assessment may have been disruptive, could exacerbate stigma, and may lead 
to them receiving less care or resources (Large et al., 2011). It may also be the case that 
despite correctly identifying someone at risk, and providing an intervention, the risk event 
still takes place; and, conversely, if risk is used to determine treatment, those incorrectly 
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identified as not being a risk may not receive treatment that may have been desired or 
beneficial. 
The nature of the provided interventions then become important in ways which may 
involve people being detained in hospital and treated without their consent prior to any 
violent act (or other risk) being committed, as legislated for in the Mental Health Act (2007). 
This process illogically assumes no difference between voluntary and forced treatment for 
mental illness (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014). Many researchers have called this separate 
legislation for mental illness discriminatory and called for its abolition or considerable 
revision (Large, Ryan, Nielssen, & Hayes, 2008; Wand, 2012). Ultimately, it remains unclear 
whether the interventions will be successful in preventing the events they set out to.  
 
1.3.3.2 Secondary risk management. 
When the cultural emphasis on accountability and litigation is considered, the 
emphasis on risk assessment encourages defensive practice. Patients become a source of 
threat. This leads to what Power (2004) describes as secondary risk management where 
professionals become preoccupied with managing their own risks rather than the primary task 
for which they are employed. A consequence of risk assessment then is that it diverts 
attention away from the primary task of providing treatments for the mentally ill and creates a 
new kind of expert, one skilled at managing the risks posed to one’s reputation through 
defensive practices. This can be thought of as substituting expertise for what is 
administratively accountable. As Power (2004) puts it: “In such a cultural environment, with 
institutions which tend to amplify blame and the logic of compensation, it is rational for 
organisations and the agents within them to invest in management systems with a strong 
secondary risk flavour” (p. 41).  
Anxiety about future uncertainty, that risk assessment is a response to, may be tamed 
on one level, but this may involve it being displaced onto the assessor. Following Power, 
Undrill (2007) describes the generation of anxiety in the assessor as the most important effect 
of risk assessment, it creates a situation where: 
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a patient may be detained because not detaining them produces intolerable anxiety in 
the staff involved in the assessment. Who in the field of mental health has not asked 
themselves ‘How would this decision play in court (or in the newspapers) if it went 
wrong?’ This is secondary risk management in action. (Undrill, 2007, p. 295) 
Risk assessment then becomes a form of insurance for professionals who may make decisions 
“from the perspective of the need to defend it in some public tribunal in the future” (Rose, 
1998, p. 186). This may explain why risk assessment pro formas used by mental health 
services tend to just focus on risks for which professionals may be held accountable, at the 
expense of other risks like socio-economic risks (Hawley et al., 2006).  
 
1.3.3.3 Stigma and trust. 
The selection of some risks over others and the attention given to this brings into 
view moral and political dimensions to risk assessment. Douglas (1992) uses this to describe 
risk as a secular form of sin and as fulfilling a similar function to that of practices of 
confinement within Victorian asylums. Risk becomes an acceptable form of stigma whereby 
a high-risk individual in the community is a legitimate moral concern due to posing an 
unacceptable danger. This bypasses the accusation of discriminating against the mentally ill, 
discrimination which is illegal as legislated for in the Equality Act, but ultimately serves to 
maintain the association between mental illness and danger, and thus reinforces stigma and 
authoritarian practices. In addition, “the assumption that mental disorder causes violence in 
adults distracts attention from the need to address the deleterious material, social and 
economic conditions experienced by many mentally disordered people…[which] encourages 
processes of social exclusion and ‘otherness’” (Langan, 2010, p. 89).  
When patients become a source of threat, this is likely to have a detrimental effect on 
the relationship between them and professionals, and the anxiety generated from this may 
also make it difficult for professionals to more accurately describe the risks posed by people 
with mental illness (Undrill, 2007). This could serve to increase stigma, and may lead to 
people not wanting to access services (Szmukler, 2003). Trust in professionals may therefore 
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be compromised. Szmukler and Rose (2013) discuss the importance of trust in mental health 
practice and how risk assessment can undermine the necessary context for effective 
treatment. It can take time away from building a therapeutic relationship and leave patients 
wondering what professionals’ priorities are which may leave patients reluctant to receive 
treatment.11 
 
1.3.3.4 Uncertainty.  
Viewed as an attempt at knowing what is unknowable, risk assessment becomes a 
paradox (Power, 2004). There is a danger of this unknowable aspect of risk assessment 
disappearing out of view through translating unknowable risks into information that can be 
reported to senior staff. This involves a quick move away from uncertainty, it becomes 
managed in a particular way rather than being acknowledged as the unknowable. This is akin 
to what Hacking (1990) described as the paradoxical taming of chance where future 
uncertainty is transformed, brought into the present, made calculable in terms of probability 
and then used to justify decisions. Translating uncertainty into knowable information, like 
through actuarial and structured clinical approaches, gives the impression that risk can be 
accurately assessed and so increases the importance placed on risk assessment at the expense 
of uncertainty. This could provide a false sense of security and risk assessment may be seen 
as a stage of treatment rather than risk being understood as something uncertain that 
fluctuates over time and in different circumstances. Maybe then, a consequence of risk 
assessment practice is not that we are more aware of the risks we face and able to develop 
rational responses, but more that we are becoming increasingly anxious and unable to tolerate 
uncertainty. If so, secondary risk management expands in importance.  
The uncertainty involved in risk assessments can be thought of as Knightian 
uncertainty, which Undrill (2007) describes as the epistemological uncertainty that exists 
when large numbers of independent observations of an event are not possible, in contrast with 
true risk which Knight (2013) described as measurable, knowable and manageable.12 Risk 
assessments used in mental health, which focus on highly idiosyncratic and unpredictable 
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events like suicide and homicide, clearly deal with the former of these two. In keeping with 
the ontological stance, the view here is that there will always remain a degree of uncertainty 
in social structures and human subjects owing to the radical contingency of the social world. 
Losing sight of uncertainty and contingency, through risk assessment, may lead to a descent 
into an ideological mode of functioning where the openness of the social world is concealed. 
This could play out in a number of ways such as a retreat into a position of certainty, denying 
any unknowability. Or certain fantasies that promise closure may be pursued, such as a 
fantasy of a risk-free world which can be achieved through a perfect system of assessment or 
through fully eliminating obstacles seen to maintain risk. 
 
1.3.3.5 Governmentality. 
At a broader level, risk assessment may be part of what Castell (1991) calls the shift 
from the clinic of the subject to the epidemiological clinic. This shift involved a move away 
from the focus on the concrete individual, as in previous traditions of medicine, to a focus on 
a combination of factors of risk linked to a form of governability seen in postmodern 
societies. Instead of a clinical interview, an examination of a patient becomes an examination 
of records compiled by various professionals. Key to Castell’s argument is what he calls the 
replacement of dangerousness with risk. This involved a move away from viewing danger as 
located within an individual, to viewing risk as located within a range of abstract factors. This 
relied upon making risk calculable which involved an estimation of probability based upon a 
statistical model of the regularity of events. This leads to new forms of surveillance in order 
to detect risk factors and relies upon making risk calculable to evaluate its probability. 
Armstrong (2002) describes this as a “new model of medicine that placed the process of 
surveillance rather than the identification of the pathological lesion at its core” (p. 109). Risk 
factors become critical as potential eventualities which need to be managed through 
correcting aberrations, changing attitudes to health and behaviours. Castel (1991) locates this 
shift within a “grandiose technocratic rationalising dream of absolute control of the 
accidental, understood as the irruption of the unpredictable” (p. 289). Two implications are 
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discussed; firstly, diagnosis and treatment are separated and caring becomes an activity of 
expertise, and, secondly, technicians or experts become subordinate to administrators or 
managers. 
In one of Rose’s (1998) studies of the governing of the modern individual, he 
describes risk as structuring and shaping the mental health system with risk classifications 
being “the means by which professionals think, act and justify their actions” (p. 189). For 
Rose, the current regime of risk does not reflect a risk society, as others have argued (Beck, 
1992), but operates heterogeneously across a multiplicity of points (clinical, epidemiological, 
actuarial, forensic and probabilistic) and creates a circuit of surveillance. Rose articulates 
three consequences of this inscription of risk thought. First, it allows the mental health 
profession itself to be governed at a distance under the shadow of the law. The administrative 
role of mental health professionals involves a series of obligations in relation to risk in order 
to enhance public safety – the public inquiry has played a key role here. Clinical activity is 
therefore pierced through with administrative, political duty. Secondly, risk thought provides 
a misleading sense of objectivity through conversion of risk into numbers. This serves to 
obscure the process by which the number was arrived at, thus concealing the ethical 
dimension and minimising contestation. Thirdly, it reflects what Rose (1998) calls a 
“governing through madness” (p. 190). Here, a new class of monsters lurk within the risk 
grid, ideally pinned down by it, and the very reason we need it. The fantasy of these monsters 
threatens the fantasy of their obverse: an idyllic construction of the public, an idealised 
community living harmoniously.  
 
1.4 Ignoble Beginnings – Problematising Risk through a Genealogical Lens 
1.4.1 Risk assessment and community care. 
Another way of problematising risk assessment is to turn our attention towards the 
idiosyncratic social and historical circumstances that led to it achieving the significance it has 
come to have. Taking a view of the social as open in its essence, describing historical context 
becomes not a documenting of the truth of a given point in time but a description of 
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hegemonic discourses, social practices and ideological investments. And as historians of 
science have shown, this is also linked to the same processes in the present.13 Historical 
context is not seen neutrally then, but through the lens of the present.  
Considering psychiatry from this theoretical view, there is not one history of 
psychiatry but many which are organised in a variety of ways. For example, in the British 
context, Berrios and Freeman (1991) organise their text around institutions, ideas and people. 
Elsewhere, Shorter (1997) in his influential social history, A History of Psychiatry, describes 
what he sees as the success of the biological approach to psychiatry while focusing on how 
culture and psychiatry intertwine. Shorter divides psychiatry’s history into an era of asylums, 
a first biological period, a psychoanalytic period and a second biological period amongst 
others. It is beyond the scope of this project to offer an in depth consideration of risk in 
relation to such histories of psychiatry. However, risk has become sedimented within the 
current era of community care so it is helpful to consider this briefly, and its constitutive 
outside, variously: the hospital, the institution, the asylum. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, there was an increasing desire for a move 
towards community care, or deinstitutionalisation, and away from the asylum. Overlooking a 
range of social, institutional and political changes, some have linked this shift to the 
development of the drug chlorpromazine, used as an antipsychotic, enabling more effective 
treatment (Eghigian, 2010). However, anti-asylum sentiments existed long before this. In the 
1850s, discourses emerged describing confinement as detrimental through rendering 
temporary excitement or depression into permanent insanity (Bennett, 1991). During this 
period though, asylums increased in size and were used for people who caused trouble in the 
community or had no family to care for them.  
Out-patient treatment began before the twentieth century and this practice was 
implemented at the Maudsley Hospital in the 1920s, and thereafter became an important 
component of treatment in part due to public concerns about asylum conditions (Bennett, 
1991). It was thus in opposition to the asylum that community care was articulated. After 
World War II, there were a series of changes which accelerated the move towards the 
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community: mental hospitals became increasingly less isolated with many adopting an open-
door policy for patients, therapeutic communities were established, and day centres were set 
up. These changes occurred in the shadow of the wider development of the welfare state 
which, of course, included the establishment of the NHS. With this, mental hospitals became 
the responsibility of the NHS rather than local authorities and this led to an increasing 
emphasis on treatments which do not require admission or which lead to discharge much 
sooner than had occurred in previous periods.  
Planning for community care advanced in the 1960s and there was greater media and 
political coverage of mental illness (Bennett, 1991). More critical voices existed too; R. D. 
Laing (1967) famously argued that schizophrenia is not an illness but an arbitrary label and 
that it is psychiatry and its practices that produce mad behaviour; and Goffman (1991), in an 
American context, described mental hospitals as total institutions which serve a social 
function of containing those perceived to be a threat to the community. The 1970s and 80s 
saw a shift towards psychiatric patients being treated in general hospitals and a governmental 
focus on reducing expenditure. Rogers and Pilgrim (2014) describe how community care, as 
a political objective, first appeared in the Mental Treatment Act of 1930 and became a 
consensus by the 70s. They link community care to a range of elements: the crisis of the 
asylum, economic determinism, and a shift to focusing on acute problems and primary care. 
Enoch Powell’s (1961) Water Tower speech rhetorically exemplifies the political 
commitment to community care with his description of the need for an “elimination” of the 
“asylums which our forefathers built with such immense solidity to express the notions of 
their day” (p. 1).  
Perhaps contemporary notions are just as peculiar as those of the past. In 1990 the 
government introduced the National Health Service and Community Care Act which aimed to 
reduce costs of hospital and community provision through a range of interventions 
(Holloway, 1996). These included introducing a purchaser/provider divide by requiring 
health and social services to distance themselves from care provision, relying on market 
forces to increase the quality of care, transferring primary responsibility for community care 
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to social services, diverting funding from the unlimited social security budget to the limited 
local authority social services budget, and dividing health and social care. 
By this time, community care was well underway and involved a variety of activities 
and services, including the development of community mental health centres, an increase in 
community psychiatric nurses and the provision of residential and day care facilities (Rogers 
& Pilgrim, 2014). Community care came with its own challenges though, in part relating to 
the loss of the multiple functions asylums provided: accommodation, treatment, and, in 
particular, social control. The importance of social control can clearly be seen in one of the 
most influential texts on the history of madness, Madness and Civilisation (Foucault, 2001a). 
Here, the way in which madness is understood is linked to particular historical conditions and 
systems of thought. One thread in this complex work shows how a process of confinement of 
people seen as socially problematic, the mad, the idle, the poor and so on, preceded any 
attempt at cure or treatment. With the social and institutional changes of the late eighteenth 
century, madness became isolated from poverty and idleness which enabled it to become an 
object of medical categorisation and obscured the social, juridical function being performed. 
This social, juridical function becomes more clearly visible at certain moments however, and 
the incident that produced risk assessment’s ignoble beginnings is one such moment. 
 
1.4.2 Christopher Clunis: A dangerous victim. 
While waiting for a tube at Finsbury Park station in December 1992, Jonathan Zito 
was attacked and killed at random by a stranger, Christopher Clunis (Waterhouse & 
Williams, 1993). Zito, a white, recently married Italian man, was on his way to celebrate 
Christmas with his and his new wife’s family. Clunis, a large, black, unemployed man with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, who had been in and out of psychiatric services for the past five 
years, stabbed Zito in the face several times.14 Clunis had been reported to the police on a 
number of occasions in the days preceding this incident and had been discharged from a 
psychiatric hospital three months earlier. He had failed to attend a number of outpatient 
appointments and in the past had attempted to stab a police officer, a patient and a roommate. 
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Following this incident, Virginia Bottomley, Health Secretary at the time, ordered a 
review of the law surrounding community care received by psychiatric patients following 
hospital discharge.15 Bottomley argued that not enough mechanisms existed to supervise 
“those most at risk” (The Guardian, 1993, p. 1). Initially, press reporting was modest.16 Two 
days after the incident, The Times (1992) reported in a matter of fact manner that the 
unemployed Clunis had stabbed Zito to death through the eye and that he was due to appear 
in court that day. It was not until June 1993 that newspapers became more interested and 
coverage became more impassioned. The Daily Mail (1993) titled an article “Why was he set 
free to kill my husband? Widow’s question as psychotic knifeman is locked away at last” (p. 
15). In the article, Zito’s wife, Jayne, describes her desire for a full public inquiry into the 
care Clunis received:  
There are people walking the streets with serious mental health problems who are 
frightened about what is happening to them. They have nowhere to go and no-one to 
care for them and they cannot take responsibility for what they do. I want to know 
why Christopher Clunis was on that platform that day. You still need long term 
psychiatric units for people like him. (The Daily Mail, 1993, p. 15) 
An investigation was carried out by The Independent who similarly focused on the 
care Clunis received arguing that buck-passing by professionals allowed a very dangerous 
man to slip “through the net. Why was he not detained in hospital? If he was being treated 
under the Government’s ‘Care in the Community’ policy, who was supposed to be caring for 
him?” (Waterhouse & Williams, 1993, p. 17). 
Press coverage began to snowball. Clunis was convicted of manslaughter at the end 
of June and political pressure increased with opposition politicians calling for a suspension of 
plans to close psychiatric units and a review of community care arrangements and resources 
(The Times, 1993a). Jayne Zito gave a press conference on the day of Clunis’s conviction 
calling for a public inquiry and met with Virginia Bottomley and John Bowis, a health 
minister, a week later where she repeated this request. Bowis described Jayne Zito as 
“courageous and dignified” but rejected a public inquiry in favour of a private inquiry 
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conducted by the two regional health authorities most recently involved in Clunis’s care (The 
Independent, 1993a, p. 6). Jayne Zito called Bottomley and Bowis “patronising and full of 
platitudes. They tried to turn this into my personal tragedy instead of tackling the questions 
that need to be answered about Care in the Community. They used our meeting as a PR 
opportunity. Shame on them” (The Independent, 1993a, p. 6).   
Jayne Zito was not alone in her criticism. Two mental illness charities, the National 
Schizophrenia Fellowship (NSF) and Schizophrenia A National Emergency (SANE), used 
the Clunis incident to argue that community care was becoming a black hole where people 
disappeared, and potentially negligent, due to being underfunded, with 40 people being killed 
by people with mental illness in the last two years and over 100 people with mental illness 
committing suicide (The Independent, 1993b).17  
Supervised discharge emerged as one response to this shifting landscape. The Royal 
College of Psychiatrists had previously proposed Community Supervision Orders as a 
solution to the problem of patients refusing treatment, such as medication, in the community 
after discharge. This would allow them to be rapidly re-detained if they refused to be 
supervised in the community (Holloway, 1996). These orders were criticised by patient 
groups and enforcing medication was said to be a violation of people’s civil liberties (The 
Times, 1993b). Supervised discharge, by contrast, would involve individual professionals 
being given responsibility for patients in the community with the responsibility to assess their 
suitability to live in the community and the ability to section them under the Mental Health 
Act if required. This was announced as part of a Ten Point Plan which recommended a 
review of possible admission when someone refuses to comply rather than an automatic 
return to hospital as well as an extension from a six month period to a year “during which 
patients given extended leave…can be recalled to hospital” (Burns, 1994, p. 130). This 
contrasted with the response desired by a range of social actors including the British Medical 
Association, Mind and the NSF who argued for additional funding and resources, a minister 
for community care and an ombudsman (Press Association, 1993a).    
34 
 
In November 1993, Jayne Zito announced she was planning to take legal action 
alongside Clunis and against the NHS for failing to care (The Evening Standard, 1993). One 
year after Zito’s death, The Independent published a two thousand word article by Jayne Zito 
describing her loss (Press Association, 1993b). She said that when she saw Clunis in court 
“there was no one there to hate…the man I saw was empty, hollow, a shell of a life” and how 
she:  
wanted the government to do something, to feel something. I wanted the goodness 
that Jon and I had shared and the value of human life to be recognised…There is also 
Christopher Clunis, the fear that I have passed him in the street, although I know that 
he is in Rampton…Mr Clunis and I, and Jon, have in common the need to expose the 
unhumanity [sic] of the system of community care that has been set up by this 
government. The system and some professionals working within it failed at critical 
moments, and it led to the denial of a life. (Press Association, 1993b, p. 20) 
 In Jayne Zito’s actions and this article, mental health campaigners, people with 
mental illness and people who are victims of crimes committed by people with mental illness 
are aligned in opposition to the ‘system’, some professionals within it, and the government 
who are given ultimate responsibility. This builds upon a specific articulation of Clunis as 
dangerous, but also as a victim of an inhumane system, afraid, in need of care and not 
responsible for his actions. In Clunis, then, we see the production of a paradoxical individual, 
a dangerous victim.  
This dangerous victim also existed in the findings of the inquiry into Clunis’s care 
(Ritchie, Dick, & Lingham, 1994). The ‘Ritchie report’ (1994) describes the Zito family, 
Christopher Clunis’s story, specifically focusing on his involvement with services in London 
and Jamaica, the incident itself, deficiencies in care, and recommendations. The report 
describes Jonathan Zito, recently married, as a talented musician, composer and artist with 
“an unassuming manner, a gentle and sensitive nature and was liked by all who knew him” 
(p. 99). Clunis, by contrast, is described, using witness statements, as “shabbily dressed”, 
“strange”, “a bit crazy”, “without any sign of remorse or concern”, “slow” and “possibly 
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educationally subnormal” (pp. 100–101). Later, he is described as an “intelligent and 
apparently easy going man, articulate and with a good sense of humour”, as someone who 
needed help but did not know how to ask (p. 103).  
So we have a slow, crazy Clunis and a smart, laid back Clunis. This double 
description, a fear-stigma paradox, produces both an image of a madman we need to fear and 
a victim of a mental illness requiring care. Through the use of witness statements, it 
simultaneously constructs a dangerous individual while avoiding the accusation of 
contributing to the stigma people with mental illness experience. It also relies upon a specific 
description of Zito to do this. He is likeable, sensitive, recently married, a model citizen, but 
an ordinary one. Regardless of the actuality of Zito, in this report he signifies the opposite of 
the dangerous version of Clunis. In this contrast between Zito and Clunis, we can see, 
drawing upon Lacanian psychoanalysis, a fantasy narrative containing both beatific and 
horrific aspects. Zito embodies the beatific, which occurs when there is a promise of social 
salvation, fullness or harmony, Clunis, the horrific, a threatening menace leading to societal 
decline (Glynos, 2011). Here, Zito personifies such harmony as a model citizen who 
succumbed to the mad, subnormal obstacle that is Clunis. This narrative then contains 
elements which can speak to us on an ideological level with an illusory promise of a 
harmonious society if the threat can be eradicated, or properly contained within a humane 
system of community care. Race is important here too, although it tended to be unspoken, in 
allowing ‘otherness’ to be linked with fear. Clunis, being black, implicitly referenced those 
historical discourses which have intertwined the black male body with threat and danger, as 
seen in the disproportionately high diagnoses of psychosis and use of sectioning amongst 
black people (Neal, 1998).  
 
1.4.2.1 The turn to risk. 
The Ritchie report made numerous recommendations including more additional 
funding for patients who need special care, extra psychiatric beds and haven type 
accommodation for those unable to cope in the community (Ritchie et al., 1994). The report 
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also recommended the establishment of a register of all patients subject to section 117 of the 
1983 Mental Health Act and the allocation of a responsible professional. Section 117 relates 
to the aftercare arrangements for people who have been detained under the mental health act. 
This recommendation was not a new idea. The Ten Point Plan had recommended the 
establishment of special supervision registers for those who are “most at risk” and “need most 
support”, as well as the powers of supervised discharge discussed above (Burns, 1994, p. 
130). These registers were introduced in April 1994, two months after the publication of the 
Ritchie report (Holloway, 1994).  
The Ten Point Plan’s recommendations were formalised in new governmental 
guidance: the Introduction of Supervision Registers for Mentally Ill People from 1 April and 
Guidance on the Discharge of Mentally Disordered People and their Continuing Care in the 
Community (Department of Health, 1994a, 1994b). The risk registers were to identify and 
provide information on patients who “are, or are liable to be, at risk of committing serious 
violence or suicide or of serious self neglect” (Department of Health, 1994b, p. 1). The 
decision to place someone on the register was said to rest with the responsible consultant 
psychiatrist in liaison with the team and to be based upon detailed evidence. The information 
required for someone on the register includes: personal information; nature of risk (category 
of risk, warning indicators and evidence of specific episodes of risk behaviour, including 
relevant criminal convictions); key worker and relevant professionals; and care programme 
details.  
The discharge guidance describes itself as an application of the Care Programme 
Approach (CPA) and here risk is “a prime consideration in discharge decisions” (Department 
of Health, 1994a, p. 3). NHS professionals and service providers are instructed to put the 
guidance “into immediate practice” (p. 1). The emphasis is on avoiding discharge unless 
clinicians are satisfied that a patient will not pose a serious risk to him or herself, or others 
and that this needs to be based on “full and proper consideration of any evidence” (p. 6). 
Those with a history of aggressive and risk taking behaviour are said to present special 
problems and require very careful assessment.  
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1.4.2.2 Dissenting discourses. 
If Jayne Zito’s discourse creates an equivalence between the government and the 
system, many professionals did their best to break such a chain of equivalence down in 
response to the announcement of risk registers. Dissenting discourses abounded which show 
not just an opposition to the registers but also to risk coming to dominate clinical practice. 
Fiona Caldicott (1994), then president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, articulated a 
number of concerns on behalf of the College in a letter to Virginia Bottomley published in the 
Psychiatric Bulletin. The letter begins with an acknowledgement of the many letters Caldicott 
had received from members across the country expressing concern about the registers. She 
states there is a strong view the registers will not help in documenting a minority of people 
who require close care and supervision, something the College supports in principle.  
Twelve specific concerns are raised (Caldicott, 1994). The criteria are said to be over 
inclusive and would lead to a considerable proportion of patients being on the register. The 
cost of establishing the registers throughout the country is estimated as £77 million. There is 
a strong concern about the legal position facing clinicians and services if there is a serious 
incident involving someone not on the register. Assessing risk is said to be imprecise and risk 
itself, impossible to be eliminated. It is not clear how people can be removed from the 
register as the risk factors continue to have an impact in the long term. The registers are also 
said to create a disincentive for working with patients who are on them because of 
professional and personal risk if anything were to go wrong. There is a concern that including 
people with personality disorders would lead to a diversion of much needed resources for this 
group. The registers are said to be an infringement upon civil liberties and, as such, a major 
benefit to being on them would need to be demonstrated before they are introduced. The 
registers are said to be of little clinical use on a daily basis and so liable to become inaccurate 
and possibly lead to complacency as they give the impression something has been done. The 
actual process of placing people upon a list is said to be counter therapeutic and could reduce 
people’s desire to enter services. It is also felt that breaches of confidentiality are likely and 
that the whole process is very time consuming and so would reduce face to face clinical care. 
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This letter of dissent combines a range of elements to make the case against the 
adoption of the risk registers and echoes some of the problems with risk assessment described 
in the archaeology section above. It also shows how the introduction of these risk registers, 
and an emphasis on risk more generally, was a very particular response to only some of the 
numerous problems articulated following the Clunis incident, and one which involved 
shifting responsibility from government to the psychiatric profession. Aware of this, many 
within the profession objected. The difficulty of being able to predict dangerousness was 
pointed to, as well as the fear “that the supervision registers will reinforce perceptions of 
psychiatrists and mental health professionals as agents of social control whose major role is 
protecting the public from dangerous or deviant behaviour” (Holloway, 1994, p. 594).  
Six consultant psychiatrists, three senior registrars and a consultant psychotherapist 
put their names on an article arguing that there was no clear benefit to patients from being on 
the registers and that it was unclear how patients should be informed they are on the register 
and how this might affect them (O’Connor et al., 1994). The lack of consultation and extra 
resources required was a further concern. The register was seen as harmful by labelling 
someone as potentially at risk and obscuring the real underlying problems leading to their 
psychiatric condition. Instead of focusing on good community provision, housing, 
employment and psychiatric services this was said to be colluding with an “exercise designed 
to shift accountability and disguises poor psychiatric provision” (O’Connor et al., 1994, p. 
1237). The registers were also described as “an invitation to litigation”, especially when there 
is a serious incident involving someone not included on the register as this would seem 
negligent (Harrison & Bartlett, 1994, p. 551). The logics affecting the decision to take 
someone off the register are also questioned: if the best predictor of the future is the past, then 
many people will remain on the register regardless of improvements as the risk factors will 
remain in their past.  
Others attempted to redirect the conversation so that risk registers were discussed in 
relation to community care. Mind and the health union, Unison, felt the risk registers were an 
attempt to distract people from the crisis of community care and its real causes, and that there 
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was a need for more community services, 24 hour crisis centres and supported 
accommodation (Press Association, 1993b). Jayne Zito’s campaigning continued with her 
delivering a petition signed by 30,000 people, including the British Medical Association and 
the Association of Directors of Social Services, to Downing Street in May 1994 (Press 
Association, 1994). This petition argued for national standards in community care provision, 
24 hour services, an end to drugs being prescribed above recommended dosages, less 
electroconvulsive therapy and more counselling and alternative therapies available through 
general practitioners. This followed Jayne Zito claiming, three months earlier, that Virginia 
Bottomley was accountable for the death of her husband which Bottomley had displaced onto 
police, health staff, a Labour run social services authority and combatted with an extra 10 
million pounds for community based mental health services in London (The Observer, 1994).   
 
1.4.2.3 The glue to hold things together. 
The contestations were then contested. Virginia Bottomley (1994) replied to 
Caldicott’s letter disputing each of the points raised and downplaying the extent to which risk 
registers altered clinical practice. Bottomley claimed that they would merely help systematise 
risk assessment and management processes. Government policy thus ploughed ahead and 
some leading psychiatrists voiced their support: “To blame government policy for community 
care is to deny our individual responsibilities as psychiatrists: we discharged the patients, not 
the Secretary of State” (Tyrer & Kennedy, 1995, p. 193). It is said to be a contradiction to 
worry about the civil liberties of patients while also supporting institutional care, and 
psychiatrists are criticised for ignoring the increasing public concern for the rights of those at 
risk like Jonathan Zito. The profession is looking for “the glue that will hold together all the 
components of care for those people who cannot hold them together for themselves, and no 
longer have a mental hospital to do it for them” (Tyrer & Kennedy, 1995, p. 194). The risk 
register is said to be this glue, but maybe risk as a system of thought became the glue which 
seeped into the void made visible by the case of Christopher Clunis.  
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1.4.3 Isabel Schwarz. 
Six months after the Clunis incident then, risk was articulated into a coherent 
discourse. It became a key feature of governmental guidance and risk assessment became a 
statutory duty for clinicians despite numerous concerns. A few years earlier, in response to a 
similar incident, risk featured but was not articulated as a solution in quite the same way. In 
July 1984, Sharon Campbell stabbed her social worker, Isabel Schwarz, to death in Schwarz’s 
office (Sheppard, 2004). There was a relative lack of discourse about this incident in UK 
newspapers in relation to the Clunis incident. A Nexis search of UK publications returns just 
14 articles using the search terms (1) Sharon Campbell and (2) Isabel Schwarz OR Social 
Worker. This contrasts with 577 articles using the search terms (1) Christopher Clunis and (2) 
Zito.  
The first of the Schwarz articles was published in The Guardian nearly a year after 
the killing (W. Schwarz, 1985). This was written by Walter Schwarz, Isabel’s cousin. He 
describes how one of Schwarz’s colleagues found her dead in her office at Bexley Mental 
Hospital at 8.50pm on a Friday evening. Campbell, a former patient at Bexley, with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, was charged on forensic evidence. The articles states that 
Schwarz’s parents did not decide to pursue legal action but Isabel’s father, Dr Victor 
Schwarz, a Reader in Biochemistry at Manchester University, had sent a list of awkward 
questions to Bexley Social Services. A motive is given in that Campbell was previously 
discharged from Bexley and transferred to a hostel against her will. Schwarz had offered to 
drive her to the hostel and on the way Campbell started attacking Schwarz with her handbag 
who then called the police. Campbell was taken away by the police without charge. She 
subsequently made threatening phone calls to Schwarz before, ultimately, she killed her. The 
article describes dangerous situations as inherent in social work and a need for better training, 
protection and security is stressed. Risk does feature in this discourse but not directly 
attached to Campbell; Schwarz is said to have taken risks which society is described as 
indifferent to. Following the incident, Campbell, like Clunis, pleaded guilty to manslaughter 
and was sent to Broadmoor indefinitely. 
41 
 
While Jayne Zito’s reflections on her husband’s death were published in The 
Independent, Victor Schwarz’s (1985) were published in a social work journal, Community 
Care. Schwarz (1985) describes his hope that Isabel’s death will not be “entirely in vain” (p. 
22). Schwarz describes how mistakes were made in Campbell’s care. It was not that her level 
of risk was not assessed, but that her mental state was not assessed regularly. This shows us 
that we are in an era before risk assessment had become sedimented, although Schwarz does 
argue for a log to be kept of anyone who has been violent or threatened to be, and for any 
violence or threat to be reported so social workers can protect themselves and the public.  
An inquiry was called for in February 1986 and promised by the government in June. 
However, by January 1987 it had still not been established (The Guardian, 1987a). An 
official public inquiry was eventually set up by the Department of Health and Social Security 
(now defunct) focusing on the care and aftercare Campbell received and in response to Victor 
Schwarz’s claims that Isabel died as a result of negligence (The Guardian, 1987b). During the 
inquiry, Stanley Bute, a social worker and expert witness on violence, described how 
violence is often not reported by social workers as it can be considered unprofessional, limit 
promotion opportunities and make some professionals feel guilty (The Guardian, 1987). Bute 
also described the need for a central register of people who had been violent, which would 
later become a risk register.    
The inquiry report was published in 1988 (Spokes, Pare, & Royle, 1988). It 
concluded that if Campbell had not fallen through the gaps of the local system, the incident 
could have been avoided. The risks of violence to social workers were discussed but risk 
assessment and management was not recommended. Instead, there was an emphasis on social 
workers being trained to recognise and avert violent incidents as well as to report them. The 
report also recommended that health and local authorities should be provided with a written 
summary of their statutory duties in relation to aftercare by the Secretary of State, and that 
good practice guidelines on the same issue should be provided by the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists.  
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The Royal College of Psychiatrists’ (1991) response was to publish guidance on good 
practice in the aftercare of psychiatric patients following discharge. This guidance was said to 
reflect the philosophy of the CPA, recently introduced by the government. This philosophy is 
said to be to ensure that all mentally ill people are discharged into the community only when 
they have adequate services to meet their needs. The document is said to be concerned with 
people who are potentially violent or particularly vulnerable because they present a risk to 
themselves or others. Risk surfaces in this way on two occasions in the guidance but then 
retreats with the emphasis returning to violence and vulnerability.  
The same can be said of the CPA (Department of Health, 1990) in its initial 
manifestation.18 Here, four main components were outlined: the need for systematic 
assessments of the health and social needs of people accepted into specialist mental health 
services; the need to devise a care plan to identify the care required from health and social 
care; the need to appoint a keyworker to stay in touch with the patient, monitor and co-
ordinate care; and the need for regular review and update of care plans where required. By the 
time the CPA was revised (Department of Health, 1999), risk assessment and management 
was in a position to be articulated as one of the key revisions to this documentation. Table 1 
provides an overview of the inscription of risk discourse within government policy and 
guidance, and select key events from 1988 to 2011. 
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Table 1 
Inscription of risk discourse within Department of Health (DH) policy or guidance 
Year  DH Policy or 
Guidance 
Risk discourse Key Events  
1988  Social workers to be trained to 
recognise, prevent and report 
violent incidents 
Spokes inquiry report into 
death of Isabel Schwarz 
published 
1990 NHS and 
Community Care 
Act 
The Care 
Programme 
Approach 
 Market based principles 
introduced into NHS 
Purchaser/provider split 
Health and social care 
divided 
 
1991   Care Programme Approach 
(CPA) introduced 
 
1992  Health Secretary, Virginia 
Bottomley, orders review of 
community care law to 
supervise those most at risk 
Christopher Clunis kills 
Jonathan Zito 
Ben Silcock mauled by lion 
at London Zoo 
 
1993   Ten Point Plan recommends 
supervised discharge 
Jayne Zito announces plan to 
take legal action alongside 
Clunis and against the NHS 
 
 
1994 Introduction of 
Supervision 
Registers 
 
 
Guidance on 
Discharge of 
Mentally 
Disordered People  
Supervision registers 
introduced to identify and 
provide information on those 
at risk of committing serious 
violence or suicide or self-
neglect 
Risk assessment required 
before a patient is discharged 
from hospital 
Ritchie Report (report of 
Clunis inquiry) recommends 
supervision registers and 
allocation of responsible 
professional 
 
1995 Mental Health 
(Patients in the 
Community) Act 
Supervision registers and 
CPA become statutory 
Supervised Discharge Orders 
enable compulsory treatment 
(although not medication) for 
patients previously detained 
under the Mental Health Act 
 
1997 The New NHS: 
Modern, 
dependable 
 New Labour Government 
Responsibility for 
commissioning services 
shifts from Health 
Authorities and GP fund 
holders to Primary Care 
Groups 
Emphasis on partnership 
between government, private 
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Year  DH Policy or 
Guidance 
Risk discourse Key Events  
companies and voluntary 
organisations 
1998 A First Class 
Service 
 
Modernising 
Mental Health 
Services 
NHS trusts obliged to have 
clear risk assessment and 
management policies 
Emphasis on the need for 
public safety from a small but 
significant minority of 
patients posing a danger to 
themselves and others  
NICE launched 
Clinical Governance 
introduced 
1999 Modernising the 
CPA 
 
National Service 
Framework for 
Mental Health 
Risk assessment and 
management a key revision of 
CPA 
Guidance removes the need 
for supervision registers if 
replaced by a two tier CPA 
 
2002   Primary Care Trusts replace 
Primary Care Groups and 
become responsible for 
commissioning 
Health Authorities replaced 
by smaller number of 
Strategic Health Authorities 
2005 Mental Capacity 
Act 
  
2006   The Depression Report 
makes the case for an 
increased role for 
psychological therapies 
 
2007 Best Practice in 
Managing Risk 
 
Mental Health Act 
amended 
Therapeutic relationship re-
described to include an 
objective assessment of risk 
Risk management embedded 
in CPA 
Community Treatment Orders 
replace Supervised Discharge 
giving the allocated 
responsible clinician the 
powers to return a patient to 
hospital for forced medication 
if non-compliant 
 
2008 IAPT 
implementation 
plan 
Refocusing the 
CPA 
CPA introduced only for high 
risk patients 
IAPT launched 
2009 Best Practice in 
Managing Risk 
2007 guidance updated to 
include implementation 
advice  
Collaborative structured 
clinical approach to risk 
assessment emphasised 
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Year  DH Policy or 
Guidance 
Risk discourse Key Events  
2010   Coalition Government 
formed between 
Conservative Party and 
Liberal Democrat Party 
2011 No Health Without 
Mental Health 
Risk assessment described as 
an intrinsic aspect of clinical 
assessment 
Majority of England has 
IAPT service 
3,660 new CBT practitioners 
Over 600,000 people treated  
 
1.4.4 From Schwarz to Clunis to risk. 
The Schwarz incident clearly did not have the same impact as the Clunis incident, 
and risk did not feature in the same way, showing its historical contingency. With Schwarz, 
the focus was on people who have been violent and how to deal with violent incidents, with 
Clunis, attention shifted to the future, towards predicting and reducing risk. When viewing 
the social world as one criss-crossed by antagonisms, the Schwarz incident did not have the 
same dislocatory effects as with Clunis. It was a serious incident within the system of mental 
health care which had an influence on policy and systems of care. However, it did not lead to 
the system of care being questioned in the same way, instead the focus was on reforming 
aspects of practice for social workers with little opposition or alternative projects articulated. 
This incident had less public visibility than the Clunis incident and we did not see such a 
range of social actors engaging with the Schwarz incident. Mental health charities and 
political campaigning were not present to the same degree. The wider context is significant; 
by the time of the Clunis incident, many mental hospitals had closed and community care was 
well underway but even in the late 80s, the vast majority of mental illness funding still went 
to inpatient care (Holloway, 1996). Mental illness itself was less visible than it was soon to 
become.  
This does not mean that risk discourse appeared for the first time following the 
Clunis incident in a moment of brilliant or necessary discovery. Risk had been germinating 
for some time before as we can see in the Schwarz incident, and in academic and clinical 
debates over how best to assess dangerousness which had been present since the 1980s 
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(Monahan, 1981). This is also evidenced by an article in The Guardian (1992) ten months 
before the Clunis incident. Here, additional homicides by psychiatric patients were discussed 
with an emphasis on the killings being foreseeable and thus preventable. The article speaks of 
“two conflicting imperatives: safety for the public, rights for patients” (p. 19). A more 
rigorous approach to discharging patients is called for such as one expert’s description of a 
graduated approach of “small, minor-risk taking decisions. ‘If the risk works, take another, 
but if it doesn’t, go back a step. That way you avoid potential disaster’” (p. 19). Here we see 
the anticipation of risk as a way of dissolving an antagonism between the public and patients.  
One wonders about the fantasmatic aspect of this as community care materialised. 
The madman, presumed dangerous, is no longer confined but is free to roam the streets. 
Clunis embodied this and some of the headlines at the time speak to a widespread anxiety 
about people with mental illness, in particular the psychotic knifeman. But at the same time, 
the madman has also become a victim, a person not responsible for his actions, someone we 
can identify with. Clunis’s constitutive outside, Zito, becomes merged with him. Anti-stigma 
campaigns and the extension of civil liberties to the mentally ill, influenced by humanistic 
discourses, allowed mentally ill people to align with charities and campaigners in opposition 
to the system of care as it existed at this time. The danger then becomes the system of care 
and those who administer it, a system which is not effectively run, lacking in bureaucratic 
efficiency, resources and funding.  
The impossible ideal here, of course, is the perfectly efficient system of psychiatric 
care and, when needed, control. Risk assessment and management allowing for individuals to 
be distributed appropriately within an elaborate system of psychiatric care with various sites 
and levels of security (institutional: high, medium and low secure units; and community: 
secondary care, primary care). Here, we all become equivalent in opposing risk – we are all 
subject to risk – and so the oppositions we saw between the government and psychiatry; 
between people with mental illness, political campaigners, unions, the press against the 
government and system of care slowly fade away and become less visible. So does the fact 
that risk as we know it relied upon a specific context to be articulated in the way it was: a 
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privatised system of health care, a liberal economic order, an individualistic philosophy 
which values blame and responsibility.   
As we have seen though, the system of mental health care remains vulnerable to 
contestation by a range of social actors and will always do so from the perspective of the 
ontological position taken here, radical contingency. 
 
1.4.5 Hegemony of risk assessment. 
In the aftermath of the Christopher Clunis incident, which occurred as care in the 
community accelerated, a range of discourses were articulated by a variety of social actors. 
This involved the government’s community care policy being critiqued in numerous ways 
including being inhumane, potentially negligent due to being underfunded, and lacking in 
appropriate resources and treatments. This line of critique was taken up variously by Jayne 
Zito, mental illness charities and unions, the media and opposition politicians. The 
government response was to introduce supervised discharge whereby individual professionals 
were made responsible for patients in the community with the ability to section them if 
required, and expected to avoid discharging someone unless they were satisfied the patient 
would not pose a serious risk to him or herself, or to others. This required systematic risk 
assessment and risk registers were introduced to provide information on people who were, or 
who were liable to be, at risk of committing serious violence or suicide.    
This move by the government shifted the discourse away from potential problems 
with community care and risk as a signifier was a key part of this. Prior to this incident risk 
retained more of its contingent nature. Isabel Schwarz, for example, took risks in her work 
with Sharon Campbell and rather than being considered a risk, Campbell was seen in terms of 
her mental state and social work was said to involve dangerous situations. Following Clunis, 
risk was modified to refer very specifically to the risk posed by people with mental illness to 
themselves or to others and this risk became linked to individual professionals whose 
responsibility it was to systematically assess the risk. This anticipated a good therapeutic 
relationship being re-described to include an objective assessment of risk as seen in 
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subsequent government documentation and so the hegemonic status of risk assessment 
practice within mental health. This response can be considered ideological as it provides an 
illusory promise of closure, a false sense of reassurance. It is as if incidents like those 
involving Clunis and Schwarz will never occur if risk can be systematically assessed. Or if 
they can be correctly identified the risk or threat that they pose can be eradicated. It also 
provides someone to blame if things go wrong – the risk assessor.  
The extent to which we should not be reassured by this response is clear when 
considering the limitations of risk assessment as shown in the archaeological and 
genealogical problematisation. It is worth rehearsing this to crystallise the problematic 
aspects of risk assessment practice. Firstly, accurate prediction of risk is not possible and risk 
assessment is imprecise regardless of the method of assessment. The risk behaviours being 
focused on, like violence and suicide, are rare within the population which means the 
majority predicted by an assessment, actuarial or otherwise, to be at risk would actually be 
false positives. Even when someone is correctly identified as being at risk, it is unclear 
whether an intervention will actually reduce the risk. 
If resources are limited and the allocation of resources is linked to risk assessment, 
this could have negative consequences. For some, this will involve being considered at risk 
which could be counter therapeutic and for those who are false positives, this may involve 
receiving unnecessary interventions. For others, they may not receive care or resources they 
may find beneficial. Some, for whom risk assessment is unnecessary, may find the process of 
risk assessment disruptive and it could serve to increase stigma through maintaining an 
association between mental illness and danger, which could encourage social exclusion. This 
is particularly the case in primary care settings like IAPT where many people receive risk 
assessments. There is also a consequence of risk assessment encouraging defensive practice 
and patients being seen as a source of threat. This may create a disincentive for working with 
particular patients. It may also lead to an over emphasis on secondary risk management 
within a culture of litigation whereby clinicians become skilled at managing the risk to their 
reputation through defensive practices at the expense of developing skills in the primary task 
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of providing treatment for people with a mental illness. Risk assessment is time consuming 
too and so takes time away from other tasks, like building a therapeutic relationship. This 
may reduce trust in mental health services as clinicians become absorbed in their 
administrative duties, and so leave people reluctant to receive treatment.  
The extensive focus on risk assessment may conceal other risks too. It may obscure 
possible risks from coming into contact with mental health services, like loss of liberty, 
forced treatment or even poor treatment. It may also obscure more social risks like the risks 
involved in living in inadequate accommodation or being exposed to victimisation. It may 
narrow the focus to the individual and so prevent social or systemic risks, like poverty and 
unemployment, from being considered. At a broader level, perhaps this feeds into a culture 
unable to tolerate uncertainty and so increasingly susceptible to ideological modes of 
functioning. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
Turning towards the actual practice of risk assessments, this archaeological and 
genealogical problematisation leads to a number of questions to be explored within the 
empirical work: 
1. What does the actual practice of risk assessment in an IAPT service entail? How 
can this be characterised?  
2. How is the practice of risk assessment instituted? What alliances between social 
actors does it create or disavow? 
3. What influences people engaging in risk assessment practice in the way that they 
do? Why do people continue to complete risk assessments despite them being 
problematic? 
The logics framework offers a way of engaging with these questions as it provides a 
way of understanding social practices through examining social logics; a way of 
understanding how practices are maintained, challenged or transformed through political 
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logics; and a way of understanding why practices retain an affective grip through fantasmatic 
logics. The logics approach and research strategy will now be outlined in more detail.  
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Chapter 2: Research Strategy 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter outlines the strategy developed for this research which utilises a logics 
approach. It begins by offering some background to the logics approach and contrasting this 
approach with other approaches used in social science research. It then discusses discourse 
theory and outlines the specific elements that constitute a logics approach emphasising the 
ontological position that informs the research. The chapter then considers the empirical 
context and material that form the object of study. The research process is then outlined as 
well as the process of analysis and the chapter concludes by describing ethical considerations 
made in relation to completing the research. 
 
2.2 A Logics Approach  
2.2.1 Background considerations. 
This thesis is informed by the framework set out in the Logics of Critical Explanation 
in Social and Political Theory (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). This approach sets itself in 
opposition to those seeking to establish universal, causal laws, those based upon causal 
mechanisms, as well as hermeneutical approaches which prioritise contextualised 
understandings of people’s own interpretations. Instead, Glynos and Howarth (2007) aim to 
establish a framework which can integrate empirical, interpretative and critical 
considerations. This involves deviating from the typical format of social science research and 
also has key differences from discourse analytic approaches most commonly used in 
psychology.19  
The typical methods used within social science research are informed by the 
underlying epistemological assumptions of positivism.20 From this view, knowledge is 
generated through empirical observation and measurement, and developed for the purposes of 
prediction and control. The hypothetico-deductive method is the dominant method linked to 
positivism which involves inducing falsifiable hypotheses from observed phenomena, 
deducing ways of testing these empirically and then doing so, before confirming or refining 
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hypotheses based upon the results (Howitt & Cramer, 2011). Positivist approaches have been 
widely critiqued.21 One important element of this critique challenges the idea that scientific 
knowledge can be neutral, value-free and objective, with both theoretical and empirical work 
undermining this ideal (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). The role of context is also problematic 
within positivist approaches, where the tendency would be to view it as an extraneous 
variable to be controlled which obscures the active role context plays in shaping meaning and 
understanding.  
Approaches which have developed in response to some of these criticisms, including 
causal mechanism and hermeneutic approaches, are also seen as problematic from the logics 
perspective. The strength of these approaches is that they take into account, but do not rely 
solely on, the meaning people attribute to their own actions. However, the idea of causal 
mechanisms remains influenced by the powerful ideal of causal laws, and hermeneutical 
accounts become overly localised and so fail to adequately explain and critique social 
phenomena. The logics approach recasts the influence of a “causal law paradigm” as a 
hegemonic grip which is inappropriate for engaging with social processes due to a narrow 
conception of testing and explanation and a neglect of context and ontology (pp. 18-19). It 
therefore prioritises ontological considerations rooted in poststructuralist discourse theory. 
 
2.2.2 Discourse theory. 22 
The logics approach grew out of Laclau and Mouffe’s (2014) poststructuralist and 
post-Marxist conception of discourse. Here, everything in the social world can be seen as 
being discursive as everything is or can become an object of discourse. The meaning of a 
particular object is therefore what is important and meaning depends upon a socially and 
historically constructed system of rules and differences. Laclau and Mouffe (2014, pp. 91 – 
101) describe how within the discursive field that is the social world, individual elements 
exist. These elements are differential positions that have not yet been articulated within a 
discourse and so have a floating character. They can be combined by social actors through a 
process of articulation to form a discourse, a system of meaningful practices which forms the 
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identities of subjects and objects. This articulatory practice turns elements into moments 
through articulating their differential positions. As figure 3 attempts to represent, this 
involves the inclusion of some elements and the exclusion of others which means that 
forming a discourse is seen as inherently political as it requires drawing a political frontier 
between elements inside and outside a discourse. Nodal points are a key part of this process 
as they enable elements to be structured into a meaningful system of moments. This means 
that nodal points are in essence empty and so can be thought of as empty signifiers yet they  
work by binding a system of meaning. This involves power as it is a structuring of relations 
between different social agents. 
 
Discourses are therefore seen as contingent and historically constituted but 
nevertheless capable of achieving a stable status or a knot of definite meaning (Torfing, 
1999). Competing discourses can be seen as engaged in a struggle for hegemonic positions 
and thus stabilisation of the social order (Howarth, 2000). Hegemony is therefore a crucial 
Figure 3. Discourse 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of discourse 
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theoretical concept within discourse theory, where the major aim of hegemonic projects is to 
construct and stabilise nodal points by articulating as many available elements as possible, 
which produces a concrete social order. No discourse though is fully capable of achieving 
complete sedimentation of a field of discursivity as elements can be re-articulated and 
discourses can be challenged or disintegrate. In fact, they can never be fully constituted or 
achieve an objective, full presence and so are marked by a lack of closure. This brings us to 
the ontological position of lack that characterises the approach used here. 
 
2.2.3 Ontology. 
In opposition to approaches which bracket ontology as unknowable or limited to 
knowledge claims about the nature of being, and then prioritise epistemological 
considerations, the logics approach places ontology centre stage. Here, ontology is seen as 
“not only about the different kinds of things in the world, but is more importantly about the 
being of these beings” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 160).  
A series of ontological assumptions therefore inform the approach taken in this 
research and so influence the way in which it engages with the practices being studied. This 
is true of all research, including positivist social science approaches, even if such 
presuppositions are not specified. Here, all actions, social practices and regimes, here 
understood as systems of practices, are seen as discursive in nature to reflect the view that 
meaning is central to all human practices. Objects acquire a definition or identity through 
particular discourses or systems of meaning. Howarth (2000) illustrates this by discussing the 
different meanings a forest can have: a part of an ecosystem, an area of natural beauty, an 
obstacle for a proposed motorway, a resource to be exploited for economic growth and so 
forth. We saw this too with Clunis; he was intelligent, dangerous, psychotic, in need of care, 
not responsible for his actions, a risk and more besides. Crucially, radical contingency 
structures the entire discursive field and the discourses formed within it meaning that all 
identities and practices are inherently instable: “radical contingency opposes empirical 
contingency’s sense of possibility with a sense of impossibility; the constitutive failure of any 
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objectivity to attain a full identity” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 110). What becomes 
important here then is the “contingency, historicity and precariousness” of objects and 
subjects rather than their essence and causal influence (p. 11). 
The division of social space into four different dimensions is a further ontological 
presupposition of a logics approach and social practices can be understood in relation to these 
dimensions which are described along two axes: a political-social axis and an ideological-
ethical axis (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 110-120). The social dimension relates to being 
absorbed in social practices and so inattentive to radical contingency. This contrasts with the 
political dimension where radical contingency is brought to the fore and social relations are 
contested. The ideological dimension refers to those aspects of social relations where subjects 
engage in practices which conceal radical contingency. Finally, the ethical dimension relates 
to practices where subjects attend to issues of radical contingency whilst engaging in social 
practices.  
In relation to risk assessment, the social dimension would involve the actual practice 
of carrying out an assessment or being assessed. The political dimension would involve 
defending risk assessment practice, or explaining, justifying or contesting it. The ideological 
dimension would involve being caught within a fantasmatic narrative that views risk 
assessment as a necessity. The ethical dimension would involve a consideration of risk 
assessment’s contingent nature and its limitations. This may include an awareness that the 
fantasies that lead us to desire a perfect system of risk assessment are just that, fantasies.  
 
2.2.4 The subject. 
In line with the above ontology, the subject is viewed as “a discursive construct or 
entity, whose identity depends on its relationship to other subjects and objects…because each 
discursive construct is never fully constituted, but essentially incomplete or lacking, the 
subject is also lacking and incomplete” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 127). This makes clear 
the impossibility of achieving a fully sutured identity. Lack is made visible at those moments 
when identities fail and subjects are compelled to engage in acts of identification. Such acts 
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can energise subjects around particular practices which raises the importance of enjoyment in 
the process of identifying with fantasmatic narratives. There is therefore a need to consider 
the interpretations subjects give to the practices they are involved in, but this is insufficient in 
itself as it can obscure aspects that subjects may be unaware of.   
 
2.2.5 Epistemological consequences. 
Viewing epistemology in a general sense, as relating to theories and methods of 
knowledge (Steinmetz, 2005a), there are certain consequences that follow from the 
ontological position employed. Firstly, any knowledge generated would not be considered a 
true or whole account of a phenomena being studied as this knowledge itself would have to 
be understood as contingent to be consistent with the ontological assumptions. This is why 
the research process is described as a process of articulation with logics being a way of 
characterising different aspects of the social world.  
A range of empirical phenomena can be engaged with from this approach and 
research findings from distinct approaches can be incorporated into its knowledge base so 
long as the findings are understood from the ontological position described. While possible, 
this is not a straightforward process as it is likely to involve decoupling such findings from 
their own ontological and epistemological assumptions and rearticulating them. Case studies, 
such as this research, and comparative cases are highlighted by Glynos and Howarth (2007) 
as being well placed to contribute to knowledge development. While the logics approach is a 
relatively recent one, it has been utilised to engage with a range of empirical phenomena 
including, for example, health and social care reform (Glynos et al., 2015), time bank 
practices (Glynos & Speed, 2012), education policy (Clarke, 2012) and business consultancy 
board meetings (Thompson & Willmott, 2015). 
To better reflect the ontological presuppositions and to distinguish this approach from 
those informed by a causal law ideal, the research is more helpfully framed as having a 
strategy rather than a method. The strategy involves three interconnected practices: 
problematisation, retroductive explanation, and persuasion. It entails a process of articulation 
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and draws upon the language of logics to characterise aspects of the social world. These five 
elements can be considered the moments which make up a logics approach and will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
 
2.2.6 Problematisation. 
The logics approach takes a problem-driven approach to research, in contrast with a 
theory or method driven approach (Glynos, Howarth, Norval, & Speed, 2009; Howarth, 
2013). As such, explanation begins with encountered phenomena which requires 
consideration. This involves constituting a problem, which can be thought of as 
problematisation, and this process itself typically transforms initial understandings. 
Problematisation combines archaeological and genealogical work to see how solutions to 
problems have been constructed, and how the solutions developed themselves depend upon a 
particular form of problematisation (Howarth, 2013).  
  
2.2.6.1 Archaeology, genealogy, hegemony. 
Archaeology refers to a methodological approach Foucault elaborated in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (2002) to characterise his previous studies of madness (2001a), 
medicine (2003) and the human sciences (2001b). This stood in stark contrast to the then 
dominant approaches taken in analysing social and historical phenomena. He critiqued 
approaches which gave a privileged role to the individual subject, famously echoing 
Nietzsche’s death of God (2006) by referring to the death of man in the closing passages of 
The Order of Things (2001b). His approach was also critical of explanations informed by an 
essentialist understanding of mankind, such as humanism, Marxism and psychoanalysis. 
Instead, Foucault prioritised discourse and discursive events and articulated a descriptive 
approach to documenting historically specific discourses. This would allow for an 
understanding of the rules that govern the production of such discourses.  
Howarth (2002) usefully outlines some conceptual ambiguities within Foucault’s 
work. He has a particular concern with objects being viewed as the product of linguistic 
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practices and capable of being exhausted by linguistic representations. Also, he problematises 
origins being tied to epistemes, or historically specific discursive formations, and the 
restricted possibility for critique when employing an archaeological approach – although 
Foucault offers a critique, it is not made clear how one can offer critique and what informs 
this. Howarth calls for archaeological work to be supplemented by a genealogical approach. 
Foucault, of course, shifted his own focus to genealogy in Discipline and Punish 
(1991) and The History of Sexuality (1990). Genealogy provides a way of investigating the 
ignoble beginnings of a research object. It starts from the view that discourse, power and 
knowledge are interconnected as “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined 
together” (Foucault, 1990, p. 100). This entails seeing discourse as something which can 
transmit, produce and reinforce power but also expose and undermine it. Power and 
knowledge are coupled as they “directly imply one another…there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute…power relations” (Foucault, 1991, p. 27). Genealogy is a way of 
uncovering the variability and contingency of discourse through a description of the 
procedures, practices, apparatuses and institutions involved in the production of discourses 
and their power effects (Howarth, 2000). In contrast with archaeology, this requires 
evaluation and invites critique on the part of the researcher.  
Despite this genealogical move, there remains a difficulty in explaining the actual 
practice of resistance and its precise relationship to issues of domination and this was 
something Foucault did not provide analyses of. What Howarth (2000) crucially adds to 
archaeology and genealogy is Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist concept of hegemony as 
described above. This allows for an understanding of how social space may be divided into 
oppositional sections, or projects seeking hegemonic status, through the establishment of 
political frontiers structured around chains of equivalence and difference.  
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2.2.7 Retroductive explanation and persuasion. 
As an alternative to inductive and deductive modes of reasoning, which separate 
discovery from explanation, retroductive reasoning is employed to create an interrelated view 
of the three stages of research: problematising phenomena, retroductive explanation and 
persuasion and intervention in a community. Retroductive reasoning is traced back to 
Aristotle and involves “studying facts and devising a theory to explain them” (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, p. 24). It is given a central role within a logics approach where it operates in 
a circular, dialogical fashion.  
Retroductive explanation seeks to make the empirical material intelligible through an 
ongoing oscillation between the phenomena and various explanations, crucially linking 
discovery with explanation in opposition to positivist research. It involves articulating the 
relevant logics involved; characterising the practices being investigated and their need for 
analysis using an archaeology; and explaining their political and ideological emergence 
through genealogy. 
Explanations are to be judged not by being empirically tested for predictive purposes 
and statistical significance, but by how intelligible they are and the understandings they offer 
in line with their underlying ontological assumptions. This makes ontology transparent in a 
way that is not often done within social science research and so links problems, explanations 
and theoretical assumptions rather than obscuring the latter.  
 
2.2.8 Logics. 
As represented in Table 2, Social, political and fantasmatic logics are the three logics 
at the heart of this poststructuralist account of critical explanation (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). 
These logics enable social practices and regimes to be described dialectically and an 
explanation of how and why such practices came into being and how they change or resist 
change. 
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Table 2 
Functions of the explanatory logics: social, political, and fantasmatic 
Explanatory Logics Function Formal Logics 
Social Provide a synoptic or 
synchronic perspective on 
social practices and 
discourses 
 
Political Provide a dynamic or 
diachronic perspective on 
social practices and 
discourses 
Logic of equivalence: 
organises social space into 
two opposing camps 
Logic of difference: 
multiples difference but 
resists dichotomies 
Fantasmatic Account for the grip of 
ideology beyond the 
limitations of pure 
rationalism, through the 
promise of beatific or 
horrific enjoyment 
Beatific: offers promise of 
social salvation in the form 
of complete social harmony 
or efficiency 
Horrific: presents threat in 
the form of spectres of 
inexorable societal decline 
Note. Adapted from “Talkin’ ‘bout a revolution: the social, political, and fantasmatic logics 
of education policy” by M. Clarke, 2011, Journal of Education Policy, 27, p. 7. Copyright 
2011 by Taylor & Francis. 
 
Social logics are the rules or grammar of a practice or regime and therefore enable 
the purpose, form and content to be seen. They can be thought of as patterned social practices 
linked to the interpretations of key people involved. They are also tied to particular historical 
and political contexts, showing their open-ended character.  
Political logics show the institution, sedimentation or contestation of social practices 
or regimes, both past and present. Laclau and Mouffe’s (2014) logics of equivalence and 
difference, referred to in table 2 as formal logics to describe their ability to be specified 
outside of particular contexts, are relevant here in showing how political logics may operate. 
A logic of equivalence divides social space into two opposing camps – it links groups and 
individuals by minimising any differences between them and uniting them against a common 
enemy. In contrast, a logic of difference breaks down such equivalences by highlighting 
individual or group differences, incorporating them into an expanding order and thus 
preventing a challenge to a dominant regime. This is likened to “the age-old practice of 
‘divide and rule’” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 145).  
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Fantasmatic logics draws upon Lacanian psychoanalysis – Žižek’s (2008) political 
employment of Lacanian thought in particular – and refers to the ideological grip of a 
particular practice or regime. The concept of fantasy is used to explain why practices resist 
or, alternatively, embrace change. Fantasy operates by obscuring the radical contingency of 
the social world and thus ‘promising’ closure (Glynos, 2001). It can have different effects 
such as reinforcing social practices, covering up the political dimension of a given practice or 
creating an energy for change. This ties affect to a universe of meaning structured by 
fantasmatic frames (Chang & Glynos, 2011). For example, beatific fantasy may promise a 
completeness or harmony once an obstacle is overcome, or horrific fantasy may warn of 
potential disaster awaiting if an obstacle cannot be overcome. Fantasmatic logics, then, 
involves considering the enjoyment subjects experience in relation to social practices and 
regimes. Although, this enjoyment, being psychoanalytic, can be consciously experienced as 
suffering. 
These three logics are described as necessary in accounting for problematised 
phenomena as they can characterise what practices are (social logics), how they came into 
being, are challenged and defended (political logics) and why this is done (fantasmatic 
logics). This allows for a descriptive, explanatory and critical framework for investigating 
social phenomena through a process of articulation.  
 
2.2.9 Articulation.  
Articulation is employed as the overarching way of conducting research from a logics 
perspective which is seen as a process of critical explanation (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 
165–208). It contrasts with approaches which attempt to subsume empirical phenomena 
under universal laws or mechanisms, or approaches which use an empirical case as an 
explanation in itself.  
In providing an explanation of the problematised issue, theoretical and empirical 
elements are linked to produce a singular explanation (singular, in that it does not necessarily 
have applicability beyond the case studies, although it may – see below). This is done by 
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constructing nodal points which partially fix meaning in a new, singular way, thus altering 
individual elements. The most important part of articulation is its contingent nature, thus 
remaining faithful to the ontological position described above. Articulation, then, requires a 
situated, reflective judgement by the researcher informed by being immersed in the discursive 
field being studied. For example, it is up to the researcher to make judgements as to when 
something counts as an empty signifier or a political logic and researchers’ judgements are 
improved through practice, as they become more familiar with the grammar of concepts and 
logics through investigating particular cases.  
The articulation offered is therefore up for debate and clearly not the last word on a 
topic. Its success depends upon its persuasiveness as a valid explanation for the investigated 
issue, and the extent to which it provides a better account than rival explanations. An 
articulation may have applicability beyond the case being studied and so contribute to 
explaining related cases. When this is the case, such an explanation would be considered 
paradigmatic. It cannot be simply applied to another case in a straightforward way, but 
through a new articulation, sensitive to similarities and differences, a justifiable ‘family 
resemblance’ can be produced. This differs from research seeking generalisability due to the 
different underlying ontological assumptions. 
 
2.2.10 Critique. 
As should be clear, the logics approach is a form of critique and enables both 
normative and ethical critique. Ethical critique is prioritised due to being more directly 
connected to the specified ontology. A view of the social as ontologically open brings with it 
a critical stance towards discourses which, through the way individuals are gripped by them, 
conceal such contingency. Ethical critique is therefore located at the ideological level, the 
point at which ‘closure’ is promised, and explores the fantasies informing social and political 
practices. Normative critique, by contrast, is directed towards the social practices people find 
themselves in. This involves naming them as social logics, which itself involves bringing 
together heterogeneous elements, and so allows alternative practices, or counter-logics, to be 
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thought of. Glynos and Howarth (2007) utilise Laclau and Mouffe’s principles of radical and 
plural democracy to inform their contingent normative judgements, where emphasis is placed 
upon the “plural, collective and democratic dimension of social life” (p. 196).  
West (2011), drawing upon the work of Norval (2005), describes three critical 
impulses that a logics approach can generate, all of which were considered in this research. 
The first of these is Derridean and genealogical, an uncovering of alternative political 
projects, or ways of thinking, that have been concealed through a dominant, hegemonic order. 
This focuses attention on the structure of social systems, which contrasts with a second, 
Lacanian impulse towards an analysis of the subject’s identifications in response to a 
fundamental lack and the degree of success associated with such identifications. Thirdly, the 
logics approach encourages a critical stance towards its own methodology and interventions, 
hence the emphasis upon articulation described above, to remain faithful to its own ontology. 
 
2.3 Empirical Context and Material 
The empirical material investigated here came from a range of sources. It consisted 
of conceptual and empirical academic texts, policy documents, NICE guidelines, mental 
health texts and newspaper articles. The primary empirical material however consisted of 
audio recordings of duty screening assessments completed within an IAPT service. One day 
was also spent within the service observing processes and asking informal questions to 
supplement my understanding. The empirical material relating to the IAPT service will now 
be outlined in more detail. 
The participating IAPT service was a primary care service and operates within the 
context of the stepped care model of service delivery previously discussed. It provides 
services to people aged 16 and over who have mild to severe levels of common mental health 
problems within a particular geographical area. The service accepts referrals from people 
registered with a general practitioner (GP) in the catchment area; the referrals can be from 
individuals themselves, from GPs or from secondary care services. The service was contacted 
and agreed to host this research. 
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The service operates a duty screening assessment when there is an indication that the 
referral is urgent and these assessments are then completed as soon as possible. The purpose 
of this assessment is to clarify the problem and level of risk, discuss previous or current 
treatment, provide information about the service and make a decision about appropriate 
support as set out in a pro forma. The assessments vary in duration but typically last between 
forty and fifty-five minutes.  
The IAPT service specify a range of criteria for accessing their service organised 
around mental health problems. They provide a service for people experiencing mild to 
severe levels of common mental health problems including depression, generalised anxiety 
disorder, panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, phobias (including social phobia), 
post-traumatic stress disorder (single event trauma), depression or anxiety in the context of 
difficulties coping with a chronic physical problem. If people also have other diagnoses or 
conditions, such as Asperger’s, Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, mild to moderate 
learning disabilities, mild self-harm or mild to moderate drug and alcohol problems, they may 
be offered a service if they also present with one of the mental health problems specified that 
they would like to address. Additionally, willingness to engage in the interventions is also 
considered important.  
The IAPT service specify a range of exclusion criteria which the duty screening 
assessment is designed to explore. The exclusion criteria are significant levels of identified 
risk to self or others within the last three months, a history of repeat self-injury requiring 
hospital treatment, individuals experiencing severe anger management problems (e.g., a 
history of agitation or threatening others, physical aggression to people or animals, property 
destruction, being arrested in the past twelve months for violence related issues), where the 
primary difficulty relates to childhood sexual abuse, multiple event trauma/post-traumatic 
stress disorder, very poor functioning in more than one domain of life (or extensive social 
care needs), a current or provisional diagnosis of severe mental ill health, a current primary 
diagnosis of personality disorder, drug or alcohol issues as a severe primary problem which 
would interfere with interventions offered, current care/involvement from secondary care 
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mental health services, moderate to severe learning disabilities whose clinical needs would be 
best met within specialist learning disability services, individuals under the age of sixteen and 
individuals not registered with a GP in the catchment area.  
As the screening assessments are the area of practice most explicitly concerned with 
issues of risk, these assessments were selected as the most relevant empirical material for this 
project. Recording the duty screening assessments was felt to offer an advantage to 
interviewing subjects about issues of risk as it more directly captures the actual day to day 
practices taking place which relate to risk. It therefore enables social practices to come to the 
fore and allows for subjects’ self-interpretations to be seen in action as opposed to focusing 
on their subsequent descriptions. This passes what is elsewhere called the dead social 
scientist test as the practice being studied would take place even if the researcher was run 
over on the way to work (Potter, 2002, p. 541).23 It also meets the call for a greater focus on 
social practices as a way of avoiding an overly hasty move towards political explanations 
which may reduce the complexity of social practices and the critical potential of a logics 
approach (West, 2011).  
A day spent in the participating IAPT service was also arranged to supplement the 
audio recorded assessments. This provided an opportunity to observe the everyday practices 
and processes within the service and to ask informal questions. This was felt to add additional 
contextualisation and to aid with informing my own judgements as a researcher. As described 
above, judgement is an important element of a logics approach and so spending a day in the 
service was seen as a helpful way to improve my ability to make situated judgements and to 
become more immersed in the empirical context. My own experience of working in an IAPT 
service (discussed in section 1.2.4) may have been an advantage in relation to developing a 
contextualised understanding of the material but a disadvantage in that a pre-existing tacit 
understanding may have obscured certain questions. However, as the primary material was 
the audio recorded assessments, this did not influence the data collected but required 
reflection at the stage of analysis. 
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2.3.1 Participants. 
The subjects participating in this research did so from the position of two distinct 
roles. One group were the practitioners who complete duty screening assessments and the 
other group were people receiving duty screening assessments, referred to by the service as 
clients. Practitioners were high intensity cognitive behavioural workers. All practitioners who 
complete duty screening calls within the participating IAPT service were invited to 
participate. All clients aged 18 and over who received a duty screening call from a 
participating practitioner were eligible to participate and invited by participating practitioners. 
Any clients who were felt to lack mental capacity to participate were not included and this 
judgement was made by the participating practitioners. Three practitioners ended up taking 
part in the research with another practitioner agreeing but her client later choosing not to take 
part. One other client also provided initial consent but not informed consent and so this 
recording was destroyed. Out of the eight assessments recorded then, six were used in the 
analysis. This meant six clients took part in the research. The recordings were collected from 
December 2015 to May 2016. The research process will now be outlined.  
 
2.4 Research Process 
The research process differed for practitioners and clients. Practitioners were 
informed of the study by the local collaborator within the participating service. They were 
provided with a consent form (Appendix A) and information sheet (Appendix B) and given 
an opportunity to meet with the researcher to ask any questions they may have. They were 
given over 24 hours to consider participating and asked to return a signed consent form to the 
researcher if they agreed to take part.  
Those who agreed to participate were given access to audio recording equipment 
which consisted of a Dictaphone that could be connected to a telephone via an audio 
recording device. They were requested to ask clients they called if they were willing to have 
the assessment recorded for research purposes and a script was provided for this (Appendix 
C). Practitioners informed clients that they did not have to agree, there would not be any 
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negative consequences for not taking part and that they would be sent information about the 
research in the post. If clients agreed at this stage, the assessment was recorded. There was no 
limit to the number of assessments practitioners were able to record, so long as their clients 
also provided consent. The only additional process for some practitioners was that they were 
observed and asked informal questions during the observation day. 
Clients who initially agreed for their assessment to be recorded were then sent a 
consent form (Appendix D) and an information sheet (Appendix E). They were given 
sufficient time to receive the information and return it by pre-paid envelope to the 
participating service. If this was not received after sufficient time had passed, they were 
contacted by telephone once only by an assistant psychologist from the participating service 
to ask if they would be providing informed consent and if so to return the consent form to the 
service. When clients could not be contacted, the relevant audio recording was securely 
destroyed. 
An assistant psychologist collected the signed consent forms and audio recordings 
within the participating service. When clients returned their signed consent forms, these were 
matched with the relevant audio recording and then copies of the recordings and consent 
forms were securely transferred to the researcher. Once the audio recordings were obtained, 
they were listened to in full, transcribed and then analysed using the logics framework.  
 
2.5 Process of Analysis  
The analytical process involved engaging with the empirical material using the five 
moments of a logics discourse: problematisation, retroductive explanation and persuasion, 
utilising the language of logics in an overarching process of articulation.  
More specifically, this involved selecting discourses to analyse as part of the 
archaeological and genealogical problematisation of risk. This was done by searching the 
university library catalogue for academic texts on the subject of risk and risk assessment, 
selecting materials of interest and consulting the references and bibliographies of selected 
materials. Additionally, electronic databases were searched for articles relating to risk 
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assessment within mental health and a Nexis search of newspaper articles relating to 
Christopher Clunis and Isabel Schwarz was also carried out. These cases were highlighted in 
the materials studied. NICE guidelines and policy documents were also obtained and 
searched in relation to risk assessment.  
These materials were analysed following the Foucauldian injunctions outlined above 
but also from a discourse theoretical perspective. This involved a descriptive approach 
towards risk assessment in the archaeological work, drawing out the objectives linked to the 
discourses explored, as well as the concepts utilised and the subjects produced, and a 
consideration of the interconnection of discourse, power and knowledge in the genealogical 
work, both supplemented by the concepts of discourse theory. The puzzling issues described 
were developed through the problematisation of risk assessment into the more formal 
research questions outlined. 
The audio recordings of the duty screening assessments were analysed from this 
discourse theoretical perspective with a more structured application of the logics framework 
at this stage. This involved an iterative process of reading and listening to the data with 
social, political and fantasmatic logics in mind, labelling empirical instances as particular 
logics, noticing patterns and reworking the logics as required to develop an overall 
articulation. 
The empirical material was transformed into textual data. This involved transcribing 
the audio recorded screening assessments in their entirety without adding punctuation other 
than apostrophes. Occasional non-verbal information was also included, such as the sound of 
typing or coughing but other information was not included, such as the length of silences or 
tone of voice. Line numbers were added for ease of reference. Once the data was in textual 
form, the logics framework was applied. Appendix F provides an example of the transcription 
and early stages of analysis.  
The primary focus was on identifying social, political and fantasmatic logics in the 
selected sections. This involved considering what was taking place within the interaction 
between participants in order to characterise the way risk was assessed (social logics), 
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considering the alliances informing the interaction using the political logics of equivalence 
and difference (political), and looking for evidence of beatific and horrific dimensions of 
fantasy in order to provide an explanation as to why risk assessment was invested in by those 
taking part (fantasmatic logics).  
 
2.6 Ethics 
As described above, this research adopted an ontological presupposition of there 
being an ethical dimension to social life. The ethical relates to practices where subjects attend 
to issues of radical contingency whilst engaging in social practices. Ethical considerations are 
therefore an important part of the broader analytic process, but here some considerations of 
ethics in relation to the research process for participants will be described. 
Ethical approval was sought and obtained from an NHS committee, the research and 
development department of the participating NHS trust and from the University of Essex who 
acted as sponsor for the project (see Appendix G). As part of this process, a number of ethical 
issues were considered in relation to participants.  
The duty screening calls involved discussion around sensitive topic areas such as 
suicide, self-harm and mental health. This had the potential to be distressing for all involved. 
However, as the assessments were part of ordinary clinical practice there were support 
mechanisms already in place. For practitioners, this included regular supervision and access 
to a senior member of staff for any immediate concerns. For clients, this included support 
from the IAPT service or referral to other sources of support. Additional information about 
relevant services, such as the Samaritans, was obtained and an opportunity for a debriefing 
session with the researcher was available. 
As clinical practice was being recorded, the possibility of practitioners feeling 
scrutinised and judged as professionals was considered. For clients, the possibility that having 
their assessment recorded could lead to additional anxiety was considered, particularly as the 
assessment itself may be an anxiety provoking situation. It was therefore made clear to 
participants that they were free to withdraw from the research at any stage without having to 
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provide an explanation and without any negative consequences. Participants were made 
aware however that if they requested to withdraw after the submission deadline, it may not be 
possible to change information at this stage. Participants were also informed that the aim of 
recording the screening calls was for qualitative research only and were offered the chance to 
discuss any concerns they had with the researcher.  
Written consent was sought from all participants and all identifying information was 
anonymised during the transcription process. To further protect confidentiality, the audio data 
was stored using encrypted, password protected software and only accessed by the researcher 
and relevant supervisors. Following completion of this analysis, the audio recordings were 
offered to the UK Data Archive to store securely for future qualitative research. This was 
fully explained to participants in the information sheets (Appendix B and E). 
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Chapter 3: Results – Articulating Logics 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter presents the results of the research which involves an articulation of the 
logics identified within the empirical material. The chapter starts by providing an overview of 
the results. It then considers social, political and fantasmatic logics in turn, discussing these 
logics in closer detail and providing illustrative extracts.  
 
3.2 Results Overview 
The analysis of the empirical material led to the identification of two key social 
logics that operated within the social practice of duty screening assessments in an IAPT 
service. These logics were a logic of well-oiled administration and a logic of preservation. In 
line with the ontology informing this research, these logics should be seen as a partial fixation 
of the overall practice enabling a critical description, examination and explanation of risk 
assessment within primary care. The logics articulated provide a grammar for understanding 
what makes risk assessment practice work in the way it does in the given social and historical 
context. As social, political and fantasmatic logics are considered intertwined, the inflections 
of these social logics were examined in relation to political logics of equivalence and 
difference, and beatific and horrific dimensions of fantasmatic logics. 
Fantasmatic logics work as the glue that holds social practices together through 
driving social actors’ continued investment in them. These logics consist of beatific and 
horrific dimensions. Beatific fantasy relates to fantasy narratives structured around ideals of 
complete social harmony or efficiency, and horrific fantasy, working in the opposite 
direction, presents a threat that needs to be curtailed to prevent catastrophic decline. In the 
assessments studied, a rigorously completed risk assessment emerged as a way of ensuring 
complete protection and security for the social actors involved leading to the service 
flourishing, being fully resourced and recommissioned. The pro forma promised to 
straightforwardly assess all risks so nothing could jeopardise this perfectly efficient 
administrative system. This beatific fantasy generated a view of an administrative machine 
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fully capable of accurately assessing risks and managing them appropriately, thus removing 
risk and contingency from the social world. Risk assessment took on infallible qualities and 
as long as practitioners completed their administrative tasks comprehensively, they were 
protected by their administrative risk assessment and so guaranteed continued employment 
and professional esteem. This meant being able to demonstrate risk had been assessed was 
more significant than actually assessing risk and generated an enjoyment in this social 
practice. 
The other side of fantasmatic logics that generated investment in risk assessment was 
the horrific dimension. Here, any break down or slippage in the logics of well-oiled 
administration or preservation became an obstacle which could set in motion a move towards 
catastrophic decline. This decline could involve the service not being provided to the right 
clients. This included clients being deemed suitable for the service despite not needing it, 
clients needing the service but not being granted access, or, worst of all, clients accessing the 
service despite presenting high levels of risk and needing a more comprehensive service. The 
assessments therefore served an important gatekeeping function and mitigated the ultimate 
threat of the service not being re-commissioned. The pro forma that structured the 
assessments became a protection from these horrific possibilities and the contingency brought 
about by the humans completing them. Practitioners could absolve themselves of any 
responsibility for granting or denying access to the service by relying on the well-oiled 
administrative process and clients’ self-reporting to ensure their own and the service’s 
preservation. This provided an enjoyment for practitioners in what potentially is a high risk 
assessment for them, due to the potential for professional vilification and reputational damage 
should clients go onto harm themselves or others without this being anticipated. It also 
enabled the service to fulfil the role of guarantor as long as the assessment had been dutifully 
completed and so protected practitioners from anxiety associated with contingency. 
Political logics work to create alliances between the various social actors involved in 
a given practice. They enable an understanding of how a social practice like risk assessment 
came into being, is maintained, or challenged. Logics of equivalence and difference were in 
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evidence in relation to the social logics of well-oiled administration and preservation. Logics 
of equivalence involve social actors creating alliances and establishing a political frontier to 
challenge existing social structures. Social actors can form chains of equivalence where they 
become equivalent in their opposition to a given social structure or common enemy. Logics 
of difference work by breaking down such political frontiers or equivalences to maintain 
existing social relations and practices. Regimes, or systems of practices, can be formed from 
social practices yet also come to structure such practices. The IAPT service studied here 
operated within what can be considered a regime of competition where commissioners act as 
an occupying power through selecting organisations to provide services in a market frame. 
This commissioning context broke down chains of equivalence between clients and 
practitioners using a logic of difference. This may work to expand the dominance of market 
based principles within mental health care. The logics of well-oiled administration and 
preservation were therefore structured by an equivalence between commissioners, the service 
and practitioners. This prevented an equivalence being created between practitioners and 
clients, particularly when the smooth operation of the social logics was challenged where the 
administrative aspects of risk assessment became prioritised along with managing risks to the 
service.  
The social logics themselves then were well-oiled administration and preservation. 
Well-oiled administration consisted of various elements including the bureaucratic processes 
of obtaining information and completing a pro forma. This involved clients’ problems being 
made to fit around the structure of the pro forma and assessment process. At times this led to 
practitioners performing an administrative role with the more analytical aspects of their role 
backgrounded. This could take the form of practitioners following the pro forma instead of 
using their own judgement and experience to inform the interaction. Another key aspect of 
well-oiled administration involved attempting to manage any contingency that arose. This 
was done either pre-emptively through treating clients as rational actors or reactively through 
denying or downplaying context and complexity. The logic of preservation involved some 
issues being conceptualised as risks but not others, in particular the risk of suicide. It also 
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prioritised the management of potential risks to practitioners and the service. A well-
documented assessment became a way of managing any risks to practitioners from the 
process of completing assessments. Other ways of managing the risks to the service included 
providing choice or input in relation to treatment decisions. This provision of choice, which 
was a restricted choice, showed the influence of market based principles and the current 
dominance of the regime of competition within health care. The logics will now be further 
elaborated in relation to the empirical material. 
 
3.3 Social Logics 
3.3.1 Logic of well-oiled administration. 
I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I 
am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police 
to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write. 
(Foucault, 2002, p. 19) 
 
The social logic of well-oiled administration is used to describe patterns in the 
empirical material where the discourse between practitioner and client was informed by an 
underlying logic of being administratively efficient. Indeed, this logic structured much of the 
overall assessment and produced a bureaucratic encounter between client and practitioner, 
focused on getting one’s papers in order. This privileged obtaining and documenting 
information. Other aspects, such as the process of the assessment, were marginalised. This 
led to clients being made to fit around the institutional requirements of the service and 
backgrounded the analytical skill of practitioners who became tied to the pro forma and 
administrative processes with the institutional process of risk assessment foregrounded. This 
logic also involved asking clients to remain the same. The administrative emphasis 
positioned clients as rational actors, obscured a contextualised understanding of the risks that 
featured and minimised complexity. This functioned to manage any contingency that arose 
which could interfere with the process of well-oiled administration.  
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3.3.1.1 Getting one’s papers in order. 
The pro forma specified the structure of the assessment and has been adapted and 
represented in figure 4.24 The pro forma highlights the importance placed upon administrative 
processes. Practitioners are politely requested to ask all the questions and the pro forma 
specifies the information to be obtained in order to make a decision about whether a client is 
suitable for the service or not. As shown, this involves seven key areas: main difficulties, 
medication, previous mental health problems and treatments, risk, safeguarding children, 
expectations and goals, and a treatment plan. 
 
Figure 4. Anonymised Pro forma 
 
Identification Number: 
Assessor: 
Date: 
Time: 
 
Please ask all the questions 
 
Explain confidentiality: 
“Anything you tell us is confidential, and is only shared within the service by people 
involved in your care, unless there is a concern about your safety or the safety of others. If 
anyone is at risk in anyway, I will need to discuss this with a senior colleague, and I may 
need to inform other professionals.” 
 
Check with self-referrals if they agree for the GP to be contacted:  
 
1. Main difficulties 
“In a few words, how would you describe your current main problems?” (Ask specific 
questions that you think are relevant to the main problem, if necessary – remember this is 
just for suitability and is not a full assessment)   
 
Mania/hypomania prompt 
“Have there been times where you have felt very high and were talking a lot, unable to 
sleep, lasting several days at a time?” 
 
Psychosis prompt 
“Has it ever seemed like people were taking special notice of you?”  
“Have you ever heard anything that other people could not hear or seen anything that other 
people could not see?” 
 
PTSD prompt 
“Have you ever been involved in a life threatening or traumatic event? 
If yes: “Do you have nightmares, flashbacks or recurrent intrusive memories about it?” 
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Have there been multiple traumas that the client has experienced? Including childhood 
sexual abuse? 
 
Anger prompt 
“Do you experience any problems controlling anger?” 
If yes does this lead to violence towards others/animals/property? 
If yes, has this led to court action/convictions? 
 
Self-harm prompt 
“Do you ever harm yourself?” (now or in the past) 
Has this required medical/hospital intervention? 
Any long term physical health conditions? (if yes what are they?)  
 
Substance misuse prompt 
“Do you use drugs or alcohol?” (include frequency, amount, drug of choice.) Any other 
addictions, gambling, internet etc.? 
“Do you feel this is your main problem?” 
 
2. Medication 
“Are you taking any medication?” 
 
3. Previous mental health problems and treatments 
“Have you had any previous mental health problems?” 
“Has a mental health professional ever diagnosed these problems?” 
“Have you had any previous therapy for any of these problems?” 
 “Are you receiving any help from a counsellor, psychotherapist, psychiatrist or mental 
health nurse at the moment?” 
 
4. Risk 
Cover the following 
• Previous suicide attempts  
• Current thoughts, plans, preparations, intent 
• Risk of harm to others 
• Risk of harm from others 
• Risk to dependents (neglect) 
• Preventative factors 
• Has this been a significant problem in the last three months? 
 
5. Safeguarding Children 
Check if patient has children. Collect names and DOB. Ask if any concerns around risk 
and if they have any support for their children. 
 
6. Expectations and Goals 
“What would be the main thing you would want to work on?” 
 
7. Treatment Plan 
Choose from the following to conclude your conversation with the client: 
Decide is this person SUITABLE – Yes/No, do you need to get information from 
secondary care.   
If suitable, step 2 for full assessment, if complex or trauma, step 3 for assessment. 
 
Figure 4. Anonymised Pro forma 
 
77 
 
As well as the proforma illustrating the importance placed upon administrative 
processes, this was well evidenced in the assessments analysed. Extract 1 provides an 
example of an explanation of the assessment. 
Extract 1 
Practitioner C:  just ticking the right boxes here okay…so what we what we’re gonna do is 
we’re going to go through the assessment in three parts err first of all we’ve 
got a set questionnaire to go through um now I’m not sure were you sent that 
in the post the questionnaire 
Client D:  there was something came in the post yeah um 
Practitioner C:  right have you had an opportunity to look at that 
Client D:  err yeah I've had a look through it 
Practitioner C: okay so we're gonna go through that if you've had a chance to complete it 
we'll we'll look at what you've your responses are and what [inaudible] we've 
got here  
Client D:  well I've looked at it I haven't actually completed it but 
Practitioner C:  okay 
Client D:  I can I can yeah 
Practitioner C:  okay well we'll go we'll go through that now but if you do have it in front of 
you it's useful for the answers 
Client D:  yeah 
Practitioner C:  and err part of that um I've just got some other added questions relating to 
risk these are questions that we ask clients um just to check that they're safe 
and that they're okay  
Client D:  mmm 
Practitioner C:  okay 
Client D:  mm 
Practitioner C:  following on from that we'll err have the main part of the assessment an 
opportunity for you to explain you know what your difficulties are um and 
some other questions that I've got relating to other conditions just to screen 
those conditions 
Client D:  mmhmm 
Practitioner C:  and then we'll talk about what options are available based on what we've 
discussed (Lines 95-118)  
 
This extract shows how administrative processes were prioritised. This involved 
‘ticking the right boxes’, completing a ‘set questionnaire’, ‘some other added questions 
relating to risk’ and ‘other conditions’. The extract also shows how the logic of well-oiled 
administration encouraged clients to facilitate administration through completing the 
questionnaires prior to the assessment or at least having them ‘in front of you’ during the 
assessment. This became ‘useful’ to the practitioner. It also shows how what is referred to as 
the ‘main part’ of the assessment follows the completion of the questionnaires and risk 
questions. Although being called the ‘main part’, the client being given an opportunity to 
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explain his difficulties was subordinated to the bureaucratic, administrative tasks. This was 
mirrored in the above extract where an explanation of the process of the assessment was 
prioritised over hearing from the client. 
The logic of well-oiled administration prioritised obtaining clear, unambiguous 
information as seen in the following extract. 
Extract 2 
Practitioner A:  okay so what I’m hearing really…is although things are really really tough at 
the moment and you do have those [suicidal] thoughts quite frequently it 
doesn’t sound as though there is any serious risk that you’re gonna act on 
them at the moment and that’s because of the thoughts of your children 
Client A:  yeah 
Practitioner A:  and also the support that you’ve got from your family 
Client A:  yeah 
Practitioner A:  have I understood that correctly? 
Client A:  mmhmm (Lines 157-164) 
 
This extract shows how the logic of well-oiled administration emphasised a correct 
understanding of responses to specific questions, such as whether there was a serious risk of 
this client acting on his suicidal thoughts. This reduced complexity and prevented more in 
depth exploration. It also marginalised alternative practices such as developing a therapeutic 
relationship, although ‘things’ being ‘really really tough’ shows some potential for this. 
However, obtaining particular information was prioritised, in this case an acknowledgement 
from the client that there wasn’t any serious risk of him attempting suicide. The importance 
of documenting information was evident from practitioners typing. Extract 3 shows one client 
commenting on this. 
Extract 3 
Practitioner B:  [typing] 
Client C: you can type quick 
Practitioner B:  just about 
Client C:  ha ha ha 
Practitioner B:  I am getting there when I look through there’s a lot of abc corrections (Lines 
563-567) 
 
The logic of well-oiled administration prioritised some actions over others. Here, 
recording information that could be utilised for decision making processes, as opposed to the 
client’s perspective or experience of the assessment, was prioritised. The client had to wait 
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for the practitioner to finish typing before the assessment continued. This highlights the 
administrative role performed by practitioners. At times this was extended and practitioners 
became technicians asking questions because the pro forma required it rather than it being 
clinically relevant as seen in extract 4. The logic of well-oiled administration could therefore 
place practitioners in a predominantly administrative role and in this sense presents a 
challenge to the development of clinical expertise.  
Extract 4 
Practitioner A:  just so with this assessment we we’d look well I’m gonna go through a few 
things now just to rule things in or out okay 
Client A:  yeah 
Practitioner A:  a kind of general screening um so some of these questions won’t relate to 
you but it’s just to make sure (Lines 424-427) 
 
The questions were not practitioners’ questions then, but bureaucratic and 
administrative. This involved the pro forma being referenced, here a ‘general screening’, as 
the reason for asking questions instead of them being of clinical interest. The pro forma 
justified this through stating all questions should be asked. While this absolved the 
practitioner of responsibility for asking a given question, it also removed analytical skill from 
the practitioner who became tied to the pro forma. Despite this, and the client’s awareness of 
it, practitioners continued to engage in this practice. This shows an investment in the process 
understood here as linked to the beatific and horrific dimensions of fantasy explored below.  
Well-oiled administration could become the client’s focus too showing how this logic 
encouraged clients to understand their own mental health in relation to the institutional 
working of the service. Client B had previously accessed the service and had prior experience 
‘volunteering in mental health’ which is likely to have contributed to this. Nevertheless, he 
assisted with the administrative process by putting his self-harm ‘in the middle range’ as 
shown in extract 5. This suggests a form of self-surveillance, echoing Foucault’s (1991) 
elaboration of the Panopticon (discussed further in the critical explanation below). 
Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, assisting with administration becomes comprehensible 
in relation to the goal, which clients may have, of being granted access to the service. 
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Extract 5 
Practitioner A:  when you self-harmed what did you do 
Client B:  it was a couple of well I’m sure you’re used to hearing this it was a couple of 
err cuts on me leg 
Practitioner A:  okay and did they need medical attention or did you just dress them yourself 
or 
Client B:  I just err sorted them out meself 
Practitioner A:  okay they weren’t too deep 
Client B:  um no I’ve had a a lot deeper um err cos I’ve had some experiences yo-well 
you probably can’t remember but working in um drug and alcohol and 
volunteering in mental health and err I’d put them in the middle range (Lines 
55-62) 
 
This client’s ‘risk’ was ‘a concern’, as shown in the extract below. Extracts 5 and 6 
show how the logic of well-oiled administration encouraged clients to be involved in 
assessing their own risks as a way of assisting the administrative decision making process.  
Extract 6 
Practitioner A:  because this risk is is um you know a concern what’s your sense of that if 
you for example if at the end of the assessment we did think about putting 
you on the waiting list for treatment but you had to wait three or four months 
do you feel that you would be safe in doing that or do you think you would 
need something sooner than that to keep safe 
Client B:  um I I possibly think I’d be I dunno how to answer that I think I would be 
okay but I do want something (Lines 431-436) 
 
This shows the primary task was administration. This led to the client’s problems 
being made to fit around the service as he was here asked to consider his safety in relation to 
waiting lists. Like extract 2, it provides another example of the onus being placed upon 
clients to confirm their own safety. The client did not know ‘how to answer’ and provided an 
ambiguous response acknowledging contingency which left the practitioner unsure at this 
stage of the assessment. Thus, contingency was a problem for the logic of well-oiled 
administration.   
 
3.3.1.2 Asking clients to remain the same. 
Contingency became a problem for the logic of well-oiled administration due to 
interrupting its smooth operation. The structure of the pro forma and emphasis on obtaining 
straightforward information positioned clients as rational, knowing subjects. Clients were 
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presumed to have the information required to complete a successful assessment and the 
challenge became obtaining the right information. One way of dealing with contingency built 
into the structure of the assessment process was to deny it from the outset. Another way was 
to attempt to disallow it as shown in extract 7, which came shortly after the client reported 
thoughts of being better off dead. 
Extract 7 
Practitioner C:  okay um so if I can just ask you some more questions about those types of 
thoughts 
Client D:  mmm 
Practitioner C:  just to check that you’re okay um if you can answer yes or no to these ones 
(Lines 159-161) 
 
Requesting a simple ‘yes or no’ to the questions asked shows how the logic of well-
oiled administration worked to prevent contingency from surfacing. This could also be seen 
in the types of questions asked. Extracts 8-10 contain examples of questions asked to client B 
about his previous suicide attempt showing the focus was on his thoughts, feelings and 
actions. 
Extract 8 
Practitioner A:  more recently have you had any more sort of thoughts or desire to do that 
(Lines 108-109) 
 
Extract 9 
Practitioner A:  you used to cut as a way of coping with feelings or frustration (Lines 81-82) 
 
Extract 10 
Practitioner A:  when you self-harmed what did you do (Line 55) 
 
The above three extracts show how the context linked to risk issues could become 
extraneous information. The client was not asked about the circumstances surrounding his 
previous suicide attempt or about what he had referred to elsewhere as a ‘very messy divorce’ 
which he linked to previous self-harm. The client had also mentioned being unemployed, 
having a criminal record and the voluntary work he used to do being cut due to funding 
issues, but these issues were not explored further showing how knowledge of past behaviour 
was prioritised over context or intention. 
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While the logic of well-oiled administration discouraged a contextualised 
understanding of risk issues, the questions asked by practitioners may have also been 
informed by a cognitive behavioural approach, as one practitioner explained to a client in 
extract 11.  
Extract 11 
Practitioner B:  we look at the thoughts or we look at the behaviours and we try and change 
the things we do or don’t do or the way we think and don’t think so that it 
starts having a positive impact on all the other areas in our lives so when we 
was doing the assessment I was looking at them physical symptoms the 
thoughts and the behaviours the theory behind the cognitive behavioural 
therapy is we get caught up into the vicious circle between all of them (Lines 
667-671). 
 
This extract illustrates that context was not one of the things practitioners ‘look at’, 
instead the focus was on ‘physical symptoms the thoughts and the behaviours’. Extracts 8-11 
show the potential for an alignment between a cognitive behavioural approach and the logic 
of well-oiled administration. Cognitive behavioural discourse may work to restore the 
analytical skill of the practitioner, which the logic of well-oiled administration diminished. 
However, this operated here to produce an understanding of clients’ problems extrapolated 
from the wider context of their lives. This was also evident in the emphasis on the ‘main 
problem’ which acknowledged the possibility of numerous problems but only provided space 
for one to be discussed which could be limited to ‘a few words’ as shown in extract 12.  
Extract 12 
Practitioner C:  so now we’ll move onto the other part of the assessment um first of all give 
you an opportunity err to to explain in a few words um your current main 
problem that you’re seeking help for what what would you say it is (Lines 
390-392). 
 
Extract 13 
Practitioner B:  what would be that main problem that you’re referring to our service for 
(Lines 62-63) 
 
 Extracts 12-13 show the logic of well-oiled administration encouraged problems to 
be understood in isolation and abstracted from the context of people’s lives including their 
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own past through the emphasis on the ‘current’ problem. It also prioritised brevity as seen in 
extract 12, another way of precluding complexity.  
Extract 14 shows how the logic of well-oiled administration did not accurately 
capture the risks from the perspective of clients.  In this extract, the client’s response to being 
asked if he felt he ‘could be a risk’ was to say ‘not at the moment no’ which was repeated as 
‘no’. The client qualified this by acknowledging contingency and indicating there may be the 
potential for him to be a risk if ‘certain situations arose’. The practitioner responded with 
okay and moved onto asking if the client felt ‘at risk from anybody’. The logic of well-oiled 
administration thus encouraged contingency to be ignored, in this case privileging the word 
‘no’ over an exploration of the situations that may lead to this client posing a risk to other 
people.  
Extract 14 
Practitioner A:  um the question we ask everyone is whether you feel you could be a risk to 
anybody else at all 
Client B:  mmm not at the moment no 
Practitioner A:  no okay 
Client B:  well you know not un unless certain situations arose but err no 
Practitioner A:  okay and then if you feel at risk from anybody at the moment (Lines 764-
768) 
 
One question that featured in all the assessments involved clients rating their 
intention to act on suicidal thoughts or plans numerically. This was how suicidal intent was 
enquired about, one of the areas the pro forma states to ‘cover’. An example is given below. 
Extract 15 
Practitioner B:  okay on a scale of zero to ten zero means that you would not currently act on 
any thoughts or plans to end your own life ten means you would where 
would you put yourself on that scale 
Client E:  err two (Lines 240-243) 
 
This question demonstrates how questions of risk of harm to self and others were 
construed in terms of the probability of an event happening. It also shows the legitimacy of 
converting the risk of suicide into a single number to assist with administrative processes 
such as determining suitability for the service. In this sense, clients became involved in a 
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form of self-assessment which lessened the need for practitioners to make a judgement about 
a client’s suitability. 
The importance of this question was underscored by the fact it was asked to all 
clients, i.e. those who had, and those who had not reported thoughts of suicide. This 
emphasises the positivist element present in the logic of well-oiled administration whereby 
risk can be converted into a single number and deprived of meaning and context. It also 
shows the assumption underpinning the risk assessment model that everyone presents some 
level of risk which can be accurately assessed and managed, and that those who may not 
appear at risk may in fact be at risk.  
This positivist element was also seen through the completion of questionnaires 
assessing symptoms of depression, anxiety, phobias and work and social adjustment. These 
questionnaires formed part of every assessment analysed and whilst being clinical tools were 
used to inform decisions about suitability for the service and so complement the pro forma, as 
shown in extract 16. 
Extract 16 
Practitioner C:  I’m gonna just look at the scores on those 
Client F:  mmm 
Practitioner C:  so the first set of nine questions which we looked at symptoms of depression 
there you scored thirteen out of a possible twenty-seven which err puts you in 
the moderate range which 
Client F:  right 
Practitioner C: is the sort of range actually that this service works with people so  
Client F: mmm 
Practitioner C:  where people are scoring very highly severely err this might not be the best 
service for them 
Client F:  yeah 
Practitioner C:  but that’s a that’s sort of within our ball park (Lines 476-485) 
 
 This extract shows how the logic of well-oiled administration led to the information 
provided being viewed as an accurate representation of a client’s difficulties. How the scores 
related to the service criteria took precedence. Again, this removed the need for practitioner 
judgement and required clients to frame their difficulties around the institutional workings of 
the service through being placed in a range for symptoms of depression. 
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3.3.2 Logic of preservation. 
The experts who are being made increasingly accountable for what they do are now 
becoming more preoccupied with managing their own risks. Specifically, secondary 
risks to their reputation are becoming as significant as the primary risks for which 
experts have knowledge and training. This trend is resulting in a dangerous flight 
from judgement and a culture of defensiveness that create their own risks for 
organisations in preparing for, and responding to, a future they cannot know. (Power, 
2004, pp. 14–15) 
 
The logic of preservation is articulated to capture how the assessments analysed were 
structured by practitioners managing the risks to them and the service that emerged from the 
practices that accompanied the completion of risk assessments. These risks were prioritised 
over other risks and so preservation of professional reputations and roles, and of the service 
itself, took precedence. The logic of preservation involved processes that identified some 
issues as risks but not others. In particular, the risk of client suicide was given considerable 
attention. The logic worked by turning particular issues into potential threats to the service, 
which were then managed through discursive work. The issues conceptualised as risks could 
at times be shown to align with issues clients viewed as risks, but equally this logic could 
position clients themselves as risks. This logic complemented the logic of well-oiled 
administration in that an incomplete pro forma became a risk in and of itself. This led to the 
assessment being very much pro forma led. Providing clients with a restricted choice also 
featured within this logic.  
 
3.3.2.1 Identifying risks. 
The pro forma conceptualises certain issues as explicit risks. It places greater 
significance on the risk of suicide than other areas as practitioners are requested to ‘cover’ 
previous suicide attempts, current suicidal thoughts, plans, preparations, and intent. For other 
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areas, like risk of harm to or from others, only one prompt is provided. It also specifies the 
need to cover preventative factors and focus on the last three months in particular.     
These issues became risks for practitioners. One assessment involved thirty-nine 
questions being asked about suicide and self-harm out of a total of around one hundred and 
twenty questions (around forty questions are specified on the pro forma and the additional 
questions asked were follow up/clarification questions). This assessment involved the client 
discussing suicidal thoughts but one client who did not report having suicidal thoughts was 
still asked twelve questions about suicide and self-harm. In contrast, answering no to a single 
question such as ‘do you feel you might be a risk to anybody else at all’ was taken as 
sufficient, and in line with the pro forma. 
Following the pro forma meant certain issues were formulated as risks and others 
were not, as shown in extract 17. 
Extract 17 
Practitioner B: okay so in terms of your work has your mood had any impact on your work 
at all at the moment…  
Client E:  um I've had a few outbursts at the managers for being useless at their job   
Practitioner B:  at other staff members have you 
Client E:  yeah well management 
Practitioner B:  well if they're not doing their jobs properly [inaudible] ha ha 
Client E:  I know [inaudible] calling them a bunch of useless wankers probably 
[inaudible] 
Practitioner B:  I know how that feels ha ha ha ha 
Client E:  I think most people do don't they they just don't say it 
Practitioner B:  that's it exactly exactly so apart from that it actually work isn't too bad a few 
incidents that 
occurred where mainly management not doing their jobs properly and you've 
just pretty much told them as it is yeah 
Client E:  yeah (Lines 455-470) 
 
Calling management ‘a bunch of useless wankers’ did not become a risk due to the 
logic of preservation which only encouraged further exploration of issues that may be a risk 
to the service. The potentially difficult issue was left unexplored and so any additional 
complexities were closed down. Issues left unexplored included whether this client was at 
risk of losing her job, whether her way of managing conflict created additional difficulties for 
her or whether her working conditions were linked to her mental health. The practitioner then 
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moved onto the next item on the pro forma. The logic of preservation led to an incomplete 
pro forma becoming a greater risk than any issue for this client linked to her work. This 
shows how a logic of preservation led to the service becoming pro forma as opposed to client 
led.  
This was also evident in extract 18 which began with the post-traumatic stress 
disorder prompt indicated on the pro forma. 
Extract 18 
Practitioner A:  have you been involved in any very um traumatic life threatening or very 
traumatic events from which you might have nightmares or flashbacks 
Client B:  I have but um no I don’t get nightmares or flashbacks no 
Practitioner A:  yeah okay and do you mind me asking what events you were referring to 
then 
Client B:  oh um god when a friend got attacked by a group of football supporters that 
were pulling out knives and machetes and that’s happened a couple of times 
that sort of thing you know 
Practitioner A:  yeah but you don’t have flashbacks or nightmares 
Client B:  no no 
Practitioner A:  okay okay okay do you feel you have a problem handling your anger at all do 
you feel that gets out of control (Lines 703-712) 
 
Again a potentially complex issue was not explored further. Here, completing the pro 
forma was prioritised over a more in depth discussion of this client’s experiences. The 
response of ‘no’ to the question about ‘flashbacks or nightmares’ was taken as sufficient and 
then moved on from to enquire about anger. This downplayed the expertise of this 
practitioner who simply obtained the required information. Perhaps this means practitioners 
provide a legitimacy to the assessment process, or possibly their expertise comes into play in 
moments of ambiguity thus acknowledging some limitations to the pro forma. In this case, no 
more was known about the ‘couple of times’ this client had been in this kind of situation and 
so this was not conceptualised as a risk despite involving violence and happening on more 
than one occasion. The use of a pro forma structured clients’ responses too. In extract 19, the 
standardised questions were answered in a very brief way which contradicted previous 
information.  
Extract 19 
Practitioner A:  do you feel you might be a risk to anybody else at all 
Client A:  no 
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Practitioner A:  no um at do you feel at risk from anybody in any way 
Client A:  um no I don’t think so 
Practitioner A:  okay you mentioned about your wife when she says abusive things does she 
ever get physically aggressive towards you 
Client A:  she has done once yeah (Lines 583-589) 
 
 This extract shows how the logic of preservation worked here to open up exploration 
of an issue conceptualised as a potential risk to the service. This contrasts with the previous 
two extracts where issues were not further considered. The extract shows how standardised 
questions could generate short responses and a potential difficulty with the language of ‘risk’ 
as it was here conceptualised differently by the actors involved. Here, the client’s wife saying 
‘abusive things’ and being ‘physically aggressive’ was not something that led him to ‘feel at 
risk’, yet the logic of preservation led to this becoming a possible risk. 
When the ‘risk issue’ was not a risk to the service, the logic of preservation reduced 
its significance as shown in extract 20.  
Extract 20  
Practitioner C:  do you feel that you’re at risk from anybody else 
Client D:  from anybody else 
Practitioner C:  yeah 
Client D:  um well it not individuals but the um as I say the the sort of current political 
situation 
Practitioner C:  right 
Client D:  and the d w p err especially since they accused me of fraud by just falsifying 
my answers 
Practitioner C:  right 
Client D:  which does make me feel very vulnerable 
Practitioner C:  when were you accused of fraud 
Client D:  that was three years ago when they accused me of cohabiting 
Practitioner C:  okay 
Client D:  they cited four points of what they call evidence and they were all the 
opposite of what I’d said in  
Practitioner C:  right 
Client D:  my interview which was very frightening 
Practitioner C:  mmhmm yeah so that’s obviously leading you again one of the things to 
worry about (Lines 624-639) 
 
In this extract, the logic of preservation legitimates the closing down of issues 
articulated as risks by clients when the risks are not shared by the service. This issue with the 
‘d w p’ does not become a relevant risk and so the issue is closed down and progression 
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through the pro forma prioritised. The logic of preservation then emphasised risks to the 
service over other issues.  
 
3.3.2.2 Managing one’s own risks. 
The logic of preservation meant the risks to practitioners completing assessments and 
risks to the service became the main risks to reduce or, if possible, avoid. These risks could at 
times align with risks to clients but this was not always the case as indicated in extract 20. 
The dominance of the logic of preservation led to practitioners becoming preoccupied with 
managing their own risks which explains why the pro forma and service procedure structured 
the assessments. A large focus of the assessment was on obtaining recordable information 
which could later be reviewed for accountability purposes, and so a risk became not getting 
the information or completing the pro forma. The following two extracts acknowledge the 
importance of recording information and following protocols.   
Extract 21 
Practitioner A:  I’ll just write that in (Line 518) 
 
Extract 22 
Practitioner B:  what I’m gonna do now is um a risk assessment this is a standard procedure 
this’ll be routinely conducted whilst you remain in our service (Lines 197-
198) 
 
The logic of preservation was particularly evident when clients reported suicidal 
thoughts as the following extract shows.  
Extract 23 
Practitioner C:  I just wanna check as well that you have got things like the err the other 
support numbers that we give out to clients 
Client F:  yeah 
Practitioner C:  um things like the crisis team numbers do you have you been given those 
Client F:  yes I’ve got all them yeah 
Practitioner C: and do you keep them on your phone or somewhere safe where you can 
Client F:  they are logged in they are logged into me phone 
Practitioner C:  ah that’s brilliant okay hopefully you’ve got the main crisis number team 
number which is a a sort of um a seven day a week twenty-four hours a day 
Client F:  yes I’ve got that yeah 
Practitioner C:  okay you’ve got that somewhere I mean it’s useful to put it on your phone 
also put it on a card somewhere where you can access it just in case you need 
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it or to give it to someone that you can trust that you can you know could 
also have access to to support if needed okay 
Client F:  yeah 
Practitioner C:  okay so we’ll continue on with the assessment (Lines 359-373) 
 
Extract 23 shows one way of managing risks was to provide support numbers to 
clients. This extract shows how the logic of preservation worked to prioritise providing these 
numbers over considering if the client would use them or further exploration of the suicidal 
thoughts. This suggests providing such numbers was one way of managing risks that came 
about from the practice of completing risk assessments. Considerable discursive effort was 
spent here ensuring the client had these numbers and they were accessible which became 
‘brilliant’.  
 Another way of managing risks and ensuring preservation was obtaining assurances 
from clients that they were not at risk as seen in extract 24. This extract occurred after the 
client had mentioned self-harming and a previous suicide attempt. He said he had not called 
the crisis numbers he had when he self-harmed and said his self-harm had ‘come out of the 
blue’. The practitioner had subsequently asked if he had made any plans to end his life and he 
sighed and said ‘no and yes’. He explained he had been ‘stashing’ pills in case he developed a 
serious physical illness and that he knew how to kill himself. There was a clear 
acknowledgement of contingency from this client then and the practitioner asked if he could 
reduce his risk through reducing the number of tablets he had in his house, but the client felt 
he had access to whatever he wanted should he decide to attempt suicide. At this point the 
practitioner asked the client to rate his intention to act on his suicidal thoughts. 
Extract 24 
Practitioner A:  okay so if I were to say this is a bit of a strange question to be asked but… if 
I were to say out of ten how likely is it that you might act on these thoughts 
in the near future um nought meaning I’m not going to as things are 
Client B:  right 
Practitioner A:  you know taking out the equation of of serious illness or of wheelchair 
Client B:  yeah yeah 
Practitioner A:  and um ten being you know imminent um would you be scoring on that scale 
at the moment 
Client B:  err it would on the acting on the thoughts I’d put it pretty low 
Practitioner A:  yes so would it be zero 
Client B:  nought or one yeah err um err yeah nought or one (Lines 306-315) 
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This extract shows how the logic of preservation could also involve contingency 
management through bracketing things like ‘serious illness’ or being in a ‘wheelchair’. 
Obtaining a numerical rating of likely future action enabled the assessment to move on from 
suicidal thoughts and so having this information recorded managed the risks to the 
practitioner. The logic of preservation made it difficult to not provide a numerical rating. The 
initial response of ‘pretty low’ was met with the suggestion of ‘zero’ which was modified to 
include some possibility of acting on the thoughts by giving the rating ‘nought or one’. This 
shows how acknowledging contingency resists the logic of preservation.  
The logic of preservation led to recording information as a way of managing the risks 
to the practitioner and service should this person go onto take his own life. It could then be 
demonstrated that he had been assessed but not fully disclosed his level of risk. This would 
obviate the practitioner and service of any blame. This shows how the logic of preservation 
created an incentive to get clients to say the right things as opposed to actually helping with 
the primary risk issue. From this view, the pro forma prioritises minimising the risk of 
reputational damage instead of reducing the risk of suicide, so the object of the risk 
assessment becomes avoiding potential damage to the organisation instead of avoiding 
potential damage to the client. Despite the rating of ‘nought or one’ the question what if this 
client was not aware of his own risk of suicide remains, especially as his previous self-harm 
came ‘out of the blue’. The logic of preservation then presents a considerable challenge to the 
process of supporting people who may be, as in this case, feeling suicidal. Its attempt to 
manage contingency, like all attempts, is doomed to fail.  
 
The logic of preservation was also evident when treatment options were discussed as 
shown in extract 25. 
Extract 25  
Practitioner B:  I teach you the techniques and I can teach you the intervention ultimately it’s 
about how much time you put into it in in in terms of sort of achieving results 
and making those changes so do you think that’s something you could try  
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Client E:  yeah definitely (Lines 686-690) 
 
Here, the client became accountable for treatment not helping. The practitioner can 
only ‘teach’ the techniques and intervention and so it is up to the client if this will prove to be 
helpful. This works to absolve the practitioner of any responsibility for the treatment not 
being successful and grants responsibility to the client. This may be linked with discourses of 
choice that featured at times in the assessments analysed where clients were offered a choice 
of interventions despite not having any prior knowledge of them. Perhaps clients choosing 
interventions was another way of managing risks to the service and avoiding blame as the 
intervention was not recommended by the practitioner but chosen by the client. The choice of 
intervention may reflect the importance choice is given within market based principles and so 
be important within the commissioning context and overarching regime of competition. 
However, the choice was a restricted one and, at most, involved choosing between different 
forms of short term psychological therapy including counselling, cognitive behavioural 
therapy and interpersonal therapy; or choosing between cognitive behavioural therapy offered 
in different formats such as face to face sessions, workshops, telephone sessions or online 
programmes. 
 
3.4 Political Logics 
As introduced in the results overview, political logics work to create alliances 
between social actors linked to a given social practice. In the assessments analysed, various 
social actors were involved. At the level of the empirical material, there were the practitioners 
and clients. The practitioners were operating within an IAPT service provided by an NHS 
Foundation Trust in partnership with a national charity. The service was located within what 
can be characterised as a regime of competition to describe the way in which NHS Trusts, 
third sector organisations and private companies compete to win contracts to provide services 
for a limited period of time. Clinical Commissioning Groups are in charge of funding 
services and so occupy a privileged role in the provision of services.  
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Political logics of equivalence and difference were in evidence in relation to the 
logics of well-oiled administration and preservation. Being administratively efficient was 
linked with being a well-run service likely to be recommissioned, in this way they worked to 
create an equivalential identity between the service and commissioners. The same was also 
the case for preservation whereby the risk to the service was conceived in terms of the risk of 
not being recommissioned. As such, there was a need for the service to align with the 
specifications of commissioners in order to remain active as a service. These social logics 
then, with this political inflection, created a context where the discursive practices functioned 
to enable some alliances and disavow others. An equivalence between clients and 
practitioners, or clients and services, was a difficult one to achieve and necessarily remained 
subordinate to an equivalence between commissioners and the service. The social logics of 
well-oiled administration and preservation acquired their significance within this regime of 
competition and commissioning context. It became necessary to be administratively efficient 
as an organisation and to manage risks effectively to survive.   
 
3.4.1 Logic of equivalence.  
Utilising Howarth’s (2000) elaboration of these political logics, the logic of 
equivalence works by dissolving the particularities of individual identities through creating 
an oppositional force. In relation to the assessments analysed, a logic of equivalence could 
hypothetically work through the creation of an alliance or equivalential identity between 
clients and practitioners with the opposing force being an identified risk, such as a risk of 
suicide or mental health problems. The providing service could form part of this equivalential 
chain and if this were the case the client (c), practitioner (p) and service (s) would be made 
equivalent (c=p=s) in opposition to the risk (r). This would take the form of (r = – (c, p, s)) 
where the specific differences between the client, practitioner and service disappear, and they 
become negated or blocked by risk (hence the minus sign), and so united in opposing it.  
Indeed, there were instances of a logic of equivalence in the assessments analysed as 
shown in extracts 26-28. 
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Extract 26 
Practitioner A:  is it okay…if I ask you some more risk questions that are quite direct really 
but just to really make sure we understand…what’s happening for you (Lines 
245-248) 
 
Extract 27 
Practitioner B:  just gaining some information from you about your current level of need so 
we can determine sort of the best way forward in terms of future treatment 
for yourself (Lines 7-8) 
 
Extract 28 
Practitioner C:  if I can just ask you some more questions about those types of thoughts…just 
to check that you’re okay (Lines 159-161) 
 
The above extracts provide examples of equivalences between practitioners and 
clients indicating some residual possibility for this within risk assessment practice. The 
discourse here focused on help clients may need, ensuring clients were okay and finding out 
about any real risk. The questions asked were acknowledged as potentially direct in extract 26 
but justified through claims they helped ensure an understanding. This implied a benevolent 
therapeutic situation between practitioner and client and thus a benign alliance.  
 
3.4.2 Logic of difference. 
 However, the dominance of the logics of well-oiled administration and preservation 
revealed a different picture where the priority was on being recommissioned through being 
administratively efficient and managing risks to the service, with the risks to clients not being 
the sole or dominant concern. The assessments analysed were therefore better characterised 
as being structured by a logic of difference owing to the overarching regime of competition. 
The logic of difference provides an explanation of how a discursive order, such as a regime of 
competition within mental health care, expands through breaking down chains of 
equivalence, such as the hypothetical chain illustrated above. In this case, the logic of 
difference works by weakening the opposition to the risk of suicide or mental health 
problems through extending different identities and objectives for the relevant social actors, 
such as practitioners having a pro forma to complete and the need for the service to be 
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administratively efficient in order to be recommissioned. In this context, being a client led 
service is only one of a series of competing objectives. This logic of difference then may lead 
to an expansion of the regime of competition. This helps to explain instances in the empirical 
material where risk assessment was introduced as an administrative task, not a clinical one, as 
shown in extracts 29-30. 
Extract 29 
Practitioner A: um the question we ask everyone is whether you feel you could be a risk to 
anybody else at all (Line 764) 
 
Extract 30 
Practitioner C:  I’ve just got some other added questions relating to risk (Line 109) 
  
These extracts acknowledge the administrative aspects of the assessment; questions 
are asked to ‘everyone’ or because practitioners have them on the pro forma. This highlights 
a difference between administrative and clinical processes with the administrative prioritised 
in line with the logic of well-oiled administration. The logic of preservation also accorded 
with this logic of difference as it showed different risks exist for different social actors. The 
service had to manage a risk of not being recommissioned and so ceasing to exist within the 
regime of competition. Being administratively efficient emerged as a way of managing this 
risk. The social practice of risk assessment, another way of managing risks, created risks for 
practitioners whose reputations and roles could be influenced by their engagement with this 
practice. It also positioned clients as potential threats through interfering with the smooth 
functioning of well-oiled administration or through acts such as committing suicide whilst 
receiving support from the service. 
The tension between these issues is well illustrated in extract 31. By this point, the 
client had mentioned a previous suicide attempt, self-harm, ‘stashing’ some pills for old age, 
as well as knowing how to kill himself.  
Extract 31 
Practitioner A:  I understand what you’re saying but um in your words you said it’s actually 
quite dangerous for you to have that stash what do you what do you feel 
might be dangerous about it for you 
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Client B:  well I was thinking I was pre-empting what ha what was probably going 
through your head actually 
Practitioner A:  okay okay what do you think might be the dangers for you though having 
that 
Client B:  um we-we-well I guess if err if if the self-control thing went 
Practitioner A:  yeah 
Client B:  I’m not so sure about the self-harm 
Practitioner A:  yeah 
Client B:  although I get the suicide thoughts I don’t think I’m likely to act on them  
Practitioner A:  okay 
Client B:  um but I’m aware that just having them there is dangerous but then like I say 
I’ve got really sharp knives for the bush craft err but I don’t act on that so 
that’s I don’t I’m not that worried 
Practitioner A:  um I know what you mean yeah okay is there anything you think you could 
do to sort of reduce that risk at all 
Client B:  of 
Practitioner A:  you know in terms of having that number of tablets in the house 
Client B:  oh right but but um thing is but um I don’t you know my alcohol 
consumption’s stayed down and I don’t take drugs but if I needed to get 
something I could get it anyway 
Practitioner A:  yeah I hear what you’re saying 
Client B:  just because I’ve 
Practitioner A:  so you don’t feel in your mind having those tablets there puts you at any 
more risk 
Client B:  no and this is horrible to say but because I’ve done the service user stuff so 
much and I know a lot of people I can pretty much go and get what I wanted 
you know 
Practitioner A:  yeah 
Client B:  drug wise and anything and not that I ever have or I’ve got any plans to 
Practitioner A:  but you have access if you chose to 
Client B:  yeah I think I wouldn’t have any problems at all 
Practitioner A:  okay so if I were to say this is a bit of a strange question to be asked but…if I 
were to say out of ten how likely is it that you might act on these thoughts of 
of taking your life in the near future… (Lines 278-308) 
 
In this extract the client’s discourse became problematic. The client indicated an 
awareness of this through ‘pre-empting’ a ‘stash’ of medication being dangerous to the 
practitioner, given his suicidal thoughts. This client’s discourse here interfered with well-
oiled administration and possible damage to the organisation was prioritised over damage to 
the client through attempting to control the situation and manage contingency which the 
client resisted. The focus then shifted to obtaining information that could later be reviewed as 
a way of avoiding blame, should this client commit suicide, by asking him to rate the 
likelihood of acting on these thoughts. The logic of difference therefore encouraged 
managing risks to the service over risks to the clients. It created practices that subordinated 
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supporting people with their mental health or potential risks to the risks posed to practitioners 
and the service that come from interacting with clients. 
 
3.5 Fantasmatic Logics 
 The articulation of the logics of well-oiled administration and preservation, combined 
with consideration of the logics of equivalence and difference, provided an explanation of the 
rules that underpinned the assessments as they were analysed and how they related to the 
regime of competition they were situated within. Considering fantasmatic logics takes this 
one step further through enabling an understanding of what drove practitioners’ engagement 
in the process of completing the assessments. Fantasmatic logics offer a way of accounting 
for the energy invested in this practice through narratives of fantasy that structure conscious 
or unconscious enjoyment. These narratives contain beatific and horrific dimensions as 
elaborated below. 
 
3.5.1 The beatific. 
Articulating beatific fantasies helps to describe the way in which fantasy narratives 
structured around ideals of complete social harmony or efficiency capture and direct energy 
towards pursuing such goals. These goals, of course, are never fully realisable as they contain 
the promise of a removal of contingency from the world. This could be seen within the 
assessments analysed in relation to the social logics of well-oiled administration and 
preservation. When inflected at the beatific level, well-oiled administration became idealised 
as a perfect system of administrative care. This fed into the ultimate ideal of the service being 
abundantly resourced and recommissioned indefinitely, with risks easily managed and 
contingency completely concealed. From this view, the service became a well-oiled 
administrative machine.  
The pro forma embodied this beatific fantasy through portraying a straightforward 
question and answer process that led to a simple decision being made determining suitability 
for the service and the support needed. Beatific fantasies led to risk assessment taking on 
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omnipotent qualities as an infallible, flawless process of assessment able to correctly identify 
people’s level of need and any risks. A thorough and dutifully completed assessment became 
a form of insurance for practitioners and a way of ensuring protection from the service. This 
enabled the service to fulfil the role of guarantor as a caring other for practitioners and so 
reduced any anxiety linked to contingency. Practitioners’ enjoyment in the practice of 
assessment was structured by their perceived closeness to this ideal. The extracts below 
provide examples of assessment being a way identifying the ‘right level of support’ and 
checking clients are ‘safe’. This also constructed risk assessment as being solely in the 
interests of clients. 
Extract 32 
Practitioner B:  okay so what I’m gonna do now…is a risk assessment 
Client E:  yeah 
Practitioner B:  and this is a standard procedure and will be routinely conducted whilst you 
remain in our service this is to ensure the safety of yourself and to make sure 
that you’re gonna you know you’d receive the right level of support if there 
was any risk identified (Lines 204-208) 
 
Extract 33 
Practitioner C:  we do carry out risk assessments just to make sure that err everybody we see 
is okay okay 
Client F:  mmhmm yeah 
Practitioner C:  it’s just to check out how you’re currently feeling and so that we can give 
you the right level of care (Lines 74-76) 
 
This infallible view of risk assessment, and the protection and insurance it offered 
practitioners, produced an enjoyment in the process and an ongoing investment in it. This was 
informed by a beatific fantasy of the ‘right level of support’ or ‘care’ being available and 
something the client will receive once identified. This could involve being referred to another 
service if the risk was too high as shown in extract 34. 
Extract 34 
Practitioner A:  whatever level of service you need that's deserved 
Client B:  um I do feel I need some help though but I don't feel I'm a I'm an emergency 
at the moment 
Practitioner A:  no that's I I don't feel that either it's more whether we need some sort of in 
the middle middle range or whether you could wait for treatment with us 
Client B:  yeah (Lines 820-824) 
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The service presumably was the bottom range in contrast with a ‘middle range’ and 
‘emergency’ service. Together, these services form part of a perfectly benevolent system of 
mental health care provided to deserving clients. This provided a certain enjoyment in the 
process of assessment although this fantasy was threatened here by the existence of waiting 
times. 
 When the pro forma and process of assessment was cooperated with, this led to a 
smooth instantiation of the social logics and fed into the idealised view of a perfect system of 
well-oiled administration. Clients fitting around the service in this way instead of the service 
having to fit around clients could generate a conscious enjoyment in the assessment as seen in 
extract 35 where it was ‘nice’ to not have to explain. 
Extract 35 
Practitioner B:  what would you like to um achieve or or aim to achieve from us 
Client C:  um I’d to perhaps work on like learning to rethink the way I think… 
Practitioner B:  …okay so that’s quite a good goal falls within the criteria of smart 
goals…it’s nice when you haven’t got to explain it to someone 
Client C:  ha ha 
Practitioner B:  it’s almost like you knew that we would be looking for the smart goals that 
we support (Lines 652-665) 
 
When clients did not fit so easily around the service, risk assessment became an 
essential component of a benign, well-oiled administration able to easily manage future risks 
as shown in the extracts below.  
Extract 36 
Practitioner C:  so what we need to look at is ways perhaps to help you manage your mood 
differently to stop triggering those types of [suicidal] thoughts (Lines 255-
256) 
  
Extract 37 
Practitioner C:  it’s really just a case of getting you in the right service (Line 711) 
 
These extracts show risk assessment practice as a way of finding out what the right 
service was for a client, or identifying types of thoughts that can then be stopped. The beatific 
fantasy here shows how services could provide a promise of fullness capable of putting a stop 
to any suicidal thoughts.  
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A well completed assessment offered protection in the form of insurance. A well-
documented pro forma and risk assessment therefore enabled the service to take on the 
function of guarantor for practitioners. This offered protection from the risks involved in the 
practice and so from the anxiety associated with contingency. This is shown in the extract 
below which followed the client reporting feeling confused about having suicidal thoughts 
and thoughts of self-harming despite trying to stay positive, get his flat sorted and think life is 
still worth living.  
Extract 38 
Practitioner A:  well sometimes people have those kinds of thoughts as a as a kind of almost 
you know final option almost but not one that they want to like an insurance 
policy if it ever got that bad if I was in a wheelchair it almost has this kind of 
insurance policy  
Client B:  mmm 
Practitioner A:  feel to it (Lines 331-335) 
 
Although responding to the client, this idea of insurance showed an important 
function of risk assessment more generally, it provides a form of insurance for the assessor. It 
reduces anxiety in the assessor by providing protection from blame. This functions to 
generate an enjoyment in the process. In this case, this could take the form of reporting the 
client had rated his intention to act on his suicidal thoughts as nought or one out of ten (see 
extract 24) so what more could be done. Completing the pro forma, and risk assessment 
questions in particular then, was an important way of managing the risks posed to 
practitioners and the service from clients and thus ensuring preservation. 
 
3.5.2 The horrific.  
Horrific fantasies also work by generating energy but in a different direction. Instead 
of an idealised vision they present a threat that needs to be curtailed to prevent the 
catastrophic decline of an individual, system or wider social order. This threat manifests in 
the idea of the obstacle which, alongside beatific fantasy, was an important aspect driving 
investment in the process of risk assessment which became a way of dealing with such 
obstacles. Clients accessing the service whose risks were ambiguous and who may then go 
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onto engage in a risk behaviour like killing themselves became an obstacle. Taken further, 
this may lead to the decline of professional reputation and status, and for the service the 
horrific fantasy of not being recommissioned. At a milder level of gradation, clients who 
were difficult to assess became a nuisance and difficulty completing the pro forma or risk 
assessment, through a lack of clear information, an obstacle. An additional threat became the 
lack of resources available within the service as indicated by waiting times which challenged 
the fantasy of the perfectly efficient administrative system.  
There was an enjoyment in risk assessment practice when clients became obstacles 
through presenting risks to the service. The horrific fantasy involved the client committing 
suicide and the service becoming accountable for this due to an inadequate risk assessment. 
This generated an investment in risk assessment practice as a way of managing risks to the 
service. Additionally, a failure in assessment took on horrific dimensions with the possibility 
of denying access to those who met service criteria or granting access to those who did not. 
This can be seen in extract 39 where the risk was ambiguous and so the client became an 
obstacle. 
Extract 39 
Practitioner C:  do you ever feel that life is not worth living 
Client D:  yeah 
Practitioner C:  …have you made any plans to end your life 
Client D:  um when are we talking about… 
Practitioner C:  well um first of all recently has that been something that  
Client D:  no not recently 
Practitioner C:  okay so you've I presume that you have had thoughts like that in the past then 
Client D:  yes 
Practitioner C:  okay so how long ago would that be 
Client D:  um three years 
Practitioner C:  about three years ago okay um what what were you thinking 
Client D:  um well I was um well I was being made homeless by the d w p they accused 
me of cohabiting  
Practitioner C:  right 
Client D:  when I wasn't and um I couldn't find a way out of it and it was the only the 
the it seemed like there would be only one solution which 
Practitioner C:  that that seemed like the only solution  
Client D:  yeah 
Practitioner C:  to you so what what were you thinking of doing to yourself  
Client D:  oh just hanging myself or something 
Practitioner C:  right okay did you did you get as far as making any preparations or 
Client D:  no 
Practitioner C:  anything like that 
Client D:  no 
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Practitioner C:  okay what what stopped you from following that 
Client D:  um um I suppose I managed to find somewhere else to live so the they had to 
drop  
their allegation 
Practitioner C:  so it was that your circumstances changed 
Client D:  yeah 
Practitioner C:  and you felt better and you felt you were having less of those types of 
thoughts 
Client D:  well I had somewhere to go to so there was a  
Practitioner C:  yeah 
Client D:  I wouldn't say I felt a lot better to be honest but 
Practitioner C:  okay okay…[risk assessment continues]… on a scale between nought and ten 
how likely is it that you’d do anything like that at the moment… 
Client D:  um well again there’s two parts to it if my mum is 
Practitioner C:  yeah 
Client D:  alive it’s a nought 
Practitioner C:  given how okay so given given how things are now that would be zero (Lines 
165-251) 
 
Thirty-one questions were asked about this client’s risk of suicide and self-harm. The 
assessment concluded with the client rating his intention to act on his suicidal thoughts. The 
number of questions asked shows enjoyment in this social practice linked to the way in which 
risk assessment both concealed contingency and protected the practitioner. This was most 
evident from the recording of the client’s intention to act on suicidal thoughts as zero. The 
client’s acknowledgement of contingency – it is only a nought if his ‘mum is alive’ – was 
overlooked. He was not asked what his intention would be should his mother not be alive. 
This contingent obstacle was dealt with by focusing on the zero, minimising contingency and 
so managing risks. 
Clients who interfered with the smooth operation of the social logics could therefore 
become obstacles. One way in which this was evident was through not providing clear 
information as shown in extract 40. 
Extract 40 
Practitioner A:  what about now how are you feeling now you say you have these thoughts 
are they actual thoughts of wanting to end your life or are they thoughts of 
just wishing it was different can you tell me what you’re thinking now 
Client A:  um thoughts of wishing it was different thoughts of getting away from it all 
um thoughts of going somewhere for two or three months closing my eyes 
and and hoping that when I open them up and go back that everything’s 
gonna be okay but 
Practitioner A:  yeah yeah okay so you have thoughts of wishing it was different and that 
you could just walk away from it all in some way 
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Client A:  yeah 
Practitioner A:  okay do you actually have thoughts at the moment of wanting to harm or kill 
yourself 
Client A:  no no (Lines 102-112) 
 
This extract shows ambiguous information was problematic. Ambiguity became a 
nuisance that led to efforts to extinguish it. The practitioner stated there could be a potential 
risk with this client, linked to his children witnessing his wife punching and kicking him. His 
wife had recently had a stroke and was receiving support from another service. The 
practitioner said this could become a safeguarding concern but encouraged this to be shared 
with the other team as shown in extract 41. Here, this issue became a potential risk which was 
dealt with by attempting to displace it onto this other team. This may have been linked to a 
fantasy of a perfectly administered network of mental health care including other services. 
However, the regime of competition may generate an enjoyment taken in competitive and 
rivalrous relations with other services. This may bring about practices aimed at making risks 
and obstacles another service’s responsibility.  
Extract 41 
Practitioner A:  I think it is really worth sharing and obviously it could become a concern if it 
was happening and the children were witnessing that 
Client A:  mmm 
Practitioner A:  you know it could really become a safeguarding issue 
Client A:  yeah 
Practitioner A:  so I think I’d really encourage you to talk to her team about that as well 
(Lines 654-659) 
 
An obstacle also emerged in the form of waiting times which challenged the image of 
the idealised administrative system linked to a beatific fantasy of the NHS as a fully 
resourced service able to unconditionally meet people’s needs. An acknowledgement of 
waiting times threatened this image and presented a horrific alternative of services being 
constrained and based on severity of need as shown below. 
Extract 42 
Practitioner A:  um I will check um with my supervisor afterwards about what um what their 
view is in terms of a sensible treatment option for you if you like that in that 
takes into account the level of risk your feeling at the moment 
Client B:  yes I’m aware there’s a score you know if you don’t hit the right score you 
don’t get certain stuff er I fully understand that and I don’t you know 
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Practitioner A:  yeah it’s not so much and I bet it does feel that way it’s not so much if you 
don’t hit the right score it’s because there is a waiting time for us 
Client B:  oh I know and I know how everything’s been cut so um you know I’m aware 
of that  
Practitioner A:  we don’t we certainly don’t want to kind of put you on a waiting list if 
you’re feeling more like you need help now 
Client B:  um 
Practitioner A:  um because this risk is um you know a concern what’s your sense of that if 
you for example if at the end of the assessment we did think about putting 
you on the waiting list for treatment but you had to wait three or four months 
do you feel that would be safe in doing that or do you think you would need 
something sooner than that to keep safe 
Client B:  um I I possibly think I’d be I dunno how to answer that I think I would be 
okay but I do want something (Lines 420-436) 
 
This shows a threat to the perfectly efficient administrative system in terms of a lack 
of resources as well as a client whose risk is a concern, thus providing a confrontation with 
horrific fantasy. This was managed by encouraging the client to share the dilemma and make 
his own assessment which led to the client framing his difficulties around the institutional 
workings of the service and gave the practitioner a sense of the risks the service face if he 
was to be on the waiting list and not supported for ‘three or four months’. It also managed the 
risks to the service through an explicit statement from him that he thought he ‘would be 
okay’. 
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Chapter 4: Critical Explanation 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides a critical explanation of the social practice of risk assessment. 
It does this through revisiting the key arguments developed in the thesis and discussing 
implications of the risk assessments studied. Counter-logics are then projected for the 
purpose of critique and as part of an imagining of an alternative social practice to the risk 
assessments seen here. The chapter then reflects on the thesis itself, considering the approach 
used and the particular application that has been developed here. The chapter concludes by 
considering potential future research and by providing some reflections on my own position 
as researcher. 
 
4.2 Retracing the Research 
Following prefatory remarks and some initial consideration of the research context 
and strategy, this thesis began in earnest with an archaeological and genealogical 
problematisation of risk assessment. The archaeological work involved approaching risk 
assessment contextually, examining problematic aspects of risk assessment and consideration 
of its consequences. This showed an explosion of discourse about risk and risk assessment 
which began in the 1980s, grew during the 1990s and continues to proliferate. This occurred 
alongside the emergence of clinical governance within the NHS which included an obligation 
for services to have clear policies linked to potential risks and systematic risk assessment and 
management programmes (McSherry et al., 2011). Key elements of a market-based system 
were introduced in the 1990s and have been extended in recent NHS reforms (Glynos et al., 
2015). Currently then, a competitive commissioning process structures the provision of 
mental health services, whereby service providers compete with each other to win service 
provision contracts and clear risk assessment and reduction programmes are an expectation of 
services.25 
Within actual clinical practice, a therapeutic relationship has been redefined to 
incorporate risk assessment as an essential component, and risk assessment has become 
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embedded within the day to day practices of mental health services (Department of Health, 
2011). This research examined one such daily practice, duty screening assessment within an 
IAPT service. IAPT grew out of the liberal, utilitarian work of Layard and was linked with 
clinical governance and the increasing significance of NICE (Clark et al., 2009). IAPT 
services were established to provide psychological therapies for common mental health 
problems such as anxiety and depression. The treatments IAPT services provide are not 
considered appropriate for those with significant risk issues which creates an additional 
incentive to assess risk in this competitive commissioning context. 
When considering risk assessment in more detail however, a number of problems 
emerged. Firstly, risk assessment has not been shown to lead to an accurate prediction of 
levels of risk. Indeed, accurate prediction of risks, such as the risk of suicide, has been 
described as impossible (The Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2008). Different methods of risk 
assessment have been developed and employed partly in response to the limited accuracy of 
risk assessment. The two dominant approaches have been clinical and actuarial approaches 
(Lamont & Brunero, 2009). Clinical approaches involve professionals making a judgement 
after an assessment and actuarial approaches involve using specific tools to identify factors 
known to be associated with particular risks.  
Neither clinical nor actuarial approaches however have been able to resolve the 
problem of inaccuracy. Clinical approaches have been critiqued for being subjective and 
unreliable. Actuarial approaches suffer from base rate problems. As the behaviours being 
assessed are rare within the population, like suicide and violence, the majority of people these 
assessments identify as being a risk actually turn out to be false positives and so not a risk 
(Duggan, 1997). Actuarial tools therefore show that risk behaviours are not statistically 
predictable for individual patients. Owing to the problems with both clinical and actuarial 
approaches, a combination of the two has become the preferred method of risk assessment 
although of course this has not fully resolved the problem of accuracy (Lamont & Brunero, 
2009). Other problems involve obtaining accurate and comprehensive information to inform 
the assessment, potential disagreement between actuarial and clinical aspects and accurate 
107 
 
assessment of risk does not necessarily lead to a reduction or prevention of the risk 
behaviour. 
Another problem seen with risk assessment was that some risks are prioritised over 
others, particularly the risks posed by people accessing mental health services towards 
themselves or others. However, this is based on an assumption that these people pose more of 
a risk than the general population which epidemiological research has problematised (Wand, 
2012). The risks people face from coming into contact with mental health services become 
side-lined despite including a potential loss of liberty though mental health legislation, forced 
treatment or ineffective treatment (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014). Prioritising the risks posed by 
people who access mental health services to themselves or others encourages other risks these 
people face to be marginalised, such as the risk of inadequate accommodation or not being 
allowed to make decisions that involve taking risks as other people may typically do. Risk 
assessment also leads to a focus on the risks posed by individuals and so overlooks risks that 
may come from living in particular communities, such as communities that experience higher 
levels of poverty, unemployment and substance abuse.  
Some additional consequences of risk assessment described were that patients 
become a source of threat to professionals, and with the contemporary cultural emphasis on 
accountability and litigation, professionals become preoccupied with managing their own 
risks (Power, 2004). Risk assessment in this context encourages professionals to develop 
skills in managing the risks to their reputation rather than the primary task for which they are 
employed. Risk assessment then generates anxiety in the assessor and can become a form of 
insurance for professionals who may make decisions from the perspective of having to later 
justify and defend the decisions taken in court (Undrill, 2007). An over reliance on risk 
assessment within mental health services may also maintain the problematic association 
between mental illness and danger and so exacerbate stigma (Szmukler, 2003). Other 
consequences were that it can take time away from building a therapeutic relationship and 
provide a false sense of security that risks have been comprehensively assessed and 
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understood. Risk assessment may also lead to a concealing of contingency and uncertainty, 
that are here viewed as inherent to both social structures and human subjects.  
Genealogical work led to a consideration of risk assessment’s ignoble beginnings. 
This showed that risk assessment as a social practice emerged, and became sedimented, 
within the era of community care. The Christopher Clunis case became a focal point for 
contestation over the policy of community care. The report into the investigation of the 
killing of Jonathan Zito by Christopher Clunis produced an image of Clunis as a madman that 
needed to be feared yet also a victim of a mental illness requiring care (Ritchie et al., 1994). 
The creation of risk registers, registers of patients who were or were likely to be at risk of 
serious violence, suicide or self-neglect, was one recommendation amongst many. Yet this 
recommendation was quickly formalised into governmental guidance and led to services and 
key professionals becoming responsible for obtaining detailed information about patients’ 
potential risks (Department of Health, 1994a, 1994b).  
This reliance on risk information and risk registers was problematised by key social 
actors and this problematisation echoed the problematic aspects of risk assessment described 
in the archaeology and summarised above. Key concerns were that the risk criteria were over 
inclusive and so would lead to many patients being included who would not go onto become 
a risk, and again problems of inaccuracy were highlighted (Caldicott, 1994). Placing people 
on a risk register was said to be counter-therapeutic and potentially reduce people’s desire to 
access services. The process was felt to be time consuming and would reduce other aspects of 
clinical care. There was also a concern about mental health professionals being viewed as 
agents of social control, and the registers creating a situation where professionals could be 
blamed if there was a serious incident involving someone not on the register. Despite the 
concerns, the risk registers were introduced and risk assessment became an expectation 
within mental health services and increasingly formalised. Consideration of a related incident 
a few years earlier where social worker Isabel Schwarz was killed by Sharon Campbell had 
not led to an articulation of the need for risk assessment in the same way (Spokes et al., 
1988). Following the introduction of risk assessment within mental health, it continued to 
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grow in importance throughout the 1990s and into the present day. The contemporary 
significance placed upon risk assessment was well illustrated with the publication of the Best 
Practice in Managing Risk where a therapeutic relationship was re-described to include an 
objective assessment of risk (Department of Health, 2007). 
After the archaeological and genealogical problematisation of risk assessment, this 
thesis turned towards day-to-day clinical practice through an analysis of risk assessments 
completed as part of duty screening assessments within an IAPT service in primary care. Six 
of these assessments, which were completed over the telephone, were audio recorded, 
transcribed and analysed using a logics approach. This led to the articulation of two key 
social logics, the inflections of which were considered in relation to the more formal political 
logics of equivalence and difference, and the beatific and horrific dimensions of fantasmatic 
logics. The two key social logics were a logic of well-oiled administration and a logic of 
preservation. 
The logic of well-oiled administration involved a bureaucratic focus on getting one’s 
papers in order. This logic structured much of the overall assessment and privileged 
obtaining and documenting information. This meant clients had to fit around the institutional 
workings of the service. This involved facilitating administrative processes and their 
difficulties being framed around service processes, such as the pro forma and questionnaires. 
The analytical skill of practitioners was also marginalised. They became tied to the pro forma 
used to structure the assessments and had less opportunity to use their analytical judgement. 
The logic of well-oiled administration also involved asking people to remain the same 
through the management of any contingency. This was done by treating clients purely as 
rational actors, minimising complexity and overlooking context.  
The logic of preservation involved identifying risks where some issues were 
conceptualised as risks whilst others were not. The risk of suicide was given particular 
attention. Issues were turned into potential threats to practitioners and the service and these 
threats were then managed in particular ways. This logic captured how the risks to 
practitioners and the service took precedence and so managing one’s own risks took centre 
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stage. A large focus of the assessments involved obtaining recordable information that could 
later be utilised for accountability purposes. A risk therefore became not completing the pro 
forma fully and so the duty screening assessments became very much pro forma led. Risks 
were managed by providing clients with support numbers and obtaining assurances from 
clients that they were not at risk. Offering clients restricted choice in relation to treatment 
decisions was also evident as a way of aligning with market based principles currently 
dominant in health care and so managing a risk to the service. In short, risk assessment 
became about avoiding potential damage to the organisation rather than avoiding potential 
damage to the client. 
At the level of political logics, the duty screening assessments were structured by a 
logic of difference whereby any chains of equivalence between clients, practitioners and the 
service were broken down by the commissioning context. A regime of competition structures 
the service operations with Clinical Commissioning Groups acting as an occupying power 
through their ability to select organisations to provide services. This logic of difference 
creates a difficult context for supporting people and may work to expand market based 
principles within health care. The logics of well-oiled administration and preservation can be 
considered consequences of this competitive commissioning process. 
When fantasmatic logics were considered, the reason for investment in risk 
assessment as a social practice became more comprehensible. Beatific fantasies produced an 
idealised image of the perfectly efficient administrative system that operates smoothly and 
leads to the service being abundantly resourced and recommissioned indefinitely. Risk 
assessment took on infallible qualities as a straightforward way of identifying any risks that 
could then be quashed. A dutifully completed assessment offered protection for practitioners 
as a form of insurance from the risks and contingencies involved in this social practice. This 
enabled the service to take on the role of guarantor as a caring other for practitioners. Horrific 
fantasies also generated an investment in risk assessment as a way of dealing with any 
obstacles that arose. Horrific fantasies involved a break down in assessment which led to 
clients being granted access who did not meet the service criteria or clients being denied 
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access who met the criteria. The ultimate threat was a client committing suicide whilst 
accessing the service with the service being held accountable. Clients therefore became 
obstacles through the potential for them to cause reputational damage to practitioners or the 
service, with failing to be recommissioned the ultimate threat. At a milder level of gradation, 
any interference with the smooth operation of these social logics such as the appearance of 
context, potential risks or contingency became a nuisance and so an obstacle to extinguish. 
 
4.3 Implications for the Social Practice of Risk Assessment 
 The articulation of the logics structuring the social practice of risk assessments is not 
a statement on the truth of risk assessment practice but an attempt at making the empirical 
material intelligible in line with a view of the social world as radically contingent. The 
articulation should be considered in terms of its ability to provide a valid explanation of risk 
assessment practice within the context studied. This means the articulation offered applies not 
to risk assessment practice generally across mental health settings and elsewhere, but to this 
particular practice of risk assessment as part of duty screening assessments completed within 
primary care. The present findings should not be seen as accurately representing risk 
assessment practice in alternative contexts. They may be relevant but this would have to be 
demonstrated through a process of articulation linked to the different contexts. Three 
implications of the logics posited here will now be considered. 
 
1. Clients disappear in their actuality and become obstacles known in terms of the 
risks they pose 
The logics of well-oiled administration and preservation led to clients being made to 
fit around service criteria. The practice relied upon and prioritised administrative process like 
completing the pro forma and questionnaires. This worked to marginalised practices that may 
involve ‘knowing’ clients in their actuality including the complexity of their lives and their 
pasts. Contextual information became noise so extraneous to administrative process and 
discursively closed down. This disappearance of clients aligns with what Castel (1991) refers 
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to as a shift from the clinic of the subject to the epidemiological clinic, which involves a 
move from a “concrete relationship with a sick person…[to] a relationship constituted among 
the different expert assessments which make up the patient’s dossier” (p. 282). 
Clients became known in terms of the risks they posed which extended the myth of 
risk assessment’s infallibility and, depending on the risks perceived, could lead to clients 
becoming obstacles. It is hard to see how this context can be one which works to support 
people with the actual issues conceptualised as risks. Although this may happen and there 
were instances where equivalences could be seen between practitioners and clients, the 
practice and logics articulated present a significant challenge to this. The emphasis was on 
preservation of practitioners’ roles and reputations and minimising damage to the service 
rather than damage to clients.  
This thesis therefore provides empirical support for Power’s (2004) description of 
secondary risk management where social actors engaged in risk assessment become 
preoccupied with managing their own risks that emerge from the process rather than the 
primary risks they are employed to manage. This was evident in the assessments analysed. 
Dutifully completing and documenting risk assessments served to protect practitioners from 
possible future blame, linked to uncertainty, and allowed the service to take on the role of 
guarantor. Reciprocally, this process also managed risks to the service. To return to Power’s 
(2004) description of this: “In such a cultural environment, with institutions which tend to 
amplify blame and the logic of compensation, it is rational for organisations and the agents 
within them to invest in management systems with a strong secondary risk flavour” (p. 41). 
This could be at the expense of clients and so shows an unintended consequence to the social 
practice of risk assessment, one which contradicts its stated aim. 
 
2. Administrative processes subordinate clinical judgement and generate practices 
of self-assessment 
Administrative process predominated. The practice and logics involved worked to 
reduce the need for analytical judgement on the part of practitioners who could become tied 
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to the pro forma. This manifested in practitioners taking on more of a technical role and the 
clinical aspects of their role being marginalised. The emphasis was on recording information 
which worked to minimise the risks to the service through explicit statements from clients 
that they did not pose a risk. The clearest example of this came from clients rating their 
intention to act on suicidal thoughts on a scale from nought to ten. This prioritising of 
administration may reflect what Rose calls a transformation of professional subjectivity 
where: 
it is the individual professional who has to make the assessment and management 
of risk their central professional obligation. They have to assess the individual 
client in terms of the riskiness that they represent, to allocate each a risk level, to 
put in place the appropriate administrative arrangements for the management of 
the individual in the light of the requirement to minimize risk, and to take 
responsibility – indeed blame – if an ‘untoward incident’ occurs. (Rose, 1998, p. 
184)   
This research provides support for this view as risk assessment and management dominated 
the clinical encounters studied. Where Rose’s focus was on governmentality, the extension of 
administration was made intelligible here by the practice of assessment offering protection, 
whether real or imagined, to the social actors involved owing to the overarching competitive 
commissioning context.  
This social practice managed risks to the service and led to clients being encouraged 
to share the responsibility for assessing risk through a form of self-assessment. It is tempting 
to see this as clients being given a greater say over their involvement with mental health 
services and so, to invert Jewson’s (1976) classic phrase, the reappearance of the sick man 
within medical cosmology. However, as argued above, this is not the discourse of the sick 
man as a totality but a fragmented discourse generated by service specification prioritising 
managing its own risks. Perhaps this is better understood then through Foucault’s description 
of Bentham’s Panopticon where the architectural design meant prisoners could be subject to 
permanent surveillance without knowing when they were being observed, and so come to act 
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as if they were continually being observed. This technology meant a subject would “inscribe 
in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection” (Foucault, 1991, pp. 202–203). Although a different context 
with important nuances, perhaps risk assessment practices generating a form of self-
assessment does have significant elements of these power arrangements with clients 
inscribing discourses of risk. In this sense, risk discourse becomes part of the canon of mental 
health service users’ discourse (cf. Speed, 2007). From a slightly different angle, the guards 
in Bentham’s prison did not need to be physically present due to the architectural 
arrangements. Risk assessment as a social practice may perform a similar function with the 
practices in place enabling an invisibility for the commissioning context which governs the 
practices seen.  
 
3. Extension of market based principles within health care 
The logic of difference that operated within the empirical material meant different 
identities and tasks were extended for the social actors involved so being a client led service 
became one of a series of competing objectives. This was linked to the regime of competition 
that the service operates within whereby any qualified provider – private, public or third 
sector organisations – can bid for contracts provided by Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(Sanderson, Allen, & Osipovic, 2016). Risk assessment and management featured as a crucial 
practice within this context as a way of preventing damage to the service and so maintaining 
its commercial viability. Risk assessment practices therefore work to maintain the hegemony 
of market based principles currently structuring health care.  
While only one aspect of this research and further empirical work would be required, 
other services did feature within the analysis. These other services could form part of a 
beatific fantasy of a perfect system of mental health care but also part of a horrific fantasy 
where other services appear as rivals and so enjoyment is taken in making clients who emerge 
as obstacles another service’s responsibility. Further empirical work would be needed to 
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better elucidate this including detailed analysis of practitioner discourse and service practices 
relating to the interface with other services. 
Risk assessment practices also worked to legitimise under-resourced services. Risk 
assessment became a way of ‘knowing’ how urgent clients’ needs were to receive support 
and so assisted decisions about service suitability. Instead of waiting lists being 
conceptualised as indicating a lack of resources, waiting lists were accepted as a ‘reality’ and 
converted into another measure for gauging someone’s level of risk, i.e. would they be safe 
whilst being on a waiting list for three or four months. In this sense, waiting lists became 
useful and so discourses contesting a lack of resources were minimised. 
Choice was also evident in the assessments analysed, although the choice was a 
restricted one and involved choosing between cognitive behavioural therapy delivered in 
different formats or between different forms of short term psychological therapy. The 
provision of choice in this way positioned clients as consumers as well as people with 
common mental health problems and so worked to extend market based principles. This 
competitive context and extension of market based principles encouraged risk assessment and 
management practices which prioritised managing risks to the service which at times 
occurred at the expense of clients. To consider the possibilities for combatting this and the 
other malign implications of risk assessment practice in its current forms, counter-logics will 
now be articulated. 
 
4.4 Projection of Counter-logics 
The social logics of well-oiled administration and preservation structured the practice 
of risk assessment within the empirical material. These logics complement and so extend the 
regime of competition they are situated within. This does not mean that risk assessment 
within IAPT services will always look the same or be dominated by these two social logics to 
the same extent. It is likely that the dominance of these two social logics will vary and some 
practitioners may well reject or challenge them. The articulation of these social logics 
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assumes they are worthy of being contested and speaks to the logics approach as a form of 
critical explanation with critique being a key aspect. 
 
4.4.1 Practices. 
To facilitate critique, counter-logics can be described and contrasted with the 
dominant logics to offer critical potential. Here, two counter-logics are proposed to contrast 
the dominant logics seen within risk assessment practice. The counter-logics relate to the 
level of practice as opposed to the level of regime. To clearly differentiate the practice 
studied and the projected practice, it may be necessary to develop a new nomenclature to 
move beyond current understandings of risk. Here, a notion around clinical perceptions of 
risks is offered as a more appropriate way of thinking about the practice of trying to 
understand risks, or at the very least risk assessment could be reformulated as intelligent risk 
assessment. Two logics are projected into the social practice of perceptions of risks, a logic of 
contingency and a logic of care as shown below in table 3. 
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Table 3 
 Logics and counter-logics 
Administrative Risk Assessment Clinical Perceptions of Risks  
  
Logic of well-oiled administration Logic of contingency 
Risk assessment viewed as essential, 
unproblematic and capable of accurately 
assessing risks 
Risk viewed as contingent and assessment 
as imperfect perceptions of risks 
Clients treated as rational, knowing subjects 
aware of their risks 
Perceptions include clients’ perspectives 
and practitioners’ 
Reliance on pro forma and standardised 
questions 
Does not use pro forma or standardised 
questions 
Context and complexity obscured or 
minimised 
Risk behaviours considered contextually 
and within the context of people’s lives, 
complexity accommodated  
Homogenous approach to risk assessment, 
focused on obtaining information 
Risk perceptions follow clients leads and so 
varies in practice 
Risk assessment indicates service provision Does not dictate the service provided in 
isolation from other issues 
Clients fit around pro forma and service Perceptions of risks adaptive to clients 
Practitioners’ analytical skill obscured Practitioners develop expertise over time 
  
Logic of preservation Logic of care 
Practitioners define risks and close down other 
issues 
 
Certain areas asked about like suicidal ideas 
and aggressive feelings and followed up if 
necessary, openness to issues clients see as 
risks 
Risks to practitioners and service prioritised Prioritise supporting people with ‘risk’ 
issues through attempting to understand 
Clients become obstacles Risk or clients’ difficulties become 
obstacles 
Risk assessment becomes insurance for 
practitioners, emphasis on recording 
information 
Perceptions of risks one aspect of the care 
someone receives, emphasis on the 
interaction having possible clinical benefits 
Focus on avoiding future blame, incentive to 
get clients to say the right things 
Practitioners reflect on own role in 
assessment process 
Risk assessment and management seen as 
infallible 
Openness to contingency and the 
impossibility of preventing some risk issues 
Risk assessment brings risks for the assessor Practitioners not held accountable for 
‘inaccurate’ perceptions of risks, supported 
institutionally 
 
Table 3 provides a comparison of the social logics articulated from the empirical 
material and the projected social logics of contingency and care articulated here as making up 
the practice of clinical perceptions of risks. The logic of well-oiled administration presented 
risk assessment as essential, unproblematic and capable of accurately assessing risk. Clinical 
perceptions of risks would begin from a contingent view of risk with assessment being 
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incapable of accuracy and so the practice being better defined as one of perceptions of risks. 
This involves the soberer position that a perfect system of risk assessment can never be 
realised. A logic of contingency invites risk to be pluralised to risks to allow both clients and 
practitioners to develop their views on what the ‘risks’ are for someone and how significant 
they are. This logic rejects the use of a pro forma and standardised questions, and expects, 
accommodates and explores complexity and contradiction. Particular issues seen as risks are 
attempted to be understood by considering the context in which they occur and in relation to 
the context of people’s lives, not just focusing on the recent past. This opening up of 
complexity works against the ‘beautiful promise’ offered by the logic of well-oiled 
administration of risk assessment being a discrete, limited task. It means more issues could 
potentially be articulated as risks but the crucial element would not be for anything and 
everything to be potential risks but for the clinical to be reoriented above the administrative, 
and so issues conceptualised as risks would be clinically not administratively informed. 
The logic of well-oiled administration treats clients as rational, knowing subjects 
aware of the risks they pose and face. Contingency, context and complexity is denied, 
obscured or minimised and clients have to fit around the institutional workings of the service 
including the proforma. The assessment indicates service suitability and due to its 
homogenous structure, obscures the analytical skill of practitioners. The logic of contingency 
would lead to a varied practice in clinical perceptions of risks and risk issues alone would not 
dictate the service someone received. Instead risks would be integrated within other aspects 
of clinical care. The logic of contingency would provide less structure and guidance for 
practitioners and so the practice would become a clinical skill that practitioners develop over 
time. This would challenge the expanding administrative aspects of practitioners’ roles. 
Mitigating the threat of the horrific, such as a catastrophic training error putting the service at 
risk, would require an ongoing articulation of the limitations and imperfections of the social 
practice of clinical perceptions of risks and alternative protection of the social actors 
involved. It would also require an articulation of this fallibility within commissioning 
practices, and so a greater tolerance of uncertainty and contingency which could be achieved 
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through directly challenging current commissioning practices or working around them as 
discussed further below. 
 Clinical perceptions of risks would also be structured by a logic of care which would 
involve asking about important areas in people’s lives like suicidal ideas or feelings of 
aggression. These areas would be opened up for clients to discuss without being introduced 
as a risk assessment. This would follow a client’s lead and not be completed as an 
administrative duty. If there was no clinical indication for ongoing exploration this would 
become unnecessary. The logic of preservation prioritised the risks to practitioners and the 
service from completing risk assessments. This involved practitioners and the service 
defining what constituted a risk and risk assessment itself was viewed as infallible. The logic 
of care counters this stance and prioritises supporting people with particular issues viewed as 
risks. This is done through attempting to understand the issue from the client’s perspective 
and so requires an openness to clients and the issues they see as risks as well as issues 
practitioners see as risks for clients, not for themselves or the service. This requires an 
acknowledgement of the limitations or fallibility of clinical perceptions of risks and so a 
supportive stance towards practitioners who do not become accountable if someone does go 
onto harm themselves or others. It is suggested here that an openness to understanding 
enables consideration of risks to become more properly integrated within clinical care, rather 
than an isolated part of an assessment process. Nevertheless, the logic of care does not 
assume omnipotent qualities and reflects on the reality that some risk issues will continue to 
occur despite practitioners’ and services’ best attempts to prevent this. 
The logic of care also encourages practitioners to reflect on their role in the process 
which may include their own experience of the clinical encounter as well as ways in which 
they may have influenced the client’s engagement. This was not evident within the logic of 
preservation where clients could become obstacles to the process and an incentive to get 
clients to say the right things was evident. This was linked to the fact that a well-documented 
pro forma and risk assessment could become a means of insurance for practitioners even if 
this was just a way of managing the anxiety associated with horrific fantasies of damage to 
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their professional reputation from poorly completed assessments. The logic of care frees up 
practitioners from this anxiety through articulating perceptions of risks as imprecise and so 
limiting opportunities for blame. 
 
4.4.2 Regimes. 
The above counter-logics are focused on the social practice of risk assessments. This 
is therefore aimed at what could pragmatically be considered a micro level issue. As 
described in the analysis however, the social logics articulated were closely linked with the 
commissioning context in contemporary mental health practice, characterised as a regime of 
competition due to the influence of market based ideas. The projected social logics of 
contingency and care are clearly a challenge to this dominant regime of competition. 
Considering a regime as a system of practices elevates regimes to a more macro level. It may 
therefore be that an intervention at the level of practice is constrained by this regime of 
competition which may serve to blunt any radical potential offered by this alternative 
practice.  
It is therefore important to contest the regime of competition as well as the practice of 
risk assessment. This necessitates consideration of political logics which work to contest, 
transform and institute practices (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). It is beyond the scope of this 
research to comprehensively engage with this issue but one way of contesting a regime of 
competition would involve an alliance between key social actors in opposition to the market 
based principles informing health care and an articulation of alternative demands. In short, a 
hegemonic struggle. Hypothetically, this could involve clients, practitioners, researchers and 
so on forming a chain of equivalence in opposition to market based principles within mental 
health care. This would involve drawing upon the discursive resources available to produce 
an alternative project. In addition to the counter-logics posed, two such discursive resources 
are the logic of care and the politics of uncertainty discussed below.  
One alternative to a direct challenge to the hegemonic structure could involve 
attempts to work around it. One example of this can be seen in the regulation of competition 
121 
 
within the NHS since the introduction of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (Sanderson et 
al., 2016). The introduction of such legislation may have little effect on the ground due to 
being absorbed within existing practices. For example, mergers have progressed despite 
reducing competition as they have been seen to promote high quality services and regulators 
have taken on the role of translating between NHS and competition authorities informally to 
avoid mergers being subjected to competition law (Sanderson et al., 2016). This shows that 
working around the regime of competition or articulating discursive resources such as ‘high 
quality services’ provide alternative means of contestation.26 
Market based logics can be contrasted with health care logics as articulated by Mol 
(2008) in The Logic of Care. Here, Mol, studying the practices involved in the treatment of 
diabetes contrasts the logic of care with the logic of choice and shows how choice, a market 
based idea, is incompatible with important aspects of health care and so a challenge to the 
provision of quality health care: 
Articulating the logic of care is an attempt to contribute to improving health care on 
its own terms, in its own language. A language in which the main emphasis is not on 
autonomy and the right to decide for oneself, but on daily practices and attempts to 
make these more liveable through inventive doctoring. In care-specific terms, care is 
bad when people are being neglected. When there is not enough time to listen. When 
physical parameters are isolated from their context; when patient’s daily lives are not 
taken into consideration. (Mol, 2008, p. 84) 
Although discussing the treatment of, and life with, diabetes, this may have a family 
resemblance to mental health care and problematises the influence of market based ideas in 
health care. Her thesis also suggests a need for articulating the elements that constitute quality 
health care from within clinical discourse without uncritically accepting all aspects of clinical 
thought. This work therefore provides a useful counter to the regime of competition.  
Another useful way of contesting the regime of competition can be found in Power’s 
(2004) discussion of the need for a politics of uncertainty. Power calls for a political 
discourse of uncertainty that rejuvenates expert judgement, enables critique and develops a 
122 
 
discourse that acknowledges the possibility of failure. This would involve debunking the 
myth of perfect manageability in favour of “necessarily imperfect, humanly designed and 
operated, risk management systems [that] continue to support an engagement with 
unknowable futures” (p. 58). This could foster an honest engagement with the unknowable 
future and minimise the expansion of secondary risk management.  
Taken together, the logic of care and politics of uncertainty provide an alternative 
way of engaging with risk assessment practice within mental health care. Combining these 
with the counter-logics articulated above contests the regime of competition and provides 
alternative possibilities for practices within mental health care. These alternative possibilities 
are not new ideas but lay dormant within already existing practices as seen in the fleeting 
glimpses of an equivalence between clients and practitioners in the empirical material. This 
articulation can be considered an excavation of them that hopefully contributes to their 
revitalisation and the possibilities this would open up.  
 
4.5 Considering the Logics Approach and its Present Application 
Howarth (2000) provides a pragmatic way of evaluating research utilising discourse 
theory which involves considering the persuasiveness of the argument constructed and its 
influence within the research community. This involves consideration of consistency and 
coherence but also a discursive account’s ability to “add new and interesting insights to their 
various objects of investigation” (p. 141). The shape and tenor of judgement of this research 
then extends beyond my own evaluation of this study to the research community. However, 
some consideration of the strengths and limitations of the study will be offered.  
One strength of this research was the empirical material it utilised. This allowed for 
the routinised, everyday practices within an IAPT service to be analysed. Much research 
within the qualitative tradition draws upon interview data which helpfully allows for 
consideration of subjects’ self-interpretations which can then be utilised in various ways, e.g., 
contextualised or analysed discursively. What this generates then is an analysis of what actors 
say about the practices they are involved in as opposed to an analysis of the actual practices 
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and this line of research has been critiqued for insufficiently attending to the role of the 
interviewer (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). This research was novel in this regard as it captured 
the actual clinical practice of completing risk assessments.  
This also points to a limitation as interviews were not completed and so the ability to 
comprehend subjects’ interpretations of their involvement in risk assessments was limited.27 
Completing interviews with practitioners would have provided more material to consider 
when attempting to articulate the various logics. This is particularly relevant with fantasmatic 
logics which here attempted to provide an explanation as to why practitioners engage in the 
practice. This was based on the empirical material and observations but being able to hear 
from practitioners directly as to how they interpret their involvement would have added a 
further useful dimension to enhance the understanding offered which should therefore be 
considered provisional and tentative. However, the view here would be that such 
interpretations would need to be contextualised and understood in connection with radical 
contingency and the view that people may not be fully aware of why they participate in a 
particular practice. This study would therefore have benefited from interviews being 
completed with practitioners to discuss various aspects of risk assessment practice including, 
for example, the way practitioners conceptualise their use of the pro forma. This would also 
have been able to shed light on reasons why some practitioners may not have wanted to take 
part, with only four of ten practitioners participating and thus a longer than anticipated period 
for obtaining recorded assessments. When discussed during the observation day, some 
practitioners expressed concerns about not having the time to read the information about the 
study and fears that taking part may have a detrimental impact on their job security. This 
would need to be explored further to be better understood yet suggests an anxiety about the 
implications of an inadequately completed risk assessment, in line with the fantasmatic logics 
specified.  
The present application of the logics approach was also a novel use of this relatively 
recently developed framework where the majority of research has engaged with policy issues. 
One study has utilised the logics approach to analyse board room interactions in terms of the 
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ontological dimensions of social space (Thompson & Willmott, 2015). West (2011), an 
advocate of the logics approach, considers it in relation to what is termed a materialist turn in 
social and political research, and argues that “a more materialist engagement with practices 
has the potential to assist the post-structuralist logics approach in the delivery of its critical 
agenda” (p. 415). Attending more closely to practices is said to advantageously allow a fuller 
engagement with their complexity and offer utility in understanding political agency.  
West (2011) draws upon material semiotic relationality to describe how social 
practices within the logics approach can take on a singular quality with the social logics of a 
practice emphasised over “activities, things that are done, embodied and materially 
furnished” (p. 420). This can lead to social practices being overlooked in favour of logics and 
regimes which may marginalise the nuanced minutiae of practices. West calls for further 
empirical exploration of the logics approach and “more subtle understandings of practices 
and the multiple realities and goods they enact and the more silent work of hegemony” (p. 
429). While West’s critique may lead to a focus on analysing empirical material such as risk 
assessment practice, interestingly it also applies to the articulation developed here. This is 
one useful critique of the logics articulated then, that there has been a reduction in complexity 
through the analytic process and an “explaining away [of] multiplicity” (p. 422).  
While the logics articulated here may have involved explaining multiplicity away, 
this was viewed as worthwhile in attempting to critically explain the dominance of 
problematic aspects of risk assessment practices and the commissioning context in which 
they are situated. It is also felt that the social logics articulated provide an important insight 
into the way a practice ostensibly defined as a benign way of supporting subjects with risks 
they may face is in contrast structured by a prioritising of managing reputational damage to 
the service. Nevertheless, this work may be assisted by ethnographic work that looks more 
minutely at the complexity of risk assessment practices including the way in which the social 
logics articulated are variously resisted or rearticulated.   
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4.6 Future Research 
This research has indicated several avenues of related work that could offer useful 
developments, contrasts or rearticulations which will now be rehearsed. As suggested, this 
research would have benefited from interviews being completed with the social actors 
involved. In a move to prioritise practices, this research somewhat neglected the self-
interpretations of actors other than as was evident in the assessments analysed or through the 
observations completed. Interviews with practitioners could shed light on their 
conceptualisations of the pro forma and practice of risk assessment, and interviews with 
clients could further explore the issue of being made to fit around the service, the loss of 
context and the inscription of risk discourse including self-assessment. The research also 
pointed towards the significance of exploring the relationship between services to better 
understand how the regime of competition may structure these relations. Some questions of 
interest include: do issues of rivalry become enacted between services? What practices are 
involved in people being referred to other services due to issues of risk? What constitutes 
constructive cooperation between services? 
This research was also completed within a primary care setting and so it is likely that 
significant differences exist within related settings like secondary care settings in the 
community or inpatient environments. It would be of interest to explore family resemblances 
to consider whether the social logics posited here have application in these alternative 
contexts. This research also suggested that it would be helpful to elucidate the elements that 
constitute quality care within mental health through drawing upon clinical discourse as a way 
of combatting the imposition of elements from a market-framed discourse. This may involve 
a focus on process rather than outcome. It may also be useful to restore the visibility of the 
commissioning context through examining commissioning practices and interviewing 
commissioners to see how risk assessment practices are interpreted and enacted at this regime 
level. 
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4.7 The Position of Researcher 
One element of the counter-logic of contingency involved practitioners developing 
expertise in the practice of clinical perceptions of risks over time. This aligns with the view 
that researchers using a logics approach develop their analytical judgement through practice 
across cases and as they become increasingly familiar with the theoretical concepts. This 
includes knowing at what point to fix the practices investigated in order to characterise them 
in an analytically useful way rather than attempting to describe their totality. This was my 
first piece of research using the logics approach which undoubtedly influenced the analysis 
produced as it involved attempting to understand the motley array of theoretical concepts and 
how to articulate them in relation to the empirical material. Fortunately, the research 
benefited from my research supervisors being experienced qualitative researchers including 
with the logics approach. 
As a social actor, while writing this thesis, I was located within the field of clinical 
psychology and so the varying discourses connected to this discipline: cognitive, behavioural, 
psychodynamic, systemic, social constructionist and so forth. While writing this research, I 
was engaged in delivering psychological therapies (cognitive-behavioural, cognitive-analytic 
and psychodynamic) as part of my training in clinical psychology and working in various 
contexts. This influenced my approach to the project and my engagement with the issue of 
critique. I was aware of being a subject enacting the practices I was simultaneously 
critiquing. Rather than aiming at a state of fragmentation, my aim was to produce an 
integrative piece of research that took the importance of critique seriously and was able to 
problematise the taken-for-granted daily practices within my field in a way that could speak 
to and inform clinical practices with the necessary antagonism. The extent to which this has 
been fruitful remains for others to judge.  
 
4.8 Reflexivity 
This research emerged from my own experience of working within IAPT and thus 
from an engagement with the practices I have here critiqued. It was also influenced by my 
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continued engagement with clinical work and practices including risk assessment during my 
training in clinical psychology. As I hope is clear, my aim was not to produce a project that 
criticises clinical work from the outside, seeing practitioners as agents of the state or as 
governed by malign forces for example, but to develop a meaningful engagement with 
clinical work that usefully draws upon ideas from a range of disciplines with the overall aim 
of improving practices. Hence, my elaboration of clinical perceptions of risks outlined above.  
Having completed this research, my own view on clinical work is that it remains a 
valuable activity that is multifaceted, complex and varied. It is influenced by a wide range of 
factors, at present this includes problematic systemic issues such as the regime of competition 
described and the increasing focus on accountability and blame. Good intentions can often 
get lost in this context. This project has led me to the conclusion that paying attention to 
risks, including negotiating what constitutes a risk and for who, is an important and integral 
part of clinical work, and can be enhanced by a greater openness towards the idea of radical 
contingency and through reflection on its own limitations as a clinical endeavour. It seems to 
me there is a danger of risk assessment descending into a static, bureaucratic process that 
focuses on managing risks to the reputation of services and professionals rather than the 
actual risk issues that assessments were initially designed to understand and reduce. I see a 
need for an ongoing critical reflection on these issues to improve practices surrounding risks 
and thus the overall support provided to people accessing services. I hope to take some of this 
with me in my own perceptions of risks in my future clinical work, drawing upon and 
refining the elements I outlined above as linked to a logic of care and a logic of contingency. 
I also believe future research, such as the ideas suggested in section 4.6, is a vital part of this 
process and will help shed further light on ways of improving clinical work and risk 
practices, and I hope this thesis has been a contribution in this respect.  
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Footnotes
1 NICE have since altered their name to the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(n.d.) to reflect that they provide guidance in the areas of public health and social care. When 
IAPT was initially set up it related to aspects of the NICE guidelines in use at the time, 
emphasising treatments for mild to moderate depression and anxiety disorders (NICE, 2004a, 
2004b). 
2 NICE guidelines specify a range of other interventions at step 2 and step 3 for depression 
and anxiety, including other therapies such as Interpersonal Therapy. IAPT services differ in 
their provision of recommended treatments but what they do provide is informed by these 
guidelines. They also provide treatments for other issues including post-traumatic stress 
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder and panic disorder. 
3 By discourse here, I am referring to discursive (i.e., textual, linguistic) and non-discursive 
(i.e., material, practices) elements, in short, the entire social space. 
4 These professional groups are, of course, far from being homogenous entities with theories 
and ideas being in a continuous state of flux. However, it is helpful to keep this network of 
competing professions in mind and to reflect on the hegemony of psychiatric discourse in the 
area of mental health.  
5 For a historical overview of the development of the quality agenda within psychotherapy 
and mental health, as well as key political milestones, see McPherson, Richardson and 
Leroux (2003). 
6 Glynos, Speed and West (2015) make the case that the empty signifier integration served as 
a master political logic in these reforms which normalised provider-blind provision and 
obscured important ideological influences.  
7 It is worth noting that the mental health act is not actually about mental health, but about 
controlling individuals seen as mentally disordered. It has been critiqued as “illogical and 
discriminatory only to legally control the risky behaviour of one defined social group 
(psychiatric patients) rather than of all citizens, independent of their mental state” (Rogers & 
Pilgrim, 2014, p. 225). 
8 These sensitivity and specificity values are unrealistically high – values of 80% are rarely 
achieved (Large, Ryan, Singh, Paton, & Nielssen, 2011). 
9 Recent focus on the area under the curve of the receiver operating characteristic curve has 
not resolved this problem and it remains the case that the better a test is at identifying true 
positives, the worse it will be at identifying true negatives (Szmukler, Everitt, & Leese, 
2012). 
10 This discourse takes the psychiatric, diagnostic approach of discrete mental illnesses for 
granted, an approach best understood as just one way of thinking about human distress and 
which obscures important and relevant moral, political and phenomenological issues (Rapley, 
Moncrieff, & Dillon, 2011). 
11 See Vassilev and Pilgrim (2007) for a discussion of the concepts of ‘trust’ and ‘risk’ in a 
broader argument that ‘mental health services’ are actually a myth and would be more 
accurately described as ‘social control of mental disorder services’. 
12 Like risk, uncertainty is a concept which has been understood differently across time and 
place. See Undrill (2007) for a distinction between different models of uncertainty. 
13 Foucault’s oeuvre has to be one exemplary of this, and Kuhn (2012) made an important 
theoretical contribution in a move away from a linear view of history as progress with his 
emphasis on paradigm shifts and truth being defined through consensus. In Psychology, 
Danziger (1994) and Richards (2010) have provided critical and reflexive histories.  
14 For a discussion of the role that race and gender played in relation to the reporting and 
investigation of this incident see Neal (1998).  
15 This review also referenced an incident involving Ben Silcock, who, also diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, was badly mauled after climbing into the lion’s den at London Zoo (The 
Guardian, 1993). 
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16 For a helpful analysis of the framing of the Clunis and Schwarz incidents in newspaper 
coverage see Paterson (2006). Paterson shows the success of the Clunis incident in being 
reframed in terms of social policy as opposed to personal tragedy. 
17 At the time, the NSF was a charity campaigning for people affected by schizophrenia (now 
known as Rethink Mental Illness). SANE was also initially established to campaign on behalf 
of people with schizophrenia. Jayne Zito went onto establish the Zito Trust (n.d.), a charity 
which focused on protecting the public from people with mental illness and advocated 
community treatment orders.  
18 For a genealogy of the care programme approach see Hawksley (2013). 
19 Two distinct ways of analysing discourse predominate within psychology, these are 
approaches which have grown out of the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) and the work of 
Parker (1989). 
20 Positivism has a long and complex history and many contemporary mainstream researchers 
are unlikely to refer to themselves as positivist researchers. 
21 An in-depth review of this critique is beyond the scope of this project, but see Steinmetz 
(2005b) for a philosophical engagement with positivism and alternative epistemologies. 
22 Howarth (2000) describes the four theoretical traditions of discourse theory as being 
Marxism, structuralism, analytic philosophy and psychoanalysis, all being understood within 
a poststructuralist frame. 
23 Although, as should be clear, the way in which this data will be understood will move 
beyond subjects’ own interpretations. 
24 The participating IAPT service provided permission for an anonymised version of the pro 
forma to be included as part of this research. 
25 While competition structures the provision of services, it may not be applied in a 
straightforward manner. Sanderson, Allen and Osipovic (2016) discuss how the nature of 
health care activities can lead to quasi market practices rather than full market practices 
where for instance quality and safety may be prioritised over choice and competition.  
26 Sanderson et al. (2016) interestingly point out that the most recent NHS strategy document 
‘Five Year Forward View’ fails to mention competition or the market perhaps indicating a 
decline in the competition imperative, although they do state that the new regulatory regime 
cannot be easily reversed.  
27 See Godin (2004) for interview based research on risk assessment practice. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
 Information included on practitioner consent form. 
Please initial each statement to indicate you consent with it 
 
I have read and understood the project information sheet, version number 1.2, 
dated 09/05/2015 
 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I agree to take part in the project. I agreed for my assessment to be recorded 
and  
I agree that this can be used for research purposes. 
 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at 
any time and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to 
take part. 
 
Use of the information I provide for this project only 
 
I understand my personal details will not be revealed to people outside the 
project. 
 
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports and other 
research outputs. 
 
I understand that my real name will not be used in this project. 
 
Use of the information I provide beyond this project 
 
I agree for the audio recording of the assessment to be archived at the UK 
Data Archive. 
 
I understand that other genuine researchers will have access to this data only 
if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in 
this form. 
 
I understand that other genuine researchers may use my words in publications, 
reports and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve 
confidentiality as requested in this form. 
 
So we can use the information you provide legally 
 
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project to 
the University of Essex. 
 
Name of participant [printed]  Signature           Date 
 
 
Researcher [printed]               Signature                 Date 
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Project contact details for further information: 
Appendix B 
 
 Anonymised practitioner information sheet. 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in some research. Before you decide, I would like to 
explain why the research is being carried out and what it involves for you. I am available to 
go through the information sheet with you and answer any questions you have. It should take 
around 10 minutes to read this sheet. Feel free to speak to others about the research if you 
want to. Part 1 tells you about the research and what will happen if you take part and part 2 
gives more detailed information about the research. 
 
Please ask if there is anything unclear. 
  
Part 1 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The aim of this research is to look at the way risk assessments are completed within 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) services. Risk assessments involve 
clinicians asking a series of questions to gain an understanding of whether an individual is at 
risk of suicide, self-harm or neglect, or a risk to or from other people. The focus in this 
research is on analysing the assessment that takes place, not the individuals involved. It is 
hoped that this will provide a better understanding of risk assessment practice. This research 
is being completed as part of a professional doctorate in clinical psychology. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
No funding is being provided for the research. The research is being sponsored by the 
University of Essex. The sponsor is the organisation which takes on ultimate responsibility 
for the initiation, management of and financing (or arranging the financing) for that research. 
The sponsor takes primary responsibility for ensuring that the design of the study meets 
appropriate standards and that arrangements are in place to ensure appropriate conduct and 
reporting. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited as you are a practitioner who completes duty screening assessments. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide if you are willing to take part. I am available to discuss this 
information sheet with you if you have any questions or concerns. My contact details are 
provided below. You will be asked to sign a consent form if you do agree to take part. You 
are free to withdraw at any time and do not have to give a reason. This will not affect your 
employment in any way.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you choose to participate, a day would be spent observing your routine clinical practice and 
asking informal questions about the process. You would be provided with audio recording 
equipment and asked to record your duty screening assessments with your clients if they 
consent to this. This would be the only change to routine care provided. 
 
The research will use a qualitative research method called discourse analysis to study the 
assessments. 
 
Expenses and payments  
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Unfortunately, I do not have the funds to offer any incentive for participating in this study. If 
you choose to participate, a copy of the final project can be provided to you along with a 
summary of the main findings.   
 
What will I have to do? 
One day will be spent observing the work you do and asking informal questions about the 
process of completing duty screening assessments. You will be given audio recording 
equipment and asked to ask clients who receive duty screening assessments if they are willing 
to have the assessment recorded for research purposes. If people agree, you would be asked to 
audio record the assessment and provide a copy of the assessment to the researcher once the 
service has received a signed consent form for this.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no disadvantages or risks expected from participating in this study.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise the research will help you but it may help improve understandings of risk 
assessment practice. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
The audio recordings will be offered to the UK Data Archive to store securely for future 
qualitative research. The UK Data Archive is a centre of expertise for storing, managing and 
providing research data securely. They are responsible for the largest collection of research 
data used in the social sciences and humanities in the UK. More information about this is 
provided in Part 2. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any concerns about the way you have been treated then this will be dealt with 
accordingly. More information about this is provided in Part 2. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal recommendations and information about you will be 
handled confidentially. For more details, see part 2.  
 
If you are considering participating following the information in Part 1, please read Part 2 
before deciding. 
 
Part 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you decide you do not want to carry on with the study before the data has been analysed, 
the audio recording will be securely destroyed. There will be no negative consequences for 
doing this and you do not have to give a reason. However, in some circumstances it may not 
be possible to remove your data from the research. The only circumstances in which this 
would occur would be following submission of the project, publication of an article or 
following the UK Data Archive accepting the audio recordings for future research (see 
below). This means that it may not be possible to remove data after April 2016 when the 
project will be formally submitted to the clinical psychology department at the University of 
Essex. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If there are any complaints about the research, the lead researcher should be contacted using 
the contact information provided below. If you remain unhappy with the outcome of this 
contact and wish to complain formally, you can do so by contacting... In the event that you 
are still not happy, you should contact … 
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Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes your confidentiality will be safeguarded before and after the study. The researcher will 
only be given access to your contact information to discuss your participation.  
 
The researcher will be given copies of the signed consent forms and the audio recorded 
assessments. This data will be stored securely and transferred using encrypted, password 
protected devices. Any identifying information within the audio recordings will be made 
anonymous. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will be written up in article form and submitted to an academic 
journal for publication. A copy of this, along with a summary sheet, can be provided to 
participants. Please let the researcher know if you would like a copy. You will not be 
identifiable in the article unless you have given consent for your name to be used. The 
research will also be written up in a longer format as a thesis for the doctorate in clinical 
psychology programme. A copy of this will be stored in the Albert Sloman Library at the 
University of Essex. 
 
Following completion of the publication process, the audio recordings will be anonymised 
and offered to the UK Data Archive to be stored for future qualitative research. 
 
What is an archive? 
An archive is a secure place where data is stored indefinitely. Data may include paper records 
and increasingly electronic records are being stored by many archives. The UK Data Archive 
contains several thousand data sets. 
 
Why put information in an archive? 
Information is put into archives for many reasons. One reason is that it allows researchers to 
look at different aspects of the data. It allows other researchers to explore the data for many 
years to come and allows other researchers to check the way the initial research was 
completed. It can be expensive to complete research and so storing data may save money. 
Archives are also good places to keep data safe and secure as archivists are experts in 
protecting data. 
 
How do I know my data will be used ethically? 
Archivists will make sure that research participants are protected. They do this by ensuring 
that informed consent has been obtained to share data, that data has been made anonymous 
and by protecting access to data. 
 
What does anonymising mean? 
Anonymising means the removal of anything that could identify someone in the data. One 
way of doing this is changing the names of people and places. Personal contact details are 
never made available. 
 
How might data be used? 
Data can be used in many different ways. Other researchers may check the way the research 
was completed or look at different aspects of the data. 
 
Who owns the data and what is copyright? 
You will be asked to sign a copyright statement which means that the researcher will have the 
legal right to use your contributions on agreed terms. This means the researcher will be able 
to publish an article on the research which may quote some of your words. A researcher can 
sign a licence with an archive which allows the archive to distribute the material to other 
researchers. 
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How do archives store my data safely? 
Data will be stored in conditions that meet national and international security standards. Data 
has licences and controls to ensure that only authorised users are given access. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is considered by an independent group of people to protect 
participants. This is called a Research Ethics Committee. This research has been reviewed 
and agreed by ... 
 
Further information and contact details: 
 
For any further information or questions about the research please contact: 
 
 
Thank You! 
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Appendix C 
  
Content of practitioner script. 
 
Please read the following script to your clients when asking them to consider having their 
duty screening assessment with you audio recorded: 
 
‘Our service is currently taking part in a research project looking at these assessments. The 
research is being undertaken as part of a professional doctorate in clinical psychology. 
Would you be happy for this assessment to be recorded for research purposes? You do not 
have to agree and you can withdraw at any stage without any negative consequences. You 
will be sent full details of the research in the post and a consent form which you would have 
to return for the recorded assessment to be used in the research.’ 
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Appendix D 
 
 Information included on client consent form. 
 
 
Please initial each statement to indicate you consent with it 
 
I have read and understood the project information sheet, version number 1.2, 
dated 09/05/2015 
 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I agree to take part in the project. I agreed for my assessment to be recorded 
and  
I agree that this can be used for research purposes. 
 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at 
any time and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to 
take part. 
 
Use of the information I provide for this project only 
 
I understand my personal details will not be revealed to people outside the 
project. 
 
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports and other 
research outputs. 
 
I understand that my real name will not be used in this project. 
 
Use of the information I provide beyond this project 
 
I agree for the audio recording of the assessment to be archived at the UK 
Data Archive. 
 
I understand that other genuine researchers will have access to this data only 
if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in 
this form. 
 
I understand that other genuine researchers may use my words in publications, 
reports and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve 
confidentiality as requested in this form. 
 
So we can use the information you provide legally 
 
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project to 
the University of Essex. 
 
 
Name of participant [printed]  Signature           Date 
 
 
Researcher [printed]               Signature                 Date 
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Project contact details for further information: 
Appendix E 
 
 Anonymised client information sheet. 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in some research. Before you decide, I would like to 
explain why the research is being carried out and what it involves for you. I am available to 
go through the information sheet with you and answer any questions you have. It should take 
around 10 minutes to read this sheet. Feel free to speak to others about the research if you 
want to. Part 1 tells you about the research and what will happen if you take part and part 2 
gives more detailed information about the research. 
 
Please ask if there is anything unclear. 
  
Part 1 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The aim of this research is to look at the way risk assessments are completed within 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) services. Risk assessments involve 
clinicians asking a series of questions to gain an understanding of whether an individual is at 
risk of suicide, self-harm or neglect, or a risk to or from other people. The focus in this 
research is on analysing the assessment that takes place, not the individuals involved. It is 
hoped that this will provide a better understanding of risk assessment practice. This research 
is being completed as part of a professional doctorate in clinical psychology. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
No funding is being provided for the research. The research is being sponsored by the 
University of Essex. The sponsor is the organisation which takes on ultimate responsibility 
for the initiation, management of and financing (or arranging the financing) for that research. 
The sponsor takes primary responsibility for ensuring that the design of the study meets 
appropriate standards and that arrangements are in place to ensure appropriate conduct and 
reporting. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited as you recently agreed to have an assessment you received from an 
IAPT service audio recorded.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide if you are willing to take part. I am available to discuss this 
information sheet with you if you have any questions or concerns. My contact details are 
provided below. You will be asked to sign a consent form if you do agree to take part. You 
are free to withdraw at any time and do not have to give a reason. This will not affect your 
treatment in any way.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you choose to participate, your recorded telephone assessment and your signed consent 
form will be provided to me. The recording of the assessment would be the only change to 
routine care provided. 
 
The research will use a qualitative research method called discourse analysis to study the 
assessments. 
 
Expenses and payments  
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Unfortunately, I do not have the funds to offer any incentive for participating in this study. If 
you choose to participate, a copy of the final project can be provided to you along with a 
summary of the main findings.   
 
What will I have to do? 
The audio recording of the assessment, which you verbally agreed to, will be given to the 
principal investigator. You will be asked to complete and return a signed consent form to the 
IAPT service. The service will then provide the researcher with the audio recording.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no disadvantages or risks expected from participating in this study.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise the research will help you but it may help improve understandings of risk 
assessment practice. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
The audio recordings will be offered to the UK Data Archive to store securely for future 
qualitative research. The UK Data Archive is a centre of expertise for storing, managing and 
providing research data securely. They are responsible for the largest collection of research 
data used in the social sciences and humanities in the UK. More information about this is 
provided in Part 2. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any concerns about the way you have been treated then this will be dealt with 
accordingly. More information about this is provided in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal recommendations and information about you will be 
handled confidentially. For more details, see part 2.  
 
If you are considering participating following the information in Part 1, please read Part 2 
before deciding. 
 
Part 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you decide you do not want to carry on with the study before the data has been analysed, 
the audio recording will be securely destroyed. There will be no negative consequences for 
doing this and you do not have to give a reason. However, in some circumstances it may not 
be possible to remove your data from the research. The only circumstances in which this 
would occur would be following submission of the project, publication of an article or 
following the UK Data Archive accepting the audio recordings for future research (see 
below). This means that it may not be possible to remove data after April 2016 when the 
project will be formally submitted to the clinical psychology department at the University of 
Essex. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If there are any complaints about the research, the lead researcher should be contacted using 
the contact information provided below. If you remain unhappy with the outcome of this 
contact and wish to complain formally, you can do so by contacting… In the event that you 
are still not happy, you should contact… 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
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Yes your confidentiality will be safeguarded before and after the study. The service you 
received an assessment from will retain your contact information in line with their routine 
clinical practice. The researcher will only be given access to your contact information to 
discuss your participation. This information will be stored in the service.  
 
The researcher will be given copies of the signed consent forms and the audio recorded 
assessment. This data will be stored securely and transferred using encrypted, password 
protected devices. Any identifying information within the audio recordings will be made 
anonymous. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will be written up in article form and submitted to an academic 
journal for publication. A copy of this, along with a summary sheet, can be provided to 
participants. Please let the researcher know if you would like a copy. You will not be 
identifiable in the article unless you have given consent for your name to be used. The 
research will also be written up in a longer format as a thesis for the doctorate in clinical 
psychology programme. A copy of this will be stored in the Albert Sloman Library at the 
University of Essex. 
 
Following completion of the publication process, the audio recordings will be anonymised 
and offered to the UK Data Archive to be stored for future qualitative research. 
 
What is an archive? 
An archive is a secure place where data is stored indefinitely. Data may include paper records 
and increasingly electronic records are being stored by many archives. The UK Data Archive 
contains several thousand data sets. 
 
Why put information in an archive? 
Information is put into archives for many reasons. One reason is that it allows researchers to 
look at different aspects of the data. It allows other researchers to explore the data for many 
years to come and allows other researchers to check the way the initial research was 
completed. It can be expensive to complete research and so storing data may save money. 
Archives are also good places to keep data safe and secure as archivists are experts in 
protecting data. 
 
How do I know my data will be used ethically? 
Archivists will make sure that research participants are protected. They do this by ensuring 
that informed consent has been obtained to share data, that data has been made anonymous 
and by protecting access to data. 
 
What does anonymising mean? 
Anonymising means the removal of anything that could identify someone in the data. One 
way of doing this is changing the names of people and places. Personal contact details are 
never made available. 
 
Who owns the data and what is copyright? 
You will be asked to sign a copyright statement which means that the researcher will have the 
legal right to use your contributions on agreed terms. This means the researcher will be able 
to publish an article on the research which may quote some of your words. A researcher can 
sign a licence with an archive which allows the archive to distribute the material to other 
researchers. 
 
How do archives store my data safely? 
Data will be stored in conditions that meet national and international security standards. Data 
has licences and controls to ensure that only authorised users are given access. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is considered by an independent group of people to protect 
participants. This is called a Research Ethics Committee. This research has been reviewed 
and agreed by ... 
 
Further information and contact details: 
For any further information or questions about the research please contact: 
 
Thank You! 
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Appendix F 
 
 Example of transcription and early stages of analysis. 
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Appendix G 
Anonymised front sheet confirming ethical approval from NHS ethics 
committee. 
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Anonymised front sheet confirming ethical approval from research and 
development department of participating NHS trust. 
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Front sheet confirming ethical approval from the University of Essex. 
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